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This study investigates the climate-related vulnera-
bilities of agricultural communities in (post)occupa-
tion environments. Following the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (2012: 5), vulnerability is 
understood as the propensity or predisposition to be 
adversely affected by hazards or stresses, where cli-
matic stresses are mediated by social vulnerabilities. 
Military occupation by foreign armed forces compris-
es an exceptional but under-researched condition of 
social vulnerability to climate-related stresses. We 
define (post)occupation as areas with current or his-
torically recent experience of military occupation. 
The three study areas reflect distinct stages of oc-
cupational control within the same regional water-
shed (Jordan Basin). They encompass: protracted 
military occupation (West Bank), annexation (Golan 
Heights) and post-occupation (southern Lebanon). 
That the coercive control regime for all three areas 
is, or was, administered by the Israeli state (military 
or civil administration) creates a governance linkage 
for comparative analysis. This research project is the first 
comparative study of climate vulnerability in conditions of 
(post)occupation.
While each of the three areas has distinctive char-
acteristics, this Executive Summary highlights key 
project findings on climate vulnerability and rural 
livelihood choices under (post)occupation. These 
are related to the three research aims of the project.
Executive Summary
1. To identify the main determinants of climate  
vulnerability for selected rural communities under 
(post)occupation
Across the three study areas, farmers’ perceptions 
within the past 10-20 years of reduced water avail-
ability, increased annual mean temperatures and 
a delayed rainy season corroborate scientific iden-
tification of a regional drying trend. This trend is 
broadly consistent with scientific projections of cli-
mate change for the Jordan Basin, which focus on a 
northwards shift of the Mediterranean storm track, 
reducing annual precipitation. Climate-driven water 
stresses are greatest in the Jordan Rift Valley (West 
Bank), where most agriculture is rainfed-dependent. 
The climatic viability of rainfed agriculture in the 
Jordan Rift Valley is threatened, during the course of 
this century, by the projected northwards retreat of 
the 200mm isohyet (an indicative ‘limit’ for rainfed 
agriculture).
However, climate stresses are perceived by farmers to 
be less important than (post)occupational conditions 
in determining water availability. Israeli state practices 
are seen as harmful to farming livelihoods, e.g. pro-
hibition and demolition of water infrastructure, land 
confiscation and/or restrictions, exclusive incentives 
to Israeli settlers, barriers to markets. Significantly, 
this holds even for contexts where Israeli military au-
thority no longer has formal effective control – the 
move to Israeli civilian administration in 1981 in the 
Golan Heights and the withdrawal of Israeli forces 
from southern Lebanon in 2000. In both cases signifi-
cant water supply constraints are attributed to Israeli 
control or influence, whether as a result of legal rules 
(Golan Heights) of the threatened use of force across 
a border (southern Lebanon). This suggests a contin-
uum of (post)occupational practices that escapes the 
legally self-contained idea of occupation – effective 
control of a foreign territory by a hostile armed force 
(Hague Regulations 1907, Article 42) – contained in 
international humanitarian law.
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2. To survey mechanisms for coping with differential 
water availability
Over the past two to three decades across the study areas, 
common coping practices by farmers to differential water 
availability are: more rainwater harvesting, selection of 
drought-resistant crop types (e.g. from citrus plants to 
dates), reductions in livestock or cultivated land, and 
switching from flood to drip irrigation.
Rainwater harvesting is a popular, low-cost coping 
practice in the three study areas, but its increased 
use is prohibited by the Israeli government both 
in the occupied Golan Heights and the Jordan Rift 
Valley (in Area C). There is more scope for chang-
ing crop selection. In the Jordan Rift Valley there 
has been a major reduction in the Palestinian pro-
duction of thirsty crops (e.g. bananas, watermelons 
and citrus crops) and the loss of a summer season for 
crops now cultivated only in the winter season (e.g. 
eggplants, cauliflowers and green peas). Similar crop 
changes and reduced production were also reported 
in the Golan Heights and, to a lesser extent, south-
ern Lebanon (where physical water stresses are less 
pronounced). Both areas favour fruit production, 
though with greater monocultural cultivation in the 
Golan Heights.
The move to drip irrigation in the occupied Golan 
Heights began after Israel took over in 1967, sug-
gesting technology transfer as a consequence of oc-
cupation. Over 80% of farming households surveyed 
reported a switch from flood to drip irrigation over 
the past 5-35 years. Drip irrigation was judged to 
be one of the most effective coping mechanisms by 
West Bank farmers in the Jordan Rift Valley, though 
reduced water quantity and quality mean that some-
times even drip irrigation cannot meet agricultural 
needs, and the cultivated area is therefore reduced. 
Changing irrigation type was less important to farm-
ing households in southern Lebanon (just over 10% 
cited this as a coping action), though post-occupation 
damage to agricultural assets is a seen as significantly 
reducing the propensity to switch irrigation type. 
Temporary or permanent migration is an important 
coping practice in the Jordan Rift Valley and south-
ern Lebanon, but difficult to quantify. In the Jordan 
Rift Valley, for example, farmers from Al Jiftlik and 
Al Auja have moved to less water-stressed Palestinian 
areas to continue agriculture and also become wage 
labourers in Israeli settlements. By turning Palestin-
ian farmers into wage labour, the economic feasibility 
and legitimacy of occupation is deepened. According 
to the southern Lebanese focus group, forced mi-
gration of farming households is a significant coping 
practice, but there are no precise statistics on these 
population movements: existing estimates in rural 
areas are rendered more uncertain by the recent, sub-
stantial inflow of refugees from Syria. 
3. To assess the adaptive implications of farming 
livelihood strategies and rural livelihood choices under 
conditions of ‘(post)occupation’
The questionnaire survey and focus groups under-
taken by the project distinguished between short-
term coping and long-term adaptation measures in 
the context of differential water availability under 
conditions of (post)occupation. Are current farm-
ing livelihood strategies and practices equipped to 
address additional climate stresses in the future?
Across the three study areas, existing independent farm-
ers’ associations are judged the most effective means 
for improving the capacity of farmers to adapt to 
continuing water-related stresses (e.g. the sharaka 
partnership system in the West Bank and the col-
lective-owned coolers for storing apples in the Go-
lan Heights). This finding is not surprising in the 
context of a lack of support from governmental or-
ganisations, which are typically seen either as weak 
(Lebanese government and Palestinian Authority) or 
hostile (State of Israel). Collective action over shared 
agricultural claims is thus an act of self-determination 
within a domain of contested sovereign authority.
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As recommended by the regional focus groups, pro-
posed adaptation measures across the three study 
areas vary according to distinctive governance con-
ditions. Each of the focus groups highlighted bet-
ter governmental support for farmers, encompass-
ing technical, economic and land supply concerns. 
Existing coping practices are generally seen as templates for 
adaptation to future climate-related stresses subject to gov-
ernmental support for their scaling up. Yet in each area Is-
raeli security and military practices are perceived to 
be the main obstacle to institutional strengthening 
of the farming sector: the maintenance and devel-
opment of farming livelihoods is severely hampered 
by exceptional governance practices which system-
atically discriminate against the affected Arab/Druze 
communities. Even if the threat of use of force is 
rarely exercised, the securitisation of land and water 
resources in the three areas undermines agricultural 
development. This is most obvious in the occupied 
Golan Heights and Jordan Rift Valley, where intensi-
fying and creeping annexation in underway; but the 
pervasive risk of violence faced by Lebanese farm-
ers in the south-eastern borderlands of the Hasbani 
Basin is as debilitating for agricultural livelihoods.
Under conditions of (post)occupation, farming liveli-
hoods in the three study areas are self-represented as 
oppositional to Israeli authority and influence, suggest-
ing shared social identity as a source of livelihood resilience. 
Farming acquires political subjectivity as ‘staying 
on the land’, whether celebrating the small farmer 
(falah) in the occupied Golan Heights or ‘striving for-
ward’ (jihad) in the Jordan Rift Valley. Both in the 
West Bank and Golan case studies, a common ref-
erent in the field survey and focus groups was the 
concept of sumud (‘steadfastness’) developed first 
in a Palestinian political context as a non-violent 
response to Israeli military-occupational practices. 
Moral attachment to the land therefore underpins 
livelihood choices that may be judged by third parties 
as economically ‘irrational’ but, from a participant 
perspective, are necessary for political resistance to 
a sovereign actor perceived as hostile.
Policy implications
• There is insufficient collection and dissemination 
of water resource use data to allow confident assess-
ments of the factors driving changes in water avail-
ability and quality across the Jordan Basin. Given 
the political sensitivity of much national data on 
water use, basin-wide scientific coordination on the col-
lection and analysis of regional meteorological and hydro-
logical information can facilitate technical improvements 
in assessing shared (climatic and non-climatic) impacts on 
water resources.
• Across the three study areas in the Jordan Basin, 
this research project highlighted the multiple 
means by which farmers cope with differential 
water availability. Some of these coping strategies 
already reflect adaptive responses to enduring re-
ductions in water availability, indicating resilience 
in the face of climate-related water stresses. How-
ever, policy responses must acknowledge that the physical 
scarcity and/or poor quality of agricultural water in the 
study areas is, according to those surveyed, principally 
caused by conditions of (post)occupation.
• Farmer associations are the most promising insti-
tutional means for fostering effective collective 
action in response to water scarcity. Internal and 
external support for institutional strengthening in water 
management is best targeted at supporting the indepen-
dent farmers’ associations which, in each of the study ar-
eas, have developed autonomous, bottom-up capacity for 
adapting to differential water availability.
• An examination of the water rights and needs of 
affected communities should be the baseline for 
donor interventions seeking to address climate 
and water insecurity under (post)occupation in 
the Jordan River Basin. International actors concerned 
with reducing the ‘climate vulnerability’ of small-scale 
farming communities in the (post)occupied regions of the 
Jordan Basin must respect the rule of international law – 
international humanitarian law, international water law, 
and international human rights law.
الملخص التنفيذي
بتمويل  سخي  من  مؤسسة  الإمارات  الخيرية  ومن  خلال  مركز  الشرق 
الأوسط التابع لجامعة لندن للعلوم الإقتصادية والسياسية، تم تنفيذ هذا 
المشروع البحثي بعنوان ‘الأمن المناخي المتعدي الحدود’ بالشراكة ما بين 
جامعة  لندن وجامعة بيرزيت في فلسطين حيث  انطلق في تموز 2102 
واختتم رسميا ًفي تموز 4102. 
وتبحث هذه الدراسة في أوجه الحساسية المناخية للمجتمعات الزراعية 
ضمن  ظروف  الاحتلال  وما  بعده.  وبحسب  الهيئة  الحكومية  الدولية 
المعنية  بتغيرّر  المناخ  (5:2102)،  يشير  مفهوم  الحساسية  إلى  الميل  أو 
الاستعداد للتأثر سلبا ً بالمخاطر أو حالات الإجهاد حيث تساعد مواطن 
الضعف الاجتماعي على ظهور حالات الإجهاد المتعلقة بالمناخ. ويشكل 
الاحتلال العسكري من قبل قوى خارجية مسلحة استثناءا ًعن القاعدة 
ولكن بشرط دراسة آثار مواطن الضعف الاجتماعي على حالات الإجهاد 
المرتبطة  بالمناخ.  ونقصد  بمصطلح  ‘ما  بعد  الاحتلال’  المناطق  التي  إما 
تتعرض حاليا ًلتجربة إحتلالية أو تخلصت منها حديثا.ً وتعكس مجالات 
الدراسة الثلاثة المراحل البارزة للسيطرة الإحتلالية ضمن نفس الحوض 
المائي الإقليمي (حوض الأردن) حيث تشمل: الاحتلال العسكري طويل 
الأمد  (الضفة  الغربية)  والضم  (مرتفعات  الجولان)  و’ما  بعد  الاحتلال’ 
(الجنوب  اللبناني).  وكون  أن  الدولة  الاسرائيلية  (من  خلال  إدارتها 
العسكرية أو المدنية) هي التي تفرض -أو قامت بفرض- نظام السيطرة 
القسري على المناطق الثلاث المذكورة، فذلك يشكل رابطا ًإداريا ًحاكميا ً
للقيام بتحليل مقارن. ويعد هذا المشروع البحثي الأول من نوعه كدراسة 
مقارنة للحساسية المناخية في سياق ظروف الاحتلال وما بعده.
في  حين  تتصف  مجالات  الدراسة  الثلاثة  بخصائص  مميزة،  يركز  هذا 
الملخص التنفيذي على أبرز نتائج المشروع بما يتعلق بالحساسية المناخية 
وخيارات سبل العيش الريفية في ظل ظروف الاحتلال وما بعده. وترتبط 
هذه النتائج بالأهداف البحثية الثلاثة للمشروع.
1. تعيين أبرز محددات الحساسية المناخية للمجتمعات الريفية 
المختارة التي تعيش في ظل ظروف الاحتلال وما بعده 
على نطاق مجالات الدراسة الثلاثة، تناغمت عوامل مثل إدراك المزارعين 
بشح  المياه  المتوفرة  على  مدار  10-20  سنة  الماضية  وارتفاع  متوسط 
الحرارة السنوي وتأخر موسم المطر مع التعريف العلمي لظاهرة الجفاف 
الإقليمي، بحيث أصبحت متسقة بشكل واسع مع التوقعات العلمية للتغير 
المناخي في منطقة حوض الأردن والتي تركز على إزاحة مسار العواصف 
 الشرق  أوسطية  باتجاه  الشمال  الأمر  الذي  يقلل  من  المطر  السنوي.
ويعد الإجهاد المائي الناجم عن التغيرات المناخية الأعظم في غور الأردن( 
الضفة  الغربية) حيث اعتماد معظم  الزراعة على مياه الأمطار. وخلال 
هذا العقد من الزمن، هدد التغير المناخي للزراعة البعلية في غور الأردن 
نتيجة الانحسار المتوقع لخط تساوي المطر(002ملم: الحد اللازم للزراعة 
البعلية) نحو الاتجاه الشمالي.
وعلى  الرغم  من  ذلك،  يقلل  المزارعون  من  أهمية  التغيرالمناخي  وأثره 
على تحديد مدى توفر المياه مقارنة بظروف الاحتلال وما بعده، حيث 
تعد  سياسات  الدولة  الإسرائيلية  مضرة  بسبل  عيش  المزارعين،  متمثلة 
بمنع إنشاء أو هدم البنية التحتية المائية ومصادرة الأراضي و/أو القيود 
والحوافز  الحصرية  للمستوطنين  الإسرائيليين  وعوائق  الوصول  للسوق). 
والملفت للنظرهنا بأن هذه السياسات ما زالت تطبق في سياق مناطق 
لم  يعد  للسلطات  العسكرية  الإسرائيلية  أية  سيطرة  فعلية  رسمية- 
الإنتقال إلى الإدراة المدنية الإسرائيلية في عام 1891 في مرتفعات الجولان 
وانسحاب  القوات  الإسرائيلية من جنوب  لبنان في عام 0002. وفي  كلتا 
الحالتين، يرجع السبب في العوائق الجمة المفروضة على التزويد بالمياه إلى 
السيطرة الإسرائيلية إما على شكل إجراءات قانونية (مرتفعات الجولان) 
أو  التهديد  باستخدام  القوة  على  الحدود  (جنوب  لبنان).  ويدل  ذلك 
على استمرار ممارسات الاحتلال وما بعده التي تجاوزت مبدأ الاحتلال 
المكتفي بذاته قانونيا ً– السيطرة الفعلية على أرض أجنبية بفعل قوى 
مسلحة معادية (أحكام لاهاي 7091، المادة رقم 24)- والمنصوص عليه 
ضمن القانون الإنساني الدولي. 
2. مسح آليات التأقلم/ التكيف مع تفاوت توفر المياه
على مدار  العقدين  أو  الثلاثة الأخيرة في مجالات  الدراسة، شملت  أبرز 
الممارسات التي يتبعها المزراعون للتكيف مع تفاوت توفر كميات المياه 
على: زيادة حصاد مياه الأمطار، واختيار أنواع المحاصيل المقاومة للجفاف 
(مثلاُ،  الحمضيات  والتمور)،  والتقليل  من  المواشي  أو  الحقول  المزروعة 
والإنتقال من الري بالغمر إلى الري بالتنقيط.
وفي  مجالات  الدراسة  الثلاثة،  يعد حصاد  المياه  من  أكثر  الطرق  شيوعا ً
وأقلها تكلفة كآلية للتكيف إلا أن الحكومة الإسرائيلية حظرت الاستخدام 
المتزايد لهذه الطريقة في مرتفعات الجولان المحتلة وغور الأردن (مناطق 
ج). فأصبح المجال أكبر في التحكم بتغييرنوع المحاصيل. ففي غور الأردن، 
تم  تقليص  الإنتاج  الفلسطيني  من  المحاصيل  ‘العطشى’  إلى  حد  كبير 
(كالموز والبطيخ والحمضيات) وخسر المزارع موسم المحاصيل  الصيفية 
(كالباذنجان  والقرنبيط  والبسلة  الخضراء)  التي  أصبحت  تزرع  فقط في 
‘لصمود’وثبات  سبل  العيش.  وتتسم  فلاحة  الأرض  بالذاتية  السياسية 
ك’البقاء  في  الأرض’  إما  احتفالاً  بالفلاح  البسيط  في  مرتفعات  الجولان 
المحتلة  أو  ‘جهادا’ً  في  غور  الأردن.  وفي  دراسة  حالتي  الضفة  الغربية 
والجولان،  برز  مفهوم  مرجعي  شائع  خلال  الاستبيان  الميداني  وضمن 
المجموعات  البؤرية  تمثل  بكلمة  ‘صمود’  والتي  تم  تطويرها  بداية  في 
السياق  السياسي  الفلسطيني  كاستجابة  سلمية  للممارسات  الاحتلالية 
الإسرائيلية. فأصبح التمسك المعنوي بالأرض أساسا ًلخيارات سبل العيش 
التي قد تراها أطراف ثالثة على أنها غير ‘منطقية’ اقتصاديا،ً إلا أنها من 
وجهة نظر المشارك/ المتأثر ضرورية للمقاومة السياسية في وجه لاعب 
سيادي يعيه (أي المشارك) بأنه عدائي. 
الآثار المترتبة على وضع السياسات
لا يعتبر جمع ونشر  البيانات المتعلقة باستخدام مصادر المياه كافيا ً	 •
للقيام بدراسات تقييمية مؤكدة حول العوامل التي تؤدي إلى تغيير 
وتيرة توفر ونوعية المياه في منطقة حوض الأردن. فأخذا ًبعين الاعتبار 
الحساسية السياسية التي تتعلق بالبيانات الوطنية لاستخدام المياه، 
يسمح  التنسيق  العلمي  -ما  بين  أطراف  منطقة  الحوض  المائي- 
بخصوص جمع وتحليل المعلومات الجوية والمائية الإقليمية بالقيام 
بتحسينات  تقنية  على  مستوى  تقييم  الآثار  المناخية  المشتركة  على 
مصادر المياه. 
يركز  هذا  المشروع  البحثي  وعبر  مجالات  الدراسة  الثلاثة  فيه  على 	 •
الوسائل المتعددة التي يستخدمها المزارعون للتكيف مع التفاوت في 
توفر المياه. وقد عكست معظم استراتيجيات التأقلم هذه الاستجابة 
في التكيف لتحمل التخفيضات في كميات المياه المتوفرة، الأمر الذي 
يشير إلى الصمود في وجه الإجهاد المائي الناجم عن العوامل المناخية. 
ولكن، يجب ان تقر سياسات الاستجابة بأنه - ووفقا ًلاولئك الذين 
شملهم  الاستبيان-  يرجع  السبب  الرئيسي في  الشح  الفيزيائي لمصادر 
المياه  و/أو  النوعية  الردئية  للمياه  الزراعية  المتوفرة  إلى  ظروف 
الاحتلال وما بعده.  
تعتبر جمعيات المزارعين أكثر الوسائل المؤسساتية تشجيعا ًمن حيث 	 •
دعم التوجه الجماعي الفعال للاستجابة إلى شح المياه. وتتمثل أفضل 
سبل  الدعم  الداخلي  والخارجي  للتعزيز  المؤسساتي  في  مجال  إدارة 
المياه  بتلك  الموجهة  نحو  دعم  جمعيات  المزارعين  المستقلة  التي 
طورت-وبحسب كافة مجالات الدراسة- مقدرة مستقلة بمنهجية ‘من 
أسفل للأعلى’ للتكيف مع التفاوت في توفر المياه. 
يجب  أن  تشكل  دراسة  الحقوق  والاحتياجات  المائية  للمجتمعات 	 •
المتأثرة  خط  الأساس  بالنسبة  لتدخلات  الدول  المانحة  الساعية  إلى 
معالجة قضية  انعدام الأمن المناخي والمائي في ظل ظروف الاحتلال 
وما بعده في حوض  نهر  الأردن. ويجب على كافة  اللاعبين  الدوليين 
المهتمين بتقليص ‘الحساسية المناخية’ للمجتمعات الزراعية الصغيرة 
في مناطق تعاني من آثار الاحتلال وما بعده في حوض الأردن احترام 
وتطبيق القوانين الدولية بما في ذلك القانون الإنساني الدولي وقانون 
المياه الدولي وقانون حقوق الإنسان الدولي.
فصل  الشتاء.  ولوحظ  أيضا ً توجهات  مماثلة  في  تغيير  أنواع  محاصيل 
وتقليص  زراعة  أخرى  في  مرتفعات  الجولان  وحتى  في  الجنوب  اللبناني 
ولكن  بدرجة  أقل  (حيث  الإجهاد  المائي  هناك  أقل  وضوحا)ً.  وتفضل 
المنطقتان المذكورتان زراعة الفاكهة بالرغم من التوجه الأكبر لزراعة نوع 
واحد من المحاصيل في مرتفعات الجولان.
لقد  بدأ  استخدام  الري  بالتنقيط  في  مرتفعات  الجولان  المحتلة  بعد 
احتلالها من قبل اسرائيل عام 7691 مما يشير إلى كون انتقال التكنولوجيا 
في هذا المجال كنتاج للاحتلال، إذ أظهرت دراسة مسحية لأسر المزارعين 
بأن  %08منهم  بيّرنوا  انتقالهم  من  الري  بالغمر  إلى  الري  بالتنقيط  منذ 
53-5 عاما.ً وقد شهد مزارعو الضفة الغربية لطريقة الري بالتنقيط بأنها 
من  أكثر  آليات  التكيف  فعالية  بالرغم من  أن  تقليص  المياه كما ً ونوعا ً
يعني  في  بعض  الأحيان  فشل هذه  الطريقة  أيضا ً في  تلبية  الاحتياجات 
الزراعية، الأمر الذي يرغمهم على تقليص حجم الحقول المزروعة. أما في 
الجنوب اللبناني، لقي تغيير طريقة الري أهمية أقل بالنسبة للمزراعين 
هناك (%01 منهم فقط أفادوا بأنها من إحدى آليات التكيف) على الرغم 
من أن أضرار الاحتلال وما بعده بالأصول الزراعية تخفض بشكل كبير من 
الرغبة في تغيير طريقة الري. 
§ومن إحدى ممارسات التكيف الأخرى المتبعة في غور الأردن وجنوب 
لبنان  هي  الهجرة  المؤقتة  أو  الدائمة  إلا  أنه  من  الصعب  قياسها.  ففي 
غور  الاردن،  مثلاً،  انتقل  المزارعون  من  منطقتي  الجفتلك  والعوجة  إلى 
مناطق فلسطينية تعاني درجات أقل من الإجهاد المائي بغية الاستمرار في 
الزراعة والانتقال أيضا ًإلى العمل المأجور داخل المستوطنات الإسرائيلية. 
وبإخضاع  المزراعين  الفلسطينيين  للعمل  المأجور،  تتعمق  الجدوى 
الاقتصادية للاحتلال وشرعيته. أما بالنسبة للمجموعة البؤرية في جنوب 
لبنان، اعتبرت الهجرة القسرية للمزارعين من أبرز آليات التكيف، إلا أنه 
لا توجد احصائيات دقيقة تصف هذه التحركات السكانية حيث أصبحت 
التقديرات الموجودة في المناطق الريفية غير دقيقة/ مؤكدة نظرا ًللنزوح 
الحالي الملحوظ لللاجئين من سوريا.
3. تقييم الآثار التكيفية لاستراتيجيات سبل العيش الزراعي 
وخيارات سبل العيش الريفي في ظل ظروف الاحتلال وما بعده
لقد  ميزت  كل  من  منهجيتي  الدراسة  الاستبيانية  والمجموعات  البؤرية 
المتبعتين في هذا المشروع البحثي ما بين إجراءات التكيف قصيرة الأمد 
والطويلة الأمد في سياق  التفاوت في توفر  المياه نظرا ً لظروف الاحتلال 
وما بعده. هل تعد استراتيجيات وممارسات سبل عيش المزراعين كافية 
لمواجهة حالات جديدة من الإجهاد المناخي في المستقبل؟
في مجالات الدراسة الثلاثة على وجه العموم، وجد بأن جمعيات المزراعين 
المستقلة هي أكثر الجهات فعالية لتحسين قدرة المزارعين على التكيف 
مع  الإجهاد  المائي  المستمر  (مثلاً،  نظام  ‘الشراكة’  في  الضفة  الغربية 
والثلاجات  المملوكة  جماعيا ً في  مرتفعات  الجولان  لتخزين  التفاح).  ولا 
تعد هذه النتيجة مفاجئة على الإطلاق نظرا ًلغياب المؤسسات الحكومية 
الداعمة التي عادت ما تكون إما ضعيفة ( الحكومة اللبنانية والسلطة 
الفلسطينية) أو عدائية (دولة إسرائيل). فيصبح العمل الجماعي لحفظ 
الحقوق  الزراعية  المشتركة  وجها ً من  أوجه  تقرير  المصير ضمن  منطقة 
متنازعة السيادة. 
وكما  أوصت  المجموعات  البؤرية  الإقليمية،  تختلف  إجراءات  التكيف 
المقترحة  ضمن  مجالات  الدراسة  الثلاثة  وفقا ً لظروف  الحكم  الخاصة 
بكل  منطقة.  وقد  ركزت  كل  مجموعة  بؤرية  على  أفضل  طرق  الدعم 
الحكومي  للمزارعين  بما  يشمل  الاهتمام  بالجوانب  التقنية  والإقتصادية 
والتزويد  بالأراضي.  ويُنظرإلى ممارسات  التكيف  الحالية  عامًة على  أنها 
نماذج للتكيف مع الإجهاد المناخي المستقبلي مشروطة بالدعم الحكومي 
لتعميمها. لكن لا تزال تشكل الممارسات العسكرية والأمنية الإسرائيلية 
في كافة المناطق العائق الأكبر أمام التعزيز المؤسساتي لقطاع الزراعة: فما 
زالت عملية صيانة وتطوير سبل العيش الزراعي معرقلة إلى حد كبير من 
قبل الممارسات الحاكمية الاستثنائية التي تميز ضد المجتمعات العربية/ 
الدرزية المتأثرة بشكل ممنهج. حتى ولو كان التهديد باستخدام السلاح 
نادرا،ً يعتبر تسنيد الأراضي والمصادر المائية في المناطق الثلاثة مقوضا ًلأية 
عملية  تنموية  زراعية.  ويظهر  ذلك  جليا ً في  مرتفعات  الجولان  المحتلة 
وغور  الاردن  حيث  تكثيف  عمليات  الضم  والاستيلاء،  وبشكل  مماثل 
يبقى  خطر  العنف  المحدق  بالمزارعين  اللبنانيين  على  الحدود  الجنوبية 
الشرقية لحوض نهر الحصباني موهنا ًلسبل العيش الزراعية هناك.
وفي ظل ظروف الاحتلال وما بعده، تبرز سبل العيش الزراعية في مجالات 
الدراسة  الثلاثة  على  أنها  شكل  من  أشكال  مقاومة  السلطة  والسيطرة 
الإسرائيلية الأمر الذي يشير إلى كون الهوية الاجتماعية المشتركة مصدرا ً
Funded generously by the Emirates Foundation for 
Philanthropy through the LSE Middle East Centre, 
the ‘Transboundary Climate Security’ research project 
was undertaken by a partnership between LSE and 
Birzeit University, Palestine. It began in June 2012 
and formally ended in June 2014. The research ad-
dresses climate vulnerable rural communities within 
territories of the watershed of the Jordan River with 
current or historically recent experience of military oc-
cupation (the occupied Golan Heights, the occupied 
Palestinian territory, and southern Lebanon).
The Jordan River is perhaps the most physically and 
politically stressed river basin in the world. It flows 
north to south for 223km, discharging into the Dead 
Sea: its principal headwaters, the Hasbani, Dan and 
Banias Rivers, are fed by groundwater sources and 
spring-led surface runoff (ESCWA-BGR Coopera-
tion Project 2013: 170). Dams and water abstraction 
from 1964 onwards have reduced the river’s original 
flow, measured at the entrance to the Dead Sea, 
from roughly 1,300 million cubic metres a year (MC-
M/y) down to 20-200 MCM/y (Courcier et al. 2005; 
Zeitoun et al. 2012). 
There are enduring asymmetries in water extraction 
from the Jordan River Basin: Israel extracts between 
580-640 MCM/y, Syria withdraws about 450 MCM/y 
and Jordan withdraws about 290 MCM/y. In contrast, 
Lebanon only abstracts an estimated 9-10 MCM/y 
(in the Hasbani sub-basin), while Palestine has no 
access to the Jordan River and faces severe restric-
tions in accessing other water sources in the basin 
(ESCWA-BGR Cooperation Project 2013: 171, 202).
At its end point at the Dead Sea, the Jordan River is 
little more than a small stream of untreated waste-
water and agricultural drainage (Mimi and Sawalhi 
2003; FOEME 2005). The pressures on the basin 
are forecast to be accentuated by climate change: 
over the course of this century, and depending on 
the global emissions scenario employed, there is pro-
jected to be: (i) a decrease in precipitation of up to 
28% (with significant seasonal variation), (ii) a signif-
icant warming of between 0.60C and 4.00C, and (iii) 
a tendency towards more extreme weather events. 
Associated impacts include an increased probability 
of flash floods, droughts, desertification and saline in-
trusion into groundwater (Cruz et al. 2007; Hoerling 
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Figure 1.1: Mean Temperature of the Control Period (1961-1989) and Future Changes for the Two 
IPCC Scenarios A2 and B2
Source: GLOWA 2008
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et al. 2012; Kunstmann et al. 2007; Lelieveld et al. 
2012; UNDP 2010; World Bank 2012; IPCC 2013: 
14.1). These biophysical stresses are likely to impact 
on human development goals and regional peace 
efforts (Feitelson et al. 2012; Mizyed 2009; Tron-
dalen 2009; Phillips 2010).
Figure 1.1 shows the projections from the region-
al downscaling of a global climate model (GCM) 
ECHAM4 according to two Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) emissions scenarios A2 
and B2 (GLOWA 2008).1 With 1961-1989 serving 
as a control run representing current climate, both 
scenarios, by 2050, feature the same temperature in-
crease of 1.5-1.7 °C. By the end of the century, how-
ever, the increase of mean temperatures in scenar-
io A2 at 3.5-4.5 °C is significantly higher than in B2 
(2.7-3 °C). 
1 Of the two scenarios, B2 is the more ecologically benign 
in terms of global economic growth and development (e.g. as-
sumption of slower population growth). The simulations were 
conducted for the two IPCC emission scenarios from 1961 – 
2099 up to a resolution of 18 x 18 km².
Figure 1.2 shows GLOWA precipitation projections, 
with most parts of the region facing decreasing yearly 
amounts by 2050, especially in scenario B2. But there 
are also some areas where increasing rainfall can be 
seen (especially in scenario A2), and high yearly vari-
ability limits the significance of these projections. As 
the time series is extended to 2099, in both scenarios 
the linear trend to decreased rainfall amounts is highly 
significant. For the period 2070 – 2099 in comparison 
to the control run (1961-1989), changes range from 
-10% to -40% in both scenarios with higher reduc-
tions in scenario A2. It is claimed that seasonal pat-
terns will be amplified, with more intense summer 
droughts and more severe rainfall events, even with 
overall falls in precipitation (GLOWA 2008).
Figure 1.2: Mean Annual Precipitation of the Control Period (1961-1989) and Relative Future Changes 
for the Two IPCC Scenarios A2 and B2
Source: GLOWA 2008
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Despite continuing uncertainties in climate mod-
elling and projections, there is agreement amongst 
climate scientists that significant climate change is 
likely in the Jordan Basin region over the current 
century. At the start of this project the plan was to 
undertake research in all the riparian territories of 
the Jordan Basin, with a focus on areas with high 
projected climate change effects (notably in terms 
of precipitation and temperature changes). After dis-
cussion on current drivers of social vulnerability in 
the region, participants at the first project workshop 
(Amman July 13-14 2012) agreed to focus on the cli-
mate vulnerability of Jordan Basin farming commu-
nities with current or historically recent experience 
of Israeli military occupation: we label this common 
geopolitical context ‘(post)occupation’. Our definition 
was informed by recognised definitions of occupation 
under international humanitarian law, notably Arti-
cle 42 of the Hague Regulations 1907: ‘Territory is 
considered occupied when it is actually placed un-
der the authority of the hostile army’ (ICRC 2014) 
and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. In 
practice, this meant that the project research fo-
cused geographically on the Jordan Rift Valley, West 
Bank (‘current occupation’), the occupied Golan 
Heights (‘current occupation’) and southern Leba-
non (‘post-occupation’). This research project is the first 
comparative study of climate vulnerability in conditions of 
(post)occupation.
The project co-directors were Dr Michael Mason (De-
partment of Geography and Environment, LSE) and 
Dr Ziad Mimi (Civil Engineering Department, Birzeit 
University). There was a project consultant, Dr Mark 
Zeitoun (School of International Development, Uni-
versity of East Anglia) and five project researchers:
• Ms Janan Mousa (Project Researcher for the 
West Bank) 
• Ms Muna Dajani (Project Researcher for the 
Golan Heights)
• Dr Mohamad Khawlie (Lead Project Researcher 
for southern Lebanon)
• Ms Sireen Abu-Jamous (Project Researcher for the 
West Bank)
• Mr Hussam Hussein (General Project Researcher)
In order to facilitate access to farmers in the occu-
pied Golan Heights, the project also employed as a 
consultant Dr Taiseer Maray, director of the NGO 
Golan for Development.
Research Aims
The key academic objective of the research project 
was to understand climate vulnerability and adap-
tation under conditions of (post)occupation. There 
was also a research impact objective to develop im-
proved policy responses for climate risk management 
within the Jordan River Basin. 
Firstly, the study examined the climate vulnerability 
of selected local populations. Climate vulnerability 
was understood in both biophysical and social terms, 
thereby integrating climate and non-climatic risks to 
livelihoods. The project conducted an in-depth ex-
amination of human climate vulnerability – in terms 
of water use and availability – in predominantly Arab 
rural communities across different riparian territories 
of the Jordan River Basin. Given the human develop-
ment importance and climate sensitivity of the agri-
cultural sector in the region, agricultural areas with 
high climate vulnerability were initially selected for 
study (see Figure 1.3). These communities were 
identified from an initial scoping research on agricul-
tural livelihoods in the region. With the governance 
focus of the project on (post)-occupation contexts, 
three research areas were identified – the Hasbani 
Sub-Basin (southern Lebanon), the occupied Go-
lan Heights and the Jordan Rift Valley (West Bank). 
Figure 1.3 shows their location within the Jordan 
River Basin.
17 Introduction
Figure 1.3: The Jordan River Basin Showing the Three Study Areas 
Source: ESCWA-BGR Cooperation Project 2013: 173
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Secondly, the study sought to understand how in-
dividuals and communities experience climate vari-
ability and change as a process of short-term coping 
and longer-term adaptation. By applying a ‘bottom up’ 
perspective to the climate change problematic, this 
approach focused on the agency of vulnerable peo-
ple in affected areas, surveying locally sourced cop-
ing mechanisms (e.g. rainwater harvesting, crop or 
ruminant selection) and examining their potential 
to contribute to more resilient climate adaptation 
strategies. To address these objectives, the project 
addressed five research aims:
• To conceptualise and define climate vulnerability;
• To identify the main determinants of climate vul-
nerability for selected rural communities in the 
region; 
• To determine how current methods of adaptation 
by vulnerable rural communities serve to increase 
resilience to climate and other human security 
threats; 
• To examine how state practices affect the capac-
ity of vulnerable rural communities to cope with 
climate hazards; 
• To inform policy processes aimed at reducing re-
gional climate vulnerability. 
The working hypothesis for the research was that 
the short-term coping mechanisms used by rural communities 
exposed to differential water availability under (post)occu-
pation negatively affect their capacity to adapt to additional 
climate stresses. A community’s ‘adaptive capacity’ is 
understood to mean its long-term ability to adapt to 
changes that strain normal coping mechanisms – and 
the relative ease or pain with which that occurs. The 
study’s findings will ultimately contribute to the cli-
mate vulnerability knowledge and policy base of the 
region, as well as academic and policy communities.
Summary of Project Activities
In the first year of the project, there was a launch 
workshop in Amman, baseline data collection, the 
first stage of field research and an assessment work-
shop in London (to review empirical findings). This 
was followed, in the second year, by a second stage 
of field research and a final workshop in Umm Qais, 
Jordan (November 2013).
Amman Workshop (13-14 July 2012)
The launch workshop for the project took place 
on 13-14 July, 2012 in Amman, Jordan. The work-
shop reviewed the project aims, discussing relevant 
conceptual frameworks and methodologies. It also 
agreed a more detailed timeline for the project, as 
well as responsibilities for deliverables across the 
project team.
Baseline Data Collection and Pilot 
Questionnaires
Baseline data collection took place between July 
and December 2012: it included a review of relevant 
climate and development/humanitarian literature, 
identification of representative rural communities, 
elaboration of an agreed analytical framework (on 
conflict and environmental stress), and development 
of a household questionnaire for farmers. The ques-
tionnaire was pilot tested in the West Bank with 
feedback discussed by the project team. A separate 
scoping survey in southern Lebanon (focused on hu-
man security concerns) also fed into the final ques-
tionnaire. This revised questionnaire was adminis-
tered in framing villages across the three regions of 
study – all facing or with recent historical experience 
of military occupation.
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Field research I (January-April 2013)
The first stage of field research – the household sur-
vey of selected farming communities – took place in 
the first quarter of 2013. The final questionnaire was 
comprehensive, and in hindsight too long. Howev-
er, 37 questionnaires were completed in the Golan 
Heights, 57 questionnaires were completed in the 
West Bank and 300 in southern Lebanon (Hasbani 
region).
Assessment Workshop (1-2 May 2013, LSE)
The second project workshop was held at LSE on 
1-2 May 2013. On the first day of this meeting, lead 
researchers for each of the three study regions pre-
sented their initial research findings, with a focus on 
the results from the household questionnaire. Bir-
zeit University employed a statistician to analyse the 
questionnaire data for the West Bank and occupied 
Golan Heights case studies, and at the workshop 
project participants from this university reported 
on some preliminary statistical analysis. Statistical 
analysis of the data for southern Lebanon was done 
separately and independently. The second day of 
the workshop featured a group discussion of results 
so far, a presentation on human security and climate 
vulnerability, and a brainstorming exercise on how 
the initial results should feed into the second stage 
of the research project (focus groups and interviews). 
A timeline was agreed for the last part of the project.
Field Research II (July-September 2013)
Follow-up field research with focus groups in the 
three regions examining the interactions between, 
biophysical and social vulnerability. 
Final Research Workshop (12-14  
November 2013, Umm Qais, Jordan)
Presentation of findings; explanation of trends and 
differences; consensus on interaction between bio-
physical and social vulnerability; generation of poten-
tial policy implications deriving from project.
Vulnerability science has evolved from a technical 
preoccupation with hazards management and cli-
mate prediction to a more sociologically nuanced 
examination of risk assessment, adaptive capacity, 
perceptions of vulnerability and the implications for 
governance (Adger et al. 2006; Füssel 2007; Patt et 
al. 2009; Smit and Wandel 2006). This core academ-
ic discourse has spawned several conceptual debates 
and specialist streams of research. Work on the im-
pact of climate change on water resource quantity 
and quality predicts that while some areas will ex-
perience more rain, others – including the Eastern 
Mediterranean – will experience greater drought and 
decreased water quality (Chenoweth et al. 2011; Ki-
parsky et al. 2012; Sowers et al. 2011). ‘Climate vul-
nerability’ has been conceptualised to examine both 
the biophysical and social effects of climate and envi-
ronmental variability.2 Understood partly in terms of 
a lack of adaptive capacity, the exploration of vulner-
ability has led to important intellectual contributions 
such as ‘environmental criticality’ (Kasperson et al. 
1999), adaptation justice (Adger et al. 2006) and ad-
aptation thresholds (Brooks 2004). Studies on social 
adaptive capacity have related, for example, changes 
in water availability with a community’s economic 
and institutional ability to deal with that change (Al-
lan 2001, Moench et al. 2003, Wolf 2007).
Exploration into links between rural livelihoods, wa-
ter and climate adaptation in developed countries 
has found responses to reduction in water availabil-
ity consisting of crop-switching or investment in in-
creased water supply or storage capacity (e.g. Weath-
erhead et al. 2005). Farmers in the lower capacity 
and less-regulated contexts of developing countries 
have fewer options, and are predicted to suffer great-
er consequences (e.g. Below et al. 2012; Gbetibouo 
2 Social vulnerability is a measure of a society to adapt to 
hazards of different natures, including: biophysical hazards, 
changes in political context, disruption to livelihoods, etc. 
(Vincent 2004; UNEP 2007).
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2009; Osbahr et al. 2008), including in the Middle 
East (e.g. Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and 
International Affairs 2014; World Bank 2012). Devel-
opment paths aimed at increasing adaptive capacity 
are being pursued by a large number of development 
agencies and lending banks (IWMI 2007a; IWMI 
2007b; Thornton et al. 2006; UNDP 2007; UNEP 
2007; World Bank 2012) and are informing related 
academic research (Brown and Westaway 2011; En-
gle 2011; Hill and Engle 2013).
While the existing body of work on vulnerability is 
a necessary starting point, it is confined by at least 
four conceptual limitations. The first is the use of inap-
propriate scales. Macro-level studies map out vulner-
ability at the continental scale (EEA 2007; Muller 
2007; Thornton et al. 2006), obscuring social-ecolog-
ical practices at the community level.3 National and 
city level research, on the other hand, ignores the 
challenges posed by international political borders 
(Alam and Rabbani 2007; Chaponniere and Smakhtin 
2006). This project’s use of a transboundary river ba-
sin (roughly the size of the Thames) as an ecological-
ly-delimited and transboundary unit of analysis is ex-
pected to provide relevant and transferable lessons. 
Moreover, examining (post)occupation contexts 
within the same basin enables comparative insights 
into exceptional governance mechanisms which are 
usually examined as separate territorial spaces. 
A second limiting feature of previous research is a 
narrow political scope. The risks associated with cli-
mate vulnerability are increasingly represented as a 
source of additional insecurity or ‘threat multiplier’ 
in unstable regions in the world (Abbott 2008; CNA 
3 Thornton et. al. (2006: 4) highlight the problem with con-
tinental-scale studies: ‘Even allowing for the technical prob-
lems and uncertainties associated with this analysis, it is clear 
that macro-level analyses, while useful, can hide enormous 
variability concerning what may be complex responses to cli-
mate change’.
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2008; Lee 2009; WBGU 2008). Establishing wheth-
er and how resilience to physical forces may affect 
resilience to social forces – or vice versa – is crucial 
to understanding the implications held for the broad-
er political and security context. We remain unsure 
how risks and responses translate across these sectors 
and across boundaries; for instance, how drought-in-
creased political tension at the state and interna-
tional levels may render the communities in ques-
tion ever more socially vulnerable. The work by the 
Tyndall Centre (Brooks 2004; Vincent 2004; Adger 
et al. 2006) on issues of fairness in adaptation to cli-
mate change broke important ground in this regard. 
Power-related ideological, economic and institution-
al drivers remain to be robustly incorporated into this 
stream, however. For the exceptional governance 
contexts of (post)occupation, where coercive power 
is omnipresent, this analytical need is even great-
er. The project builds on earlier work (Mason et al. 
2011; Mason et al. 2012) addressing climate vulnera-
bility in the occupied Palestinian territory. In a wider 
regional context, the political landscape of the Jordan 
River basin features territorial tensions: in the last 
century the borders have been re-drawn on several 
occasions from a single political entity to the current 
five, entailing significant population transfers, vio-
lence and restricted water access.
Third, key temporal aspects of the influence of polit-
ical and climate change on local adaptation practices 
have not been properly conceptualised; most nota-
bly their episodic, cyclical and chronic features. Sudden 
changes in the political context may lead to commu-
nities investing in means of reactive measures of pro-
tection (e.g. armed or legal), while relatively routine 
and medium-term seasonal variation is likely to be 
dealt with through precautionary measures, such as 
food storage. In the sense that they may evoke sim-
ilar responses, major political events (such as a civil 
war) may be likened to major climatic events (such 
as an earthquake). Likewise, coping methods de-
veloped for seasonal changes may be of limited use 
when confronting the much more gradual changes in 
water stress forecast by the regional climate change 
models, yet issues related to rates of change remain 
under-studied. One of the project’s objectives is to 
provide an integrative manner of incorporating the 
temporal aspects of environmental and political-eco-
nomic change. 
Finally, vulnerability science has, thus far, inappropri-
ately absorbed research from basic development disci-
plines about the political economy of water scarcity. Water 
scarcity thresholds (Falkenmark 2001), for example, 
have been uncritically taken on board (Mutembwa 
1998; WBGU 2008), while insights into the con-
structed nature and economic features of scarcity 
(Falkenmark et al. 2007; IWMI 2007a; Mehta 2001) 
have proven their limitations. Likewise, insufficient 
attention has been given to the significant mitigat-
ing qualities of ‘virtual water’ (water imported in the 
form of food), which silently relieves communities of 
the otherwise expected devastating effects of being 
water or food insecure (Allan 2002; Biro 2012; Kumar 
and Singh 2005).
This project is designed to addresses these shortcom-
ings through an examination of adaptation of rural 
communities in a transboundary context to climate 
and political changes. The rural communities that 
once depended on the Jordan River for domestic and 
agricultural purposes have responded to changes in 
political context and water availability in a wide vari-
ety of ways, providing a fertile empirical context for 
vulnerability and adaptation analysis. Following the 
move by the IPCC to a more integrative understand-
ing of vulnerability (e.g. IPCC 2012: 5; IPCC 2014: 
4), we define climate vulnerability as the propensity or 
predisposition to be adversely affected by climate-related haz-
ards or stresses. As they seem to affect (both directly 
and indirectly) the exposure, sensitivity and adap-
tive capacity of people to climate-related stresses, 
we posit that (post)occupation practices are structurally 
constitutive of climate vulnerability.
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From the academic literature on climate vulnera-
bility in poorer countries, a key proposition is that 
the coping mechanisms used by rural communities 
to maintain existing livelihood systems can work 
against longer–term adaptation to climate change 
stresses (Jerneck and Olsson 2010: 287; O’Brien et 
al. 2008: 195). This proposition directly informs our 
working hypothesis that:
The coping mechanisms used by rural communities exposed 
to differential water availability under (post)occupa-
tion negatively affect their capacity to adapt to additional 
climate stresses.
The reference here to (post)occupation is crucial, 
for livelihood strategies in contexts of strong coer-
cive power are of course even more precarious (Col-
linson 2003; Lautze and Raven-Roberts 2006). The 
project seeks to investigate how rural households 
exposed to differential water availability perceive, 
and respond to, a challenging nexus of conflict- and 
climate-related stresses.
Photo taken from the inside of an old IDF pillbox, on Lebanese/Syrian border at Jabal al-Shaykh/Mount Hermon. 
Methodology
Janan Mousa (lead author)
The particular security and political context of the 
Jordan River Basin dictated a resilient methodology. 
The project management was initiated and conclud-
ed through two workshops held in Jordan – Workshop 
1 (Amman, July 2012) and Workshop 2 (Umm Qais, 
November 2013). Country-level researchers led the 
methodological investigations of the vulnerable rural 
communities in Jordan, the occupied Golan Heights 
and the West Bank. These researchers met togeth-
er and with the Principal Investigators and Project 
Consultant in the first of the two workshops to refine 
the original research plan, and agree on the criteria 
for selection of marginalised communities. The re-
vised research plan was further modified following 
consultation with the members of the communities 
concerned. Recent climate change prediction projec-
tions were used to generate water availability scenar-
ios. Primary data (both quantitative and qualitative) 
was gathered sequentially through questionnaires 
and then focus groups testing, and building on, the 
results of the questionnaires. Table 3.1 summarises 
the data collected in relation to the research aims on 
climate vulnerability (biophysical and social), adap-
tive capacity and regional governance responses. 
The second workshop towards the end of the project 
brought together the research findings and devel-
oped conclusions on climate vulnerability and human 
security for the studied communities.
The Principal Investigators, advised by the Project 
Consultant, monitored the execution of the research 
(including running the workshops), wrote-up the fi-
nal report and are responsible for disseminating the 
research. The forging of collaborative links with local 
researchers was designed to build regional capacity 
for environmental knowledge transfer.
24 Transboundary Climate Security: Climate Vulnerability and Rural Livelihoods in the Jordan River Basin
Research Question Data Collected Source
Biophysical  
Vulnerability
Climate change predictions;  
Projected trends in precipitation and 
water availability
Peer-reviewed climate science and regional 
climate models
Record of seasonal climatic data; 
Seasonal variation
Ministries of water, agriculture
Severe weather patterns;  
Elements (shelter)
Ministries of water, agriculture
Social Vulnerability Water – livelihoods links;  
Dependence on water for livelihoods
Field research
Mapping of institutional network; 
Institutional stability
Ministries of water, agriculture, field surveys
Civil rights, legal status, quality of  
basic services; Marginalisation by 
state or regional government
Field surveys, reports from human rights groups
Micro and macro-economic  
factors; Global interconnectivity
FAO Faostat, ministries of planning
Cost of living, incomes, alternative 
financial sources;  
Livelihoods assessment
Field surveys, ministries of planning, grey litera-
ture of development agencies
Climate Coping and 
Adaptation 
Assessment of current coping  
mechanisms, available water sources 
(quantity, quality, access, reliability), 
food trade, livelihoods, diversity of 
economy, social adaptive capacity 
Field surveys and focus groups, village councils
Domestic  
Capacity-Building 
Current policies, current plans, 
donor interventions.
Ministries of water, agriculture, planning
Table 3.1: Data Collection
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Rapid Rural Assessment and Pilot 
Questionnaires
In order to assess vulnerability and potential adap-
tive capacity in the designated study areas, research-
ers began by adopting a rapid rural assessment (RRA) 
approach. This allowed for research concepts to be 
framed according to local conditions and facilitated 
baseline data collection for study area profiles. During 
August 2012, field researchers conducted two field 
visits to the West Bank and occupied Golan Heights. 
For the first visit to the West Bank, researchers trav-
elled to the villages of Jiftlik and Al-Auja, both in the 
Jordan Valley. The second visit was to the town of 
Majd al-Shams, in the occupied Golan Heights. The 
RRA visits included informal meetings with village 
council heads, NGO heads, and local farmers. Field 
researchers informally discussed climate conditions, 
farming conditions, and water availability in an at-
tempt to capture the locally-specific parameters of 
the study concepts. These concepts included bio-
physical and social vulnerability, coping, and ad-
aptation. An additional scoping survey (focused on 
climate vulnerability in the context of human inse-
curity) was carried out in November 2012 across the 
southern Lebanese study area. The findings of this 
survey generated data for the study profile of the 
Hasbani Watershed.
This initial scoping research and baseline data col-
lection across the three study areas informed the 
development of a draft survey questionnaire on cli-
mate vulnerability, coping strategies and adaptive 
capacity. In order to test this survey questionnaire in 
the field, in December 2012 researchers conducted a 
pilot survey with 30 respondents in the West Bank. 
Based on the practical experience of administering 
the pilot questionnaire, some minor changes were 
made to the final version. The data collected during 
the pilot study was also included in the research find-
ings, although there were minor differences between 
the pilot questionnaire and the final version.
Field Research I (January - April 
2013)
After discussion, the project team agreed a final, re-
vised questionnaire designed to capture local condi-
tions and understandings of climate vulnerability in 
relation to the research aims. Thus, the questionnaire: 
• measured both biophysical and human (econom-
ic, political and social) dimensions of climate 
vulnerability;
• surveyed short-term coping mechanisms;
• surveyed current and potential adaptive capacity;
• ascertained the scope and nature of (post)occupa-
tional practices;
• elicited perceptions on the effectiveness of do-
mestic governmental interventions in reducing 
climate vulnerability.
Each question addressed a particular aspect of climate 
vulnerability, and cumulatively addressed the research 
aims. In this process, coping and adaptive capacity 
were identified as the dependent variables, with the 
principal independent variables encompassing bio-
physical and human (social, economic and political) 
vulnerability. (Post)occupation practices were posited 
as partly constitutive of climate vulnerability. 
In designing the research instruments, researchers 
included both quantitative (categorical) and qual-
itative questions; the former consists of numerical, 
ordinal, and nominal questions. The questionnaire 
was divided into sections, each reflecting a particular 
research theme or category. These include: demo-
graphic concepts/variables; water; product; land; cli-
matic changes; coping and adaptation; political con-
ditions, overall needs, and vision for the future; and 
finally, economic situation. Once the instruments 
were designed, researchers established the concep-
tual validity of the questionnaire through its critical 
review by the project research team. 
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Comparative case study research allows for high lev-
els of conceptual validity (George and Bennett 2005: 
19); in this case by considering in detail, across three 
territorial spaces, the climate vulnerability of rural 
communities affected by (post)occupation.
The survey was administered in farming villages 
across the three regions of study – all facing or with 
recent historical experience of military occupation. 
The sampling strategy used was convenience sam-
pling, arrived at by default, and by virtue of the in-
herent difficulties involved in locating, meeting, and 
interviewing famers in the study regions. 
The sample in the West Bank was conducted in 11 
communities – which includes villages and towns – 
comprising 58 respondents. This figure includes the 
30 questionnaire interviews conducted during the 
pilot study. Study locations were selected to ensure 
that northern, middle, and southern regions of the 
Jordan Rift Valley were covered. Selection criteria 
also aimed to target communities that are subjected 
to varying water conditions, have access to varying 
numbers of water resources, and utilize varying cul-
tivation practices. Table 3.2 below shows the West 
Bank communities surveyed in this study.
Table 3.2: West Bank Communities Surveyed
Number Community Governorate No. of questionnaires
1 Al –Jiftlik Jericho 12
2 Al – Auja Jericho 15
3 Tubas Tubas 4
4 Ras Al Fara’a Tubas 7
5 Froush Beit Dajan Nablus 5
6 Marj Na’ajeh Jericho 2
7 Nwei’meh Jericho 3
8 Jericho Jericho 3
9 Dyouk Jericho 3
10 Zubeidat Jericho 2
11 Marj Ghazal Jericho 1
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The sample in the Golan Heights was conducted 
in two communities, comprising 37 respondents. 
The two villages were selected after carrying out a 
few field visits to the Golan Heights, which includ-
ed meeting with a number of farmers and a leading 
non-governmental organisation, Golan for Develop-
ment. The first village selected was Majdal Shams, 
the capital of the 5 remaining villages, as it encom-
passes the largest area – both geographically and de-
mographically – and is the village whose residents’ 
main occupation is agricultural production. The main 
agricultural produce in Majdal Shams are apples and 
cherries, owing to its high elevation. The second vil-
lage selected was Ein Qinya, due to its relatively low-
er elevation, as well as the change in crops suitable 
for agriculture, such as olive trees. The two villages 
provide a sample of varying topography, crops, and 
climatic conditions.
In the Hasbani region of southern Lebanon, the 
questionnaire was administered purposively across 
the whole study area, generating 296 responses (Ta-
ble 3.3). The communities chosen were those most 
geographically related to the Hasbani River water-
shed, with numbers of questionnaires reflecting the 
relative size of the community. Due to the cumula-
tive stressing conditions from Israeli military-securi-
ty actions over the last few decades, some communi-
ties’ names that show up on the map (see Figure 6.2) 
do not show up here because they were marginalized. 
But the main rural communities of the survey cov-
ered the three administrative areas (Cadha’) of the 
region: Rachaya (north), Hasbaya (middle) and Mar-
jeyoun (south) (Table 3.3), with differences in num-
bers due to what is mentioned above. The question-
naire survey was undertaken by Lebanese Master’s 
students, mostly from the area itself, trained to deliv-
er the survey and accompanied on several field visits 
by the lead Lebanese researcher. The background of 
the research, purpose of questionnaire and its con-
tent were thoroughly explained to the students and, 
of course, to the community themselves. 
Table 3.3: Distribution of Survey Sampling Localities in the Hasbani Basin
Number Community Cadha’ No. of questionnaires
1 Aein Arab Rachaya 7
2 Aein Atta Hasbaya 10
3 Aein Kenya Hasbaya 16
4 Al Howsh Hasbaya 3
5 Amara Marjeyoun 8
6 Aqaba Hasbaya 2
7 Arab lwayze Rachaya 2
8 Ayha Hasbaya 5
9 Beire Rachaya 5
10 Beka Rachaya 3
11 Bekkifa Hasbaya 2
12 Ebel essaqy Marjeyoun 15
13 Halta Merjeyoun 5
14 Hasbaya Hasbaya 27
15 Hebbariyeh Hasbaya 2
16 Kauwkaba Marjeyoun 19
17 Kfar Hamam Marjeyoun 10
18 Kfar Meshke Hasbaya 2
19 Kfardanis Rachaya 2
20 Kfarshouba Marjeyoun 10
21 Kfeir Hasbaya 10
22 Khalwat Hasbaya 5
23 Kherbet eddweir Marjeyoun 3
24 Lebbaya Hasbaya 3
25 Marjeyoun Marjeyoun 13
26 Mazraet Jaafar Hasbaya 3
27 Mdoukha Rachaya 4
28 Mhaydse Rachaya 9
29 Mimess Hasbaya 13
30 Qnaba Hasbaya 5
31 Rafid Rachaya 1
32 Rashaya Hasbaya 10
33 Rashaya elwady Rachaya 8
34 Rfeid Marjeyoun 9
35 Sarda Marjeyoun 7
36 Shebaa Hasbaya 14
37 Shwayya Hasbaya 5
38 Wazzany Marjeyoun 15
39 Yenta Rachaya 4
Total 296
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No. of Cadha’ Cadha’ Name Sub-total no. of questionnaires
1 Hasbaya 103
2 Marjeyoun 127
3 Rachaya 66
Field Research II (July -September 
2013)
A second project workshop held at LSE (May 2013) 
reviewed the questionnaire results from all three 
study regions. Common themes and questions were 
identified to feed into the second stage of the re-
search project (Table 3.4). This follow-up field re-
search, employing focus groups within affected com-
munities, examined in more depth the experience of 
climate vulnerability in (post)occupation contexts, 
including the role of political identity and gender in 
livelihood choices. The focus groups took place in 
Madjal Shams, Golan Heights (August 2013), Has-
baya, Lebanon (September 2013) and Al Jiftlik, West 
Bank (September 2013).
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Table 3.4: Summary of Major Questionnaire Findings for Focus Group Discussion 
Grouping Impact Coping Mechanisms Adaptive Capacity
Israeli Climate Other Farming Practices and  
Technology & Knowledge
Water • Prevention 
& demolition 
of water in-
frastructure
• Allocation
• Pricing
• How do  
Israeli  
actions 
(govern-
ment/mili-
tary) most 
affect your 
farming 
practices?
Quantity
• Have you 
noticed any 
changes to 
the timing 
of the rainy 
season? 
Quality
• What are 
the most  
important 
deter-
minants 
of water 
quantity and 
quality for 
your farming 
practices? 
•  Rainwater harvesting
• Crop selection
• Reducing cultivated land 
• Drip irrigation
• To what extent do 
water conditions affect 
your farming?
• What do you think can 
be improved to help 
you keep farming? 
• How do coping mech-
anisms affect adaptive 
capacity? 
Land • Land-use 
restrictions
• Land  
confiscation
• Zoning 
• Soil quality 
(salinity, 
pests, etc.)
• Crop selection
• Crop /livestock reduc-
tions & changes
• Increased use of pesti-
cides
• Agricultural technologies 
(refrigerators, greenhous-
es, thermometers)
• How do you assess the 
current land/farming 
conditions? 
• How do you foresee 
the future of farming 
under the prevailing 
climatic and Israeli 
conditions? 
• What can be im-
proved?
Socio- 
Economic
• Feelings of insecurity
• Israeli market hegemony
• Government incentives for settlers
• Farmers Associations 
• Collective action (farmers 
helping each other out, 
Jordan Valley) 
• How can farming be 
maintained in your 
opinion? What type of 
technical/political/eco-
nomic assistance do 
you require?
• Role of collective 
action: What collective 
mechanisms reduce 
your vulnerability? 
• How do they help in 
adapting to climat-
ic and non-climatic 
stresses? 
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Data Analysis
In conducting the data analysis, the project team ad-
dressed the research and questionnaire aims. In cases 
where the research aim was descriptive, data analy-
sis techniques were employed to map out the dis-
tribution of various characteristics. These included 
the distribution of all quantitative concepts/variables 
(e.g. all demographic variables); the distribution of 
vulnerability across regions – the comparative ambi-
tion of the study – as well as the distribution of cop-
ing mechanisms across study regions. 
In cases where the research aim was explanatory, 
data analysis techniques were employed to indicate 
connections and relationships between concepts/
variables. These addressed posited determinants of 
coping according to the questionnaire structure – 
water availability, household characteristics, percep-
tion of climate change, assistance measures, (post)
occupation damage – then the relationship between 
short-term coping and long-term adaption, hence ad-
dressing the study hypothesis. The necessary tech-
niques were drawn up to facilitate the process of an-
alyzing the collected data (Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5: Data Analysis
Concept(s)/variable(s) to be an-
alysed 
Purpose: Descriptive (single 
variable) or explanatory (rela-
tionship between variables)
Data analysis test/technique
All vulnerability dimensions Distribution Cross-tabulation (for percentages of each 
type of vulnerability according to region)
 All coping mechanisms Distribution Cross-tabulation for percentages of each 
coping mechanism according to region)
Posited determinants and coping mech-
anisms
Relationship between posited determi-
nants and coping practices (dependent 
variable)
Cross tabulation (% of observed coping 
according to vulnerability)
Coping mechanisms and adaptive capac-
ity (working hypothesis)
Relationship between coping mecha-
nisms and adaptive capacity
Qualitative analysis
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Area and Population
The Jordan River Basin is located primarily in Isra-
el and the Palestinian territories, but also includes 
parts of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, with a total sur-
face area of roughly 18,000 square kilometers (GENI 
2011). The ‘Jordan Rift Valley’, which herein will be 
referred to as the study area, is the part of the Jor-
dan River Basin within the West Bank borders which 
is shared among three governorates including: Jer-
icho & Al Aghwar, Nablus and Tubas, as shown in 
Figure 4.1 below. It covers 29 Local Government 
Units (LGUs), consisting of 2 municipalities and 27 
village councils (JICA 2008). 
Table 4.1: Localities and Population Projection of the Study Area
Source: JICA 2008
Locality Population (est. 2014)
Marj Na’ja 972
Az Zubeidat 1,698
Marj al Ghazal 488
Al Jiftlik 5,575
Fasayel 1,140
Al ‘Auja 5,080
An Nuwei’ma 1,476
‘Ein ad Duyuk al Foqa 1,031
‘Ein ad Duyuk Camp 2,579
‘Ein ad Duyuk at Tahta 1,225
Jericho (Ariha) 25,863
Aqbat Jaber Camp 8,035
Other Localities 96
Total Jericho Governorate 55,258
Bardala 1,998
‘Ein el Beida 1,370
Table 4.1 shows the localities included in the study 
area with the total population and population pro-
jection for each locality; projections were calculated 
with an annual growth rate of 2.7%. Based on this, 
the total population in the study area is estimated to 
be about 127,000 in 2014. 
The Palestinian Jordan Rift Valley is the eastern sec-
tion of the West Bank, running adjacent to the Jor-
dan River. Starting at the Dead Sea and extending 
approximately 70 km north to the border with Israel, 
the Jordan Rift Valley is approximately 15-20 kilo-
metres wide and, at 1,700 square kilometres, covers 
around 28.5% of the West Bank (Maan 2012).
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Kardala 209
‘Aqqaba 7,693
Tayasir 3,037
Al Farisiya 270
Ath Thaghra 327
Al Malih 261
Tubas 20,382
Ras al Far’a 888
El Far’a Camp 7,285
Wadi Far’a 2,966
Tammun 13,,229
Al Hadidiya 232
Other localities 831
Total Tubas Governorate 60,978
Al Badhan 3,060
An Nassariya 1,711
Al ‘Aqrabaniya 1,131
Ein Shibli 250
Frusush Beit Dajan 1,465
Talluza 3,386
Total Nablus 425,056
Total Wadi Far’a Area 11,004
Total Study Area 127,240
Total Study Area (Excl. Camps) 109,340
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Topography and Land Use
The landscape and topographic condition in the 
study area are varied and can be categorized into 
three types, namely mountainous areas, foothills, and 
flat areas, (JICA 2008), described as follows:
• Mountainous areas are located in the upstream 
area of Wadi Far’a. The elevation reaches up to 
600 m above sea level;
• Most of the study area is covered by foothills with 
steep slopes. The elevation of the foothills range 
from 0 to 200 m above sea level; and
• Flat areas, which are lower than the sea level and 
have relatively high agricultural production, lie along 
the Jordan River. The length and width of the areas 
are about 10 km and 1 to 2 km, respectively.
These general land use features are shown in Figure 
4.1, with land cover figures summarised according to 
zoning of Palestinian and Israeli control in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 shows that agriculture is the principal land 
use in the Jordan Rift Valley: it is one of the most im-
portant agricultural areas in Palestine. It is considered 
the food basket for the Palestinians having unique 
climate conditions that allow the production of food 
throughout the year (UNICEF 2010). The Jordan 
Rift Valley area heavily utilizes its agricultural pros-
pects, providing 35% of the total produce distributed 
to the Palestinians. It produces 60% of the vegetables, 
40% of the citrus and 100% of the bananas. This ag-
ricultural success is associated with the area’s unique 
location below sea level, which is likened to a giant 
greenhouse where crops ripen early in the winter 
(Ma’an 2007). Politically, for the Palestinians, the Jor-
dan Rift Valley offers great potential for a viable state 
in terms of access/location and economic success. Its 
borders with Jordan are the only foreseeable entrance/
exit for a future Palestinian state (Ma’an 2007). 
Table 4.2: Present Land Use in the Study Area (km2) 
Source: JICA 2008
Land Cover Area A4 Area B Area C Total
Agricultural Areas 86 36 219 342
Palestinian Communities 16 2 47 65
Israeli Settlement 0 0 17 17
Military Base 13 3 67 84
Other 32 16 537 586
Total 148 (13.5%) 58 (5.3%) 887 (81.2%) 1,093 (100%)
4 In the agreements signed between Israel and the PLO, the West Bank is divided into Areas A, B, and C. Area A was transferred 
to the complete control – security and civil – of the Palestinian Authority; Area B is under Israeli control in security matters and 
Palestinian control in civilian matters; and Area C, which comprises 60 per cent of the land area of the West Bank, remains under 
complete Israeli control in all matters – land registration, planning and building, designating land use, and so forth. ‘Other’ in-
cludes rangeland for Bedouin and natural grassland or unused area.
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Figure 4.1: The Jordan Rift Valley 
Source: JICA 2008
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Climate 
In the Jordan Rift Valley there is a close correlation, 
both on regional and local scale, between physio-
graphic features, geological structures and climate. 
Three climatic zones prevail in the study area, (Hot-
zl et al. 2009: 465-481).
• Mediterranean climate zone: this type of climate 
prevails along the highlands with precipitation 
rates of 600-800 mm/yr. and potential evaporation 
rates of about 1600-1900 mm/yr.
• Arid climate zone: this type of climate prevails in 
the Jordan Rift Valley. Precipitation rates ranges 
form 50-150 mm/yr. and the potential evaporation 
rates reach 2600 mm/yr.
• Semi-arid to Mediterranean climate zone: be-
tween the arid zone of the Jordan Rift Valley floor 
and the Mediterranean zone along the highlands, a 
transitional zone prevails along the slopes extend-
ing from the highlands to the Jordan Rift Valley. 
This zone receives average precipitation rates 
ranging from 200-300 mm/yr, with average evapo-
ration of rates from 1900-2400 mm/yr.
Temperature
Mean monthly temperature in Jericho and Wadi 
Far’a ranges between a minimum of 13.1°C in De-
cember to a maximum of 32.4°C in August, as shown 
in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Mean Monthly Temperature from Jericho Meteorological Station
Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2005
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Precipitation
Rainfall in the study area is mainly observed between 
mid-November and March and is scarce in summer. 
Figure 4.3 shows the annual average rainfall from Jer-
icho and Tubas meteorological station; located with-
in the study area, for the period 1968-2006.
Evaporation
Evaporation rates are high due to high temperatures, 
intensive sunshine and low humidity, particularly 
during the period of May through September. 
Figure 4.3: Annual Average Rainfall from Jericho and Tubas Meteorological Stations 
Source: Palestinian Water Authority
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Water Resources
Wadis 
There are numerous wadis in the study area. The wa-
dis are mainly categorized in nine major wadi basins 
as shown in Table 4.3. Wadi Fara occupies the largest 
catchment area of 340 km2. The northern part of the 
study area including Wadi Fara basin is blessed with 
abundant vegetation and rainfall. On the other hand, 
the ratios of low-lying flat and desert areas with an-
nual rainfall of less than 300 mm become relatively 
larger in the southern wadi basins. Therefore, the 
rainfall hardly contributes to the yield of water re-
sources in the southern area. The availability of dis-
charge records of the wadis is limited, partly because 
of lack of utilization of these sources.
Spring water
There are 114 springs discharging in the West Bank 
and 24 springs of these are located in the study area. 
The 24 springs are categorized in 8 groups by loca-
tions and origins. The characteristics of the groups 
are summarized in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.3: Major Wadi Basins in the Study Area 
Source: JICA 2008
No. Name of Wadi Catchment Area (Km2)
1 Wadi Hahal Milah 2776.1
2 Wadi Abu Sidra 120.8
3 Wadi Far’a 336.9
4 Wadi Al’Ahmer 180.1
5 Wadi Auja 291.4
6 Wadi Nueima 152.5
7 Wadi Qilt 172.4
8 Wadi Marar 102.4
9 Wadi Mukallak 140.5
Total 1773.1
No. Spring Group Basin Catchment Total Discharge (MCM/yr)
1 Nablus Spring Group North Eastern Al Far’a 0.31
2 Al Far’a Spring Group North Eastern Al Far’a 6.51
3 Badhan Spring Group North Eastern Al Far’a 5.15
4 Shibli Spring Group Eastern Al Far’a 2.14
5 Fasayil Spring Group Eastern Al’Ahmer 0.66
6 Al’Auja Spring Group Eastern Al’Auja 9.55
7 Jericho & Dyuke Spring Group Eastern Al Nwai’mah 13.61
8 Al Qilt Spring Group Eastern Al Qilt 7.91
Total 45.84
Table 4.4: Springs in the Study Area
Source: JICA 2008
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Wells
Wells have played an important role as one of the 
main sources of water supply for the Palestinians in 
the study area. Water allocated from the wells and the 
springs is 95% for agriculture and 5% for human con-
sumption. The number of working agricultural wells 
in the study area is 88 out of 184 existing wells; the 
others are non-pumping and abandoned wells. Most 
of these wells were drilled before 1967 and the wells’ 
condition became worse due to electromechanical, 
hydro-geological or economic reasons (JICA 2008).
Water and Occupation
Due to the historical and political development of 
the region, the legal framework governing water is-
sues in Palestine has changed frequently during the 
last hundred years and still awaits final agreement in 
connection with the Israeli-Palestinian peace nego-
tiations. Under Ottoman rule, Shari’a Law was the 
legal norm and provided in principle that the water 
was God’s property and therefore not owned by any 
person. The British mandate Law in Palestine (1922-
1948) and Jordanian legislation (1948-1967) retained 
Shari’a Law and introduced additional laws concern-
ing water rights and management (Hotzl et al. 2009).
The 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank had 
significant implications for Palestinian water resourc-
es and their access and distribution. Under three 
military orders, Israel declared all water resources 
and water usage in the region as controlled by the 
military governor. These regulations are in force to 
the present day. As a transboundary resource, con-
trol over water has significant legal and political im-
plications. Yet while key water resources are shared 
between Israel and the occupied Palestine territory 
(as well as regionally by Syria, Jordan and Lebanon), 
its access and distribution are dependent on a polit-
ical process marred by asymmetries of power (Selby 
2003; Zeitoun 2009).
In July 1967, shortly after Israel occupied the West 
Bank, Yigal Allon, a leading force in the Israeli Labor 
Party and minister of labor at the time, submitted a 
plan to the government; under the plan, which was 
never officially adopted by any government, the Jor-
dan River marks the strategic border of the State of 
Israel and serves as a buffer zone between Israel and 
the  ‘Eastern Front’, referring to a potential Iraqi-Jor-
danian-Syrian military coalition. The plan also called 
for Israel to annex a strip up to 15 kilometres wide 
along the Jordan Rift Valley and Judean Desert, in 
which a relatively small number of Palestinians lived, 
and to leave a land corridor in the Jericho area that 
would link Jordan and Palestinian population cen-
tres in the West Bank. The settlements in the area 
were to be ‘permanent advance-position lookouts 
that would avoid having to call up military forces and 
could not only alert the military to a sudden attack by 
the enemy, but also attempt to halt, or at least delay, 
the enemy’s advance until military forces could con-
trol the situation’ (B’Tselem 2010). From 1967 to 
1977, the government initiated the establishment of 
19 settlements in the Jordan Rift Valley and northern 
Dead Sea area. In September 1977, following the rise 
of the Likud to power, Ariel Sharon, then minister of 
agriculture and head of the Ministerial Committee 
for Settlement, presented a plan that referred to the 
Jordan Rift Valley as ‘the eastern security zone’ and 
proposed expanding the chain of settlements in the 
area. From 1978-1992, under Likud-dominated gov-
ernments, 11 more settlements were built.
With the Oslo Agreement (1992) and the signing 
of the Declaration of Principles, Israelis and Pales-
tinians agreed on the equitable utilization of water 
resources and their joint management. In the Oslo 
II Agreement (1995) there was also a joint under-
standing on Palestinian water entitlements and the 
operation of a joint water commission. However, 
the translation of these principles into actual shares 
still awaits successful peace negotiations. The Oslo 
Accords divided control over the shared surface and 
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groundwater sources roughly 90%-10% in Israel’s fa-
vour. Israel uses approximately 85% of groundwater 
resources originating in the West Bank and Gaza, 
leaving about 15% of available water for Palestinian 
use. Following the signing of the Oslo Accords all is-
sues relating to Palestinian water rights are subject to 
the outcome of Final Status Negotiations.
The so-called interim period has effectively restrict-
ed the development of additional water sources and 
made them contingent upon the approval of the Is-
raeli government. Thus despite the fact that Oslo II 
clearly asserts Palestinian water rights within the po-
litical boundaries of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
(albeit to be resolved in the context of a Final Status 
Agreement) the inability to ensure a just solution in 
line with international law has allowed Israel to pro-
tract the interim period and continue its exploitation 
of Palestinian water resources (Ma’an 2007).
Following the start of the Oslo Process in 1993, Is-
rael’s government, headed by the Labor Party, un-
dertook not to establish new settlements and not 
to expand existing settlements. However, it did not 
consider the undertaking to apply to the Jordan Rift 
Valley. In his speech to the Knesset on approval of 
the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II), 
Prime Minister Rabin explained clearly that ‘the se-
curity border to protect the State of Israel will be set 
in the Jordan Rift Valley, in the broadest meaning of 
this term’.
The present government, headed by Binyamin Ne-
tanyahu, continues this policy, opposing any with-
drawal from the Jordan Rift Valley. In a speech to 
the Knesset, Netanyahu quoted Rabin, saying that 
Israel’s security border will be set in the Jordan Rift 
Valley, and during a visit in the Jordan Rift Valley he 
declared that the army ‘must remain along the Jordan 
River in any future agreement’ (B’Tselem 2010).
Consequently, Jordan Rift Valley settlements have 
grown at a steady rate aided by governmental aid 
that expanded important settlement infrastructure 
and attracted individual settlers. In 1993, the im-
plementation of the Oslo Accords allowed Israel to 
strengthen its means of military control in the region; 
the Oslo Accords designated 95% of the Jordan Rift 
Valley as Area C, legitimizing full Israeli military and 
civil control for the inhabitants of the region (Ma’an 
2012). The settlers in the area, like many Israelis, do 
not consider the Jordan Rift Valley and the northern 
Dead Sea occupied territory, but as part of the sover-
eign State of Israel.
Geopolitical Context
The first civilian settlements in the West Bank 
were built in the Jordan Rift Valley (Ma’an 2012); 
the first colonization wave hit the Jordan Rift Valley 
in 1968 when Israel built three settlements: Meho-
la in the north, Argaman in the centre and Kalia in 
the south. Currently there are 36 settlements in the 
Jordan Rift Valley.
In addition to the highly visible presence of the settle-
ments and settlers in the Jordan Rift Valley, the Israeli 
occupation imposes a wide range of restrictive measures 
on local inhabitants which impacts on every aspect of 
their daily life, and which constitute breaches of inter-
national humanitarian law, international human rights 
law, and the law of self-determination. These include 
land confiscations and closures, property demolitions, 
restrictions on movements of people and goods (in-
cluding through checkpoints and curfews), diversion 
of water resources, restrictions on the maintenance and 
development of Palestinian water infrastructure, ex-
ploitation of the tourism and minerals sectors, restric-
tions on building, expanding or improving structures, 
restricted access to utilities and basic services, control 
of inhabitants’ residential status, and, since 2000, an in-
creased Israeli military presence. 
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Since 1967 Israel has sought to attract settlers to the 
Jordan Rift Valley, although recent efforts were boost-
ed after implementing the unilateral evacuation plan 
from Gaza. After evacuating the settlements in Gaza 
in 2005, Israel took measures to resettle the people 
in the Jordan Rift Valley (Ma’an 2007). Israel has 
expanded available grants to facilitate further settle-
ment activity in the Jordan Rift Valley, and settlers in 
this area enjoy high quality, free or subsidised public 
services. As a result of this policy, thousands of Pal-
estinian families, particularly in the northern part of 
the Valley, have been issued orders to evacuate their 
agricultural land and grazing fields. 
Israel’s justification for occupying the Jordan Rift 
Valley has always been security purposes. Thus, 
consecutive Israeli governments have implemented 
plans seeking complete control of the area.
Taking Control of Land 
Israel has used various means to take control of most 
of the land in the area (B’Tselem 2011), including:
• Settlements: thousands of dunums were taken 
from Palestinian refugees and used to build the 
first settlements there, beginning in 1968 and ex-
tending throughout the 1970s. 
• State land: by legal manipulation, Israel has en-
larged the inventory of ‘state land’ in the area, 
such that 53.4 per cent of the area, four times 
greater than pre-1967, is now deemed state land.
• Military firing zones: Israel has declared 45.7 per 
cent of the area military firing zones, although they 
are situated next to main traffic arteries, alongside 
settlements’ built-up areas and farmland, or in-
clude land of settlements that is under cultivation.
• Nature reserves: Israel has closed some 20 per cent 
of the land by declaring nature reserves, although 
only a small section of them has been developed and 
made suitable for visitors. Two-thirds of the nature 
reserves areas are also areas military firing zones.
• Minefields: Israel has seized lands in the north-
ern Jordan Rift Valley for the Separation Barrier 
and has placed 64 minefields near the route of the 
Jordan River. The army itself contends the land-
mines are no longer required for security purposes.
• Tourist sites: Israel has taken control of most of 
the prominent tourist sites in the area – the north-
ern shore of the Dead Sea, Wadi Qelt, the Qumran 
caves, the springs of the ‘Ein Fashkha reserve, and 
the Qasr Alyahud site. 
With over 81% of the area classified as Area C (under 
full Israeli control), residents of the Jordan Rift Val-
ley face difficult living conditions: limited access to 
water resources; movement restrictions (residence, 
farming and grazing activities); limits in the expan-
sion of the agricultural sector; policies that under-
mine agricultural activity; confiscation of fertile land 
and control of Palestinian access to local and Arab 
markets (JICA 2008).
Ma’an (2011) identifies the following agricultural 
barriers imposed by Israel on Palestinians in the Jor-
dan Rift Valley:
• Complete dependence on Israeli production com-
ponents, such as fertilizers, seeds and irrigation 
networks; it is difficult to find Palestinian alterna-
tives to Israeli goods, meaning that Israeli compa-
nies control price and quality;
• Continued confiscation of agricultural land to 
complete the eastern segregation zone and expand 
settlements and closed military zones;
• Dumping the Palestinian market with Israeli 
goods produced in settlements, especially during 
peak production, in order to eliminate Palestinian 
products that may supply the local markets;
• Demolition and destruction of infrastructure, such 
as curettage of agricultural lands, demolition of 
stone terraces and irrigation networks;
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• Prevention of building new wells, reconditioning 
existing wells and digging deep wells near springs 
and other Palestinian wells, which prevents water 
from running to Palestinian fields;
• Erosion of the livestock sector by imposing high 
fines on shepherds who let their sheep cross an Is-
raeli zone from which Palestinians are forbidden
• Prevention of land owners, who do not have a Jor-
dan Rift Valley residential address on their ID, 
from reaching or cultivating their lands;
• Closure of Arab, Israeli and regional markets to 
Palestinian farmers.
Also, the confiscation of Palestinian lands has greatly 
contributed to the decline in natural grazing areas in 
the Jordan Rift Valley. 
The Israeli Civil Administration has closed an area 
of 240,000 dunums of natural grazing in the Jordan 
Rift Valley under the pretext of wildlife protection, 
although this ‘closed area’ is used for military training 
by the Israeli army, resulting, in the burning of thou-
sands of pastoral dunums per year. Moreover, Israeli 
settlers have directly targeted Palestinian citizens in 
the Jordan Rift Valley by a series of measures, no-
tably limiting the grazing areas, burning fields and 
attacking shepherds and their communities with the 
declared aim of forcing them to leave. These Israeli 
practices have led to a decline of grazing land in the 
Jordan Rift Valley. And as farmers have increasingly 
used fodder as a substitute for natural grazing areas, 
production costs have increased and animal husband-
ry has declined (Ma’an 2011). Figure 4.4 illustrates 
the decline in Palestinian livestock numbers.
Figure 4.4: The Declining Number of Animal Livestock in the Jordan Rift Valley (2000-2010) 
Source: Ma’an 2011
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Taking Control of Water Resources 
The Jordan Rift Valley is situated over the Eastern 
Water Basin. However, Palestinians in the area suffer 
from the lack of access to water due to Israeli restric-
tions and copious usage. They are only permitted to 
use 40% of the water in this basin or approximately 
58 million m3 of water per year (Ma’an 2007).
Most Israeli water drillings in the West Bank – 28 
of the 42 drillings – are located in the Jordan Rift 
Valley. These drillings provide Israel with some 32 
million m3 a year, most of which is allocated to the 
settlements. The annual allocation of water to the 
area’s 9,400 settlers from the drillings, the Jordan 
River, treated wastewater, and artificial water res-
ervoirs is 45 million m3. The water allocation to the 
settlements is almost one-third the quantity of water 
that is accessible to the 2.5 million Palestinians living 
in the West Bank (B’Tselem 2011).
Israel’s control of the water sources in the area has 
caused some Palestinian wells to dry up and led to a 
drop in the quantity of water that can be produced 
from other wells and from springs. In comparison, in 
2008, Palestinians pumped 31 million m3, which is 44 
per cent less than Palestinians produced in the area 
prior to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement of 
1995. Due to the water shortage, Palestinians have ne-
glected farmland and switched to less profitable crops. 
In the Jericho governorate, the amount of land used 
for agriculture is the lowest among the Palestinian 
governorates in the West Bank; 4.7 per cent compared 
to an average of 25 per cent in the other governorates.
Israel’s control of most of the land area also prevents 
equal distribution of water resources to the Pales-
tinian communities in the area; it also prevents the 
movement of water to Palestinian communities out-
side the area. Water consumption in Bedouin com-
munities is equivalent to the quantity that the UN 
has set as the minimal quantity needed to survive 
in humanitarian-disaster areas. Over the last four 
decades, Israel has isolated 162 agricultural wells in 
the Jordan Rift Valley, prohibiting Palestinians from 
using them.
Furthermore, due to various Israeli restrictions, set-
tlers in the Jordan Rift Valley, who cultivate around 
27,000 dunums (6,672 acres) of land, consume about 
41 mcm of water per year. They mainly extract Pal-
estinian water sources, in addition to restricting its 
access to the Palestinians, to cultivate their lands. In 
contrast, Palestinians cultivate about 53,000 dunums 
of the valley’s land, consuming 37 mcm of water per 
year. Overall, settlers consume about six times more 
water than Palestinians (Ma’an 2007). Israel also 
fully controls the Dead Sea and denies Palestinian 
rights to access its water, minerals and shores.
Restrictions on Movement
A 2009 Israeli framework for easing movement re-
strictions in the West Bank was not applied to the 
Jordan Rift Valley, despite the security calm in the 
area. Israel still operates four checkpoints in the Jor-
dan Rift Valley – Tayasir, Hamra, Ma’ale Efrayim, and 
Yitav. At these checkpoints, only Palestinian-owned 
vehicles that Israel recognizes as belonging to res-
idents of the area are allowed to pass (B’Tselem 
2011). These restrictions on movement seriously im-
pair Palestinian life, since most of the educational fa-
cilities and medical clinics that are supposed to serve 
the local residents are situated outside the area. The 
restrictions also prevent landowners, whose IDs do 
not show a Jordan Rift Valley residential address, 
from reaching their lands, resulting in loss of sources 
of income and making it easier for Israel to confis-
cate their land under Israel’s ‘absentee’ property law 
(Ma’an 2007).
By surrounding the Jordan Rift Valley with check-
points, closures and roadblocks and confiscating 
more land for settlements and military bases, Israel 
is securing segregation as a fact on the ground.
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Restrictions on Building
Israel’s planning policy in the Jordan Rift Valley makes 
it practically impossible for Palestinians to build and 
develop their communities. The Civil Administration 
has prepared plans for only a tiny fraction of the Pal-
estinian communities. Furthermore, these plans are 
nothing more than demarcation plans, which do not 
allocate land for new construction and development. 
For example, the plan for al-Jiftlik, the largest commu-
nity in Area C (the area that is under complete Israeli 
control), left 40 per cent of the built-up area of the 
village outside its borders; as a result, the houses of 
many families are in danger of demolition. The plan 
for al-Jiftlik is smaller in land area than the plan issued 
for the Maskiyyot settlement, although al-Jiftlik has 
26 times as many residents (B’Tselem 2011).
Although Palestinians can still cultivate any land re-
maining after Israeli confiscation and colonisation, 
Israel prohibits Palestinians from constructing any 
infrastructure or other development projects, such as 
reclaiming of agricultural land, opening agricultural 
roads or extending irrigation networks. Moreover, Is-
rael continues to confiscate land, demolish homes and 
prevent rehabilitation of existing houses and roads of 
the Palestinians, but maintains plans for settlement 
expansion and infrastructure development for Israeli 
settlers in the Jordan Rift Valley (Ma’an 2007).
Demolitions and Displacements
The Palestinian communities located in the Jordan 
Rift Valley have been facing significant threats of a 
possible wide-scale displacement as the Israeli Oc-
cupation Forces issued around 350 evacuation and 
demolition orders, from January 2010 up until June 
2011 (Ma’an 2011). It is estimated that 11 Palestin-
ian communities have been targeted by consistent 
Israeli violations, as 242 demolitions, eviction and re-
moval orders have been issued. Five of these commu-
nities are located in the northern part of the Jordan 
Rift Valley, in the Tubas governorate, while six are in 
the southern and middle areas of the West Bank in 
the Jericho governorate (Ma’an 2011).
Socio-economic Indicators
Poverty & Unemployment
The wide range of restrictions placed on them by 
the occupation mean that the majority of Palestin-
ians living in the Jordan Rift Valley live below the 
poverty line. In 2011 poverty levels were 60% in the 
study area, compared with 46% in the rest of the 
West Bank, and 70% in Gaza (Ma’an 2011). In 2006 
unemployment rates reached 21% in Jericho and Tu-
bas districts, with 20.5% being Palestinian Authority 
employees who were not receiving their salaries (Jor-
dan Valley Solidarity, 2010). Unemployment rates in 
these governorates have remained higher than those 
for the West Bank as a whole: in 2013 unemployment 
rates were 21.2% in the Jericho Governorate and 
22.5% in the Tuba Governorate, compared to 20.3% 
average for the West Bank (Palestinian Central Bu-
reau of Statistics, 2013: 19).
Infrastructure
There is a lack of basic services available to the Jor-
dan Rift Valley, especially in Area C. The occupation 
has the effect of denying to the local communities 
adequate electricity, health, education, sewage, wa-
ter and public transportation services. Health ser-
vices in particular do not meet the requirements of 
the population, especially in emergency situations, 
where poorly equipped clinics with limited hours 
of operation are frequently required to transfer pa-
tients to city hospitals, often subject to delays at 
checkpoints with potentially detrimental effects on 
patients’ health.
Similarly, the prohibition on improving buildings 
means that no new schools can be built, and existing 
ones cannot be improved to meet the socio-economic 
needs of a growing population. In 2010 13,000 Pales-
tinian students in the Jordan Rift Valley returned to 
schools in tents, caravans or tin shacks (Ma’an 2011).
The Occupied Golan Heights: Study Area Profile
Muna Dajani (lead author) and Ziad Mimi
Area and Population
Historically, the Golan Heights are located in Syria, 
bordering with Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine. For 
that reason the Golan Heights have been a transit 
zone between these countries throughout history. 
Since the establishment of the Israeli state, the Go-
lan Heights are in the south-west of Syria, bordered 
by Lebanon in the north, in the west by the Gali-
lee region of Israel and the Jordan Valley, and in the 
south by Jordan and the Yarmouk valley. In the east 
are the provinces of Damascus and Dara’a, the plains 
of Horan and the foothills of Mount Hermon. 
The area of the Syrian Golan is 1860 km2. During the 
June 1967 war, Israel occupied about 1250 km2 (Brik 
2009). During the October War of 1973, Syria was 
able to take back 50 km2, and the rest remained un-
der occupation. The Syrian population of the Golan 
Heights has dramatically changed due to the Israeli 
occupation of 1967, as shown in Table 5.1. With a his-
torically prosperous population of 153,000 inhabitants 
in 1967, this population has diminished substantially 
due to ethnic cleansing and forced displacement and 
merely 7000 residents remained in the Golan after 
the war. Today, Syrian residents compromise 50% 
of the inhabitants of the occupied Golan Heights 
(oGH) with 20,000 residents, while Jewish Israeli 
settlers comprise the other 50%. This demographic 
change has transformed the indigenous inhabitants of 
the Golan into residents inside Israel with temporary 
status and no citizenship (Jawlan 2012).
Table 5.1: Population in Occupied Golan Heights 
Source: Jawlan 2012
Year Population
1949 62,293
1967 153,000
After 1967 7,000
Today
Topography and Land Use
The Golan Heights is a sloping plateau, ascending 
from 300 metres on its west end to 1,000 meters on 
its east end, covering a total area of 1,860 km2 (Brik 
2009). The Jordan River and the Lake Tiberias mark 
the western border, the Yarmouk River demarcates 
its southern perimeter and the Hermon Mountain 
marks the northern boundary of the Heights (Inbar 
2011). The Golan Heights elevation ranges from 
2,814 metres at the Hermon Mountain to below sea 
level at Lake Tiberias and the Yarmouk River, with 
an average elevation of 1,000 metres (CIA Factbook 
2012). The Golan Heights area is covered by basalt, 
originating from volcanic eruptions, and serving as lo-
cal aquifers (Dafny et al. 2003). The southern Golan, 
where the first illegal Israeli settlement was built, 
is the richest area in terms of soil quality and water 
availability and has the most productive agricultural 
land (Brik 2009). In the north of the oGH, the less 
fertile scrub landscape is mainly used for grazing: Is-
raeli beef cattle ranches have been operating here for 
over 30 years.
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Agriculture in the Golan
Following the occupation in 1967 and the declara-
tion by the state of Israel that 98% of the oGH lands 
are closed military zones, the agricultural practices 
conducted by the Syrian residents in the area were 
transformed from extensive to intensive (Al Marsad 
2009). This has shifted the agricultural practices of 
the Syrian inhabitants to production of apples. His-
torically, the Syrian population of the Golan used 
to depend on rain-fed agriculture due to the vast 
amounts of land available for that and the lack of strict 
planning rules in their area and rearing of livestock 
in rocky and mountainous terrain (Mara’i & Halabi 
1992). Following the occupation and annexation, a 
huge shift in the type of products grown (from wheat 
and barley) and from rain-fed to irrigated crops. This 
was highly influenced by the Israeli occupation and 
confiscation of land, the introduction of agricultural 
technologies and the limitation on water utilisation 
(Personal Interview, August 2012). 
Agricultural Committees
The total cultivated land of the Golan Heights by the 
Syrian population is around 20,000 dunums, 18,000 of 
which are planted with apples. This cultivated land 
represents only 30% of the total area of Syrian land 
owned by people living in the oGH. Before the occu-
pation, elected collective communities, in coordina-
tion with the Syrian government, used to coordinate 
the agricultural activities in the Golan Heights. After 
the occupation, these committees were dissolved, 
leaving the Syrian residents totally disconnected to 
Syrian government assistance and the Syrian market 
(Al Marsad 2009). This has led to an emerging depen-
dence on Israeli products, especially dairy. During the 
1970s, the Syrian population started organizing around 
the issue of water rights and the right to be allocat-
ed water for agriculture from the local water sources, 
especially Ram Lake. Therefore, agricultural land in 
the oGH belonging to the Syrian villages was divided 
into areas or plots. Each area established a committee 
for the farmers responsible for management of water 
purchase issues from Mekorot (the national water 
company of Israel) and other land management pro-
cesses. Today, 20 agricultural committees exist in the 
five villages of the Golan (Mara’i 2012). 
Since 2007, agricultural centres were established 
which collectively manage committees that come to-
gether. These centres were established to enhance 
transparency, facilitate water payment, avoid finan-
cial disputes and provide a legal and managerial plat-
form to better manage the committees work. Today, 
one centre in Majdal Shams serves 3,500 farmers 
from 6 committees. Each farmer is thus obliged to 
pay his/her water bill through the centre, which is 
processed after receiving the water meter readings 
from the water regulator of each shared plot. The 
centre also facilitates and provides the committees 
with opportunities to benefit from governmental 
subsidies, grants and reclamation of water pumping 
fees, therefore re-claiming the legal entitlements of 
the farmers to these subsidies. The reclamation of 
water pumping fees was a precedent by the centre, 
taking into consideration that the pumping expens-
es had always been incurred by the farmers with no 
compensation from Mekorot. 
Today, the Syrian farmers of the oGH are paying a 
high rate of 3.90 – 4.20 NIS per cubic metre while 
the settlements are acquiring water with a lower rate 
of 0.90 NIS per cubic metre due to incentives and 
subsidies given to them by the Israeli government 
(Mara’i 2012).
Settler Land Use and Agriculture
Today, the Israeli settlements use 90,000 dunums 
for agricultural purposes. According to the latest sea-
sonal study on the agricultural products of 2012, 70% 
of the Gross National Product in the Golan Region-
al Council comes from agriculture, livestock, dairy 
products and flower growing (Shishibagolan 2012). 
The settlements in the oGH today produce mainly 
beef, cherry, apples, wine and mineral water. In ad-
dition, many of these products are exported to many 
countries around the world, including the USA and 
Canada (Al Marsad 2009).
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Climate
The Golan Heights climate is generally described 
as Mediterranean with dry summers and cold wet 
winters, with temperatures ranging from a minimum 
average of 4.4 to a maximum average of 36 degrees 
Celsius (Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel 2012: 
68). In the Golan Heights, the annual precipitation 
varies from 1,200 mm in the northeast to less than 
500 mm in the south (UNESCO 2009). Annually, 
the GH receives 250 million cubic metres (MCM) of 
rain (Brik 2009). 
Water Resources
The occupied sector of the Golan Heights provides 
a substantial portion of the water in the Jordan River 
watershed, which in turn provides a portion of Israel’s 
water supply (Gvirtzman 2002). The Golan Heights 
are the source of about one third of Israel’s water 
supply for drinking, irrigation and other uses. This 
is one of the main reasons for the continued Israeli 
refusal to implement the provisions of UN Security 
Council Resolution 242 and withdraw to beyond the 
borders of 4th June 1967 (Dajani 2011). The sources 
of the Jordan River are the Dan (270 million m3/yr), 
the Banias (120 million m3/yr) and the Hasbani (120 
million m3/yr) that flow at the foot of the Hermon 
Mountain (Zeitoun et al. 2012; Brik 2009). Since 
the occupation in 1967, Syria is not allowed to uti-
lise the contribution the Banias springs make to the 
Jordan River. Today and since the occupation, Isra-
el controls the three tributaries of the River Jordan 
and exercises full control of their waters (Zeitoun et 
al. 2012). The Israeli water company, Mekorot, is in 
charge of water management in the oGH and the ba-
sin as a whole. 
Three tributaries of the Jordan River, the Dan, Has-
bani, and Banias find their sources in this region and 
are crucial to agricultural development. 
The inactive volcanic crater in the northern Golan 
is filled with water and forms Masada Lake (also 
known as Ram Lake). It has an area of 1 km2. Lake 
Masada is a unique natural phenomenon in Syria and 
the Arab world, the lake’s surface being 945 metres 
higher than sea level. Recently and due to pumping 
by Mekorot, Lake Ram is under the threat of drying 
up. Once 1000 m long and 600 m wide, this lake has 
provided water for agriculture, especially for apple 
orchards (Jawlan 2012). 
Water and Occupation
After the occupation, Israel intensified its settlement 
building in the south of the Golan Heights, known to 
be the most fertile part of the heights and the most 
productive zone agriculturally. Israel initially provid-
ed water resources for these agricultural settlements 
by pumping water from Lake Tiberias. With the high 
elevation difference and the costly process of pump-
ing, the Israeli authorities begun a project of con-
structing artificial lakes to collect surface water from 
the North of the Golan and provide water resources 
to its agricultural settlements. Today, there are 18 
artificial lakes built by Israel to capture the water of 
the many springs of the Golan through construct-
ing multiple dams for storage and use in the illegal 
agricultural settlements in the south of the Golan. 
The total yield of these lakes is around 30 MCM/
year (Mara’i 2012). ‘Mey Golan [Golan Water]’ is a 
company that operates and manages all water reser-
voirs in the occupied Golan Heights, from the north 
at Hermon Mountain to the south in Hamat Gader. 
It provides water for 27 agricultural communities and 
aims to provide potable water and wastewater for ag-
riculture and domestic use (Golan Residents Com-
mittee 2013). 
In the 1970s, with the introduction of mechanisation 
into agricultural practices, the Syrian population of 
the Golan started investing more in harvesting rain-
water and building large reservoirs for water storage. 
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This occurred until the 1970s, when Israel started 
to impose strict laws on water abstraction and con-
fiscated all existing water reservoirs in an attempt 
to control the water used by the Syrian population. 
During the period when Israel annexed the Golan, 
the Syrian population continued the construction 
of 1000 cubic metre reservoirs to collect rain water 
and use it for agriculture. There were some cases of 
reservoirs demolitions but with no clear laws regard-
ing rainwater collection at that time, 650 reservoirs 
remain in use. Today, five different permits are re-
quired from agencies and governmental offices to ob-
tain a permit to construct and use such a reservoir. In 
addition, rain water harvesting is considered illegal in 
Israel and its occupied territories under the guise of 
it being state property (Mara’i 2012).
Today, the Syrian population in the oGH receives 
about 250 cubic metres of water per dunum of land 
while the Israeli settlers receive 750 cubic metres 
per dunum, limiting the Syrian land and crop devel-
opment. Additionally, Syrian farmers are subjected 
to cuts in water supply in dry seasons to ensure that 
settlements receive their share without interruption 
(ILO 2012).
Geopolitical Context
Golan Heights before 1967
The Franco-British Boundary Agreement of 1920 
started dividing the land previously governed by the 
Ottoman regime. According to this agreement, most of 
the Golan Heights was placed under the French man-
date, including the Wazzani and Banias, highlighting 
the water borders which are still in negotiation and de-
bate until today. In 1944, Syria became independent 
of the French colonial regime and the Golan Heights 
became part of the Quneitra governorate. 
After the Israeli-Arab war of 1948, the 1949 armistice 
agreement signed between Israel and the neighbour-
ing Arab countries (Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan) 
established demarcation lines between Israeli forc-
es and the Arab forces. The armistice line of 1949 is 
where the Syrian army withdrew its forces in three 
areas to the west of the 1923 international line and 
west of the Jordan River as seen in Figure 5.1 (Hof 
2009). There were numerous violations, from both 
sides, of the armistice agreement. In the demilita-
rised zone Israel unilaterally removed Arabs, replac-
ing them with settlers, prompting exchanges of fire 
with the Syrians. Syria and Israel also clashed over 
Israeli water development works in the Huleh basin, 
which lies in the demilitarised zone (Daoudy 2008; 
Muslih 1993). 
Through 1965–1966, Israel and Syria exchanged fire 
over an Arab plan to divert the Jordan River head-
waters, presumably to block Israeli construction of 
a national water carrier, an out-of basin diversion 
plan from the Sea of Galilee to areas of the coast and 
southern Israel (Wolf 1998). This attempt was avert-
ed by Israeli use of force, which precipitated the out-
break of the 1967 War (Inbar 2011).
Golan Heights after 1967: Occupation
Israel captured the Golan Heights in the 1967 war. In 
1973, Syria managed to reclaim the capital city of the 
Golan, Quenitra, albeit heavily damaged. The armi-
stice agreement was signed in 1974, where the Unit-
ed Nations Disengagement Force (UNDOF) was de-
ployed on the ceasefire line. In 1981, Israel annexed 
the oGH, applying Israeli jurisdiction, administration 
and laws: the Golan Heights Law was was ratified by 
the Knesset on December 14, 1981. Under UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 497/1981, the UN declared 
the annexation null and void. 
The Golan Heights Law required Syrian residents 
of the oGH to change their citizenship to Israeli. 
This was widely refused by the residents, with 10% 
accepting Israeli citizenship, and the oGH saw a res-
idents’ strike and non-violent actions opposing the 
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5
of the Jordan River and along the northeastern quadrant of the Sea of Galilee placed 
them under the de facto control of Syria, “international boundary” notwithstanding. 
This situation prevailed throughout the mandate era, until the second week of June 
1967.
During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Syrian troops penetrated Palestine-Israel in 
several areas. When an armistice was signed in July 1949, Syrian forces still held 
blocs of territory west of the 1923 international boundary. The parties agreed to a 
compromise: Syrian forces would withdraw from the farthest extent of their advance 
(the truce line—later the Armistice Demarcation Line [ADL]) to the 1923 international 
boundary, and Israel would refrain from introducing military forces into areas vacated 
by Syria. Thus was created a demilitarized zone consisting of three, noncontiguous 
blocs of land in what had been mandate Palestine totaling 66.5 square kilometers.
In some places the ADL corresponded to the 1923 international boundary, and 
in others it penetrated into the former Palestine mandate. The demilitarized zone 
was everything between the ADL and the 1923 international boundary. Syria—quite 
inexplicably—agreed that the ADL along the northeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee 
would correspond to the 1923 international boundary (i.e., the 10-meter strip), even 
Figure 5.1: The Golan Heights 
Source: Hof 2009
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law (Nashashibi 2007).
Before 1967, the Golan Heights had a prosperous 
and thriving population living in 164 villages and 146 
farms (Davis 1983). After 1967, only six Arab villages 
remained in the oGH; Majdal Shams, Masada, Buqa-
ta, Ein Qenia, Ghagar and Sahita. Residents of Sahita 
were displaced to the village of Masada in 1971-1972, 
when Israel destroyed the village and turned it into 
military camp along the ceasefire line. The Israeli oc-
cupation has destroyed 131 villages, 112 farms and 
two cities. The proportion of total demolition, dis-
placement and genocide in the oGH is about 98% of 
the total area; only five villages in the northern Golan 
remain today. Today, there are 41 Jewish-only set-
tlements in the oGH, with a population of around 
20,000 inhabitants (CIA Factbook 2012). Today only 
5% of the Golan Heights is under the control of its 
indigenous population. 
Socio-Economic Indicators
The Golan Heights is known for its fertile land, am-
ple water resources and its ideal location for tourism 
and for agricultural development. Therefore, the Is-
raeli settlements that exist today in the oGH depend 
heavily on agriculture, industry and tourism to main-
tain their economic security. With the Israeli occu-
pation maintaining a strong grip on natural resourc-
es, mainly land and water, it has provided subsidies 
and economic incentives for settlers’ investment in 
farms and agricultural businesses. However, Israel’s 
economic practices towards the Arab population have 
been far from supportive. Land confiscation, water 
control and creation of competitive settler goods 
have all played a role in weakening the economic sta-
tus of the Syrian inhabitants of the Golan. 
Poverty and Uncertainty
The economic situation in the oGH is deteriorating 
due to the Israeli occupation; namely, the lack of job 
opportunities and the high competition with settlers 
practising agriculture, which is still the main source 
of income for the Syrian population of the Golan 
(ILO 2012). Restricted access to resources and im-
posed taxation (without representation) exemplify 
this disparity (Nashashibi, 2007).
In terms of employment, the Syrian population is ex-
periencing discrimination and limited employment 
opportunities in Israel. According to the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation, Israeli policies and laws 
limiting access to resource have hindered any sub-
stantial growth of the Arab villages in the oGH (ILO 
2012). Nevertheless, the communities in the villages 
have established and maintained a strong social se-
curity net that allowed them to develop the area col-
lectively and strengthen their resistance against the 
occupation (Al Marsad 2009)
Tourism
Tourism in the Golan Heights draws around 3 mil-
lion visitors a year, according to the Israeli Ministry 
of Tourism. The first Israeli ski resort is on Mount 
Hermon in addition to many nature hiking trails, 
nature reserves, wineries in settlements and archae-
ological sites. According to Golan for Development 
(GfD), the Mount Hermon ski resort is managed by 
the settlement of Navi Ativ, where all profit goes to 
the settlement with an average visitor number of 
300,000 people in the winter season. 
Southern Lebanon: Hasbani Watershed Study Area Profile
Mohammed Khawlie (lead author)
Area and Population
The Hasbani River, the result of the merging the 
Hasbani and Wazzani tributaries plus others, all is-
suing from Lebanon, constitutes a major watershed 
in Southern Lebanon, and is one of the main con-
tributors to the Jordan River at its upper reaches: 
The Hasbani-Banias-Dan tributaries (Zeitoun et al. 
2012) (see Figure 6.1). At the upper reaches, Jordan 
River water sources also come from Syria and Isra-
el, making its waters shared by five political entities: 
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel and the occupied Pal-
estinian territory. 
The Hasbani Basin covers about a 670 km2 water-
shed in Southern Lebanon (bordered by Syria to the 
east and occupied Palestine to the south), making 
about 3.62% of all Jordan River Basin, with a usual 
annual average flow of about 160 million cubic me-
tres (mcm). And yet, in spite of the Johnston Plan 
of 1953 allocating to Lebanon, as a riparian country, 
only 35 mcm annually, Israel does not allow Lebanon 
to use this share. Al-Shaikh Mountain (Haramoun), 
occupying the whole eastern flank of the Basin from 
north to south, is the major source of water. This 
comes from its high peaks, up to 2814m, with snow 
cover for more than 4 months of the year, plus the 
many water springs issuing from its precipices and 
slopes, including the Hasbaya and Wazzani springs. 
The large, elevated and rugged mountain mass, with 
natural diversity and very mild weather, has long at-
tracted settlement with the current population es-
timated be around 170,000 residents (MoSA 1998).
The area has enjoyed a strategic position since history 
as lying on the cross roads between Lebanon-Syria-Pal-
estine, serving multi-purpose goals in social interac-
tion, agricultural exchange, commercial dealings and 
tourism, facilitated by a fairly dense network of roads. 
The different lithologies, reflecting the geological 
history plus surface cover, soil types and interaction 
with the climate elements and hydrology, have al-
lowed a variety of processes for human benefit, be it 
in agriculture (most prominent), in industry, in ser-
vices and human settlements.
Hasbaya is the major urban centre, located about 
750m above sea level and 114km south-east from 
the capital Beirut. It services a large congregation of 
towns and villages, 161 in total, spreading over 3 Ca-
zas (administrative districts). The area hosts a num-
ber of archaeological and historical sites, including 
Al-Chehab Palace which used to be a Crusader’s cas-
tle, the Antara palace at mount Al-Shaikh, Al-Khalil 
Ibrahim mazar, and a lot of widely dispersed Roman 
ruins, bridges, colonial castles, old churches, towers 
and Khans (Sharrouf 2012).
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Figure 6.1: The Jordan River Basin Showing Upper Reaches including the Hasbani River 
Source: Zeitoun et al. 2013: 296
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The Hasbaya district comprises 4.2% of total Leb-
anese housing (compared to about 18% in Beirut), 
with an average of 5 people per residence, of whom 
about 70% live in relatively recent concrete structures 
from the last 30 years (including re-construction af-
ter damage caused by the Israeli military) (MoSA, 
1998). The rest live in stone or mud/brick huts or 
houses. Population growth rate varied between a 
high of 2.5% to a low of 1.5% (the latter during Israeli 
control from 1982-2000). Figure 6.2 shows the distri-
bution of population in the Hasbani Basin.
Figure 6.2: Distribution of Population over 
Towns and Villages in the Hasbani Basin
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Topography and Land-use
Figure 6.3 reveals the land forms and physiograph-
ic layout of the watershed. The land can be divided 
into four zones relating to its surficial processes: El-
evated zone, containing most of Jabal Al-Shaikh and 
other mountains north-east and east; Sloping zone 
comprising the north-west, central and west; the 
Platform zone filling the south-west; and the basalt 
Plains towards the south. Physiographically, these 
same zones, consecutively, are occupied by the ele-
vated Jurassic limestones and dolomites, highly dis-
sected and karstic; followed by the mixed Cretaceous 
calcareous and clastic rocks with variable to moder-
ate slopes, also highly dissected and karstic; then the 
plateau holds the Hasbani River with its mostly Pa-
leogene marls on both banks of the Wadi with mod-
erate dissection and clastics filling the highly weath-
ered volcanic forms; and finally the Neogene mostly 
basaltic plain holding the Wazzani watershed, where 
the volcanic rocks spread widely as they become part 
of the Golan volcanic region. 
Figure 6.4 shows that the green cover is quite dense 
in the study area with all types of vegetation, al-
though, due to the rugged rocks at higher elevations, 
35% is barren. Especially notable are the olive groves, 
considered among the largest in the country, and due 
to the diversity in local weather, there is a variety of 
agro-products, i.e. fruits, vines, citrus and field crops, 
interspersed with forests and urban patches. 
There have been major changes in land use over the 
past 40-50 years, ostensibly caused by chaotic urban 
expansion at the expense of agriculture, forestry and 
natural resources. Masri et al. (2002) revealed dras-
tic reductions in Lebanon’s agro-production between 
the 1970s and 2000, accentuated in southern Leba-
non by weak Lebanese governmental authority in the 
face of the Israeli occupation and subsequent mili-
tary incursions. Most recently, the 2006 summer war 
between Israel and Lebanon caused major economic 
losses to the Lebanese agricultural sector (Darwish 
et al. 2009). The claim that conflict-related, rather 
than climate-related, stresses have resulted in signif-
icant losses to agricultural production was tested by 
the project fieldwork surveys and focus group work.Figure 6.3: Physiography of the Hasbani Basin
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Figure 6.4: Land Use/Land Cover Map of the Hasbani Watershed 
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Agriculture in the Hasbani Basin
In the Hasbani Basin up to 70% of the population 
works in agriculture, although there is high local 
variability. Thus in Hasbaya city, only about 10% 
work in agriculture, while 25% work in industry and 
most of the rest work in services: this is broadly rep-
resentative of national employment in these sectors 
(Sharrouf 2012).
Less than 22% of the Hasbani Basin is arable, and up 
to 60% needs irrigation, with about 18% used for agri-
culture. Indeed, a recent land-cover survey (Merheb 
2010) revealed the actually irrigated land is about 
15%, with 13% field crops and 2% are fruits. Another 
actual 15% for non-irrigated land is 11% olives (the 
major single product with 70% of agro-land) and 4% 
vines and other products. Forest covers about 6% and 
grassland 60%, with 4-5% bare and urbanized. Prod-
ucts vary from citrus to legumes, vegetables, fruits 
and olives. Use is made of available water in rivers, 
canals and water wells. Vegetable production is var-
ied: tomatoes, cucumbers, cauliflower, cabbage, egg-
plants, zucchini, onions, lettuce, watermelons as the 
major ones, occupy the plains and river banks. Major 
cereals include wheat and barley. Fruits are also var-
ied, with significant production of apples, pomegran-
ates, and pears. A few freshwater fisheries exist in 
the Hasbani River which serve some restaurants and 
partly for the local community. Growth in this sector 
is constrained by persistent river pollution, and lack 
of governmental assistance. 
A recent trend is the growth of agricultural produc-
tion from greenhouses. The use of heavy machinery 
is also increasing, as is irrigation and the use of insec-
ticides and herbicides. The increasing intensification 
of agricultural production is not monitored closely for 
environmental effects, nor is it usually supported by 
agri-training. Pastoral land use is very low reflecting 
the lack of accessible rangeland and widespread land 
degradation. Chicken husbandry is increasing in the 
area with at least 200,000-300,000 heads produced 
for meat and another 50,000 for producing eggs to 
the local market.
Climate
As a typical Mediterranean climate, the region is 
characterised by a wet short winter and a long hot 
and dry summer. The annual rainfall ranges between 
600 -1100 mm/year, with annual average standing at 
940 mm, leading to a total precipitation of 565 Mm3 
over the watershed (Abdallah et al. 2006). Rain falls 
for around 90-120 days between September and 
April, but 90% of the total annual precipitation falls 
erratically between the months of November and 
March (MoE 2001; MoT/PW 1977). Snow (where it 
accumulates on high mountains and slopes normal-
ly exceeding 1200m elevation, though under severe 
weather conditions may go down to 800-900m) falls 
between December and March. This means that the 
rest of the year, especially in the dry summer, not only 
there is a high need for water, but also that there are 
often shortages. Indeed, the frequency of droughts is 
increasing recently, which is important because it is 
already known that precipitation declines to 60% and 
even 40% in consecutive dry years (e.g. in 1988-91).
Increased drought frequency is one of the projected 
climate change impacts for Lebanon (Khawlie 2003). 
The HadCM2/HHGGax model predicts an average of 
1.6°C increase in temperature by the year 2020, and 
an equivalent average of about 3% less precipitation 
(MoE 1999), though some local researchers project a 
higher value, but that comes from short time projec-
tions. Water balance is generally barely secured, with 
deficits commonly felt locally. The projection in ten 
to fifteen years, however, predicts an annual deficit 
of up to 800 Mcm with the business as usual scenario 
(see Introduction for regional climate projections). 
Lebanon is divided, going from west to east, into four 
main climatic zones determined by its geographic lo-
cation and the configuration of the terrain. This is 
due to two dominating high mountain ranges aligned 
north-northeast parallel to Lebanon’s Mediterranean 
Sea coast. 
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These zones are: 1. Coastal stretch of narrow plains, 
up to about 200-400m elevation, which receives an-
nually 700mm rain on average; 2. Mount Lebanon 
(or Coastal/or Western Mountain Range) rising with 
rather steep slopes to reach, in the north, to 3080m, 
receives anywhere between 800-1400mm rain, and 
snow on elevated areas; 3. The inner Bekaa plain av-
eraging about 900m, receives between 700mm in the 
south down to 250mm in the north, and 4. The An-
ti-Lebanon range (or Inner/Eastern Range) further 
inland (whose highest peak is in Jabal ech-Shaikh-Ha-
ramoun at 2814m) receives between 300mm to more 
than 1100mm. The Coastal Mountain barrier is 
subdued in the south down to an elevation of about 
600m, making the sea influence deeper inland than 
in the north. This, plus the fact that the inner moun-
tain chain peaks highest also in the south, gives the 
Hasbani watershed, from Ibel es-Saqi west to Har-
amoun eastward, its climatic character. Along with 
the rainfall, the snow of Jabal ech-Shaikh charges the 
three main tributaries of the Upper Jordan River (i.e. 
Hasbani, Dan, and Banias) (Zeitoun et al. 2012), as 
well as the groundwater in the region.
Water Resources of the Hasbani 
Basin 
Authoritative information is lacking on the water re-
sources of the Hasbani Basin. As with Lebanon gen-
erally, proper monitoring and data recording/updat-
ing in Lebanon is not consistent, sometimes reliable 
and often not continuous due to both technical and 
geopolitical challenges. The former include improp-
er planning, lack of technical know-how and funding. 
There is a lack of quantification on: infiltration, run-
off, aquifer rejuvenation, localised evapo-transpira-
tion, snow-equivalence and other relevant processes. 
For southern Lebanon, geopolitical challenges in-
clude continuous Israeli interference in, and some-
times damage to, water resource infrastructure, no-
tably public drinking reservoirs (most recently in the 
summer 2006 war); and also the unwillingness of the 
Lebanese government to develop new supply sources 
on the Hasbani River because of past Israeli opposi-
tion to, and past destruction of, such infrastructure 
(Zeitoun et al. 2013; Zeitoun et al. 2014).
The lack of accuracy of water statistics is well reflect-
ed in divergent figures on the annual water balance 
in Lebanon (Jaber 1994; Khawlie 2002): Tables 6.1 
and 6.2 provide, therefore, an approximation. As in-
dicated in Table 6.1, the estimated annual flow of 
the Hasbani River is 169 Mm3 (million cubic metres 
per year).
Wazzani Pumping Station
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Table 6.1: Lebanon Annual Water Flows
Table 6.2: Lebanon Freshwater Availability (mm3) 
Source  Annual flow mm3
Precipitation 8600
Evapotranspiration 4300
Unexploited water (into ground & sea) 880
Underground losses into Israel/Palestine 150
Surface rivers to Syria (A’assi & N. el-Kabir) 510
Allocation to Lebanon from A’assi 80
Hasbani river 160
Exploitable ground water 400
Possible net available surface flow 2280
Precipitation Wet Year 9000
Dry Year 4500
Evapotranspiration Wet Year 4500
Dry Year 2250
Surface Water Coastal Rivers 2570
Internal Rivers 1305
Ground Water Losses to the sea 270
Losses to Syria 175
Losses to Palestine/Israel 125
Stored groundwater 1156
Spring Water 1150
Available Water Surface water 2200
Ground water 1200
Total Available Water 3400
Inaccessible surface water 2000
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The density of drainage lines shown in Figure 6.5 is 
a reflection of the ruggedness of the Hasbani Basin, 
notably within Jabal ech-Shaikh. It is an indication of 
water infiltration/non-infiltration in the subsurface, 
which is important for groundwater rejuvenation under 
the cover of snow as observed for around 4-5 months.
As stated above, the annual rainfall over the Hasbani 
Basin ranges between 600 -1100 mm/year, with an-
nual average standing at 940 mm. Once again, cau-
tion is advised in interpreting these figures in view 
of the increasing frequency of drier conditions in 
recent years. Merheb (2010) calculated the natural 
water balance over the Hasbani Basin, with baseline 
annual data from 2005, using the Water Evaluation 
and Planning (WEAP) system. He estimated precip-
itation at 463.9 Mm3 with irrigation at 18.4 Mm3, a 
decrease in soil moisture at 97.9 Mm3 ; evapo-tran-
spiration at (minus) 86.3 Mm3, groundwater flow at 
(minus) 171.1 Mm3, surface run-off at (minus) 91.8 
Mm3, and increase in soil moisture (minus) 100.9 
Mm3; he further indicated the water demand as: Wa-
ter for domestic and non-domestic use at 12.5 Mm3, 
water for irrigation at 89 Mm3, and for livestock at 
0.2 Mm3. Drawing partly on the data from Merheb 
(2010), Zeitoun et al. (2012: 51) offer a higher-end 
estimate of total water abstraction from the Hasbani Basin 
of 8 Mm3 comprising 3.7 Mm3 from nine public wells, 
0.7 Mm3 from private wells and approximately 4 Mm3 
from the Wazzani pumping station. 
Starting with the main natural water flows, the Has-
bani River, with three tributaries: Nahr Abou Djaji; 
Nahr el Fardis and Nahr Sreid (with minor season-
al rivulets contributing to the tributaries, as several 
springs and snow-melt from Haramoun-Hasbaya area 
and Bekaa el-Gharbi send their waters to join course) 
that contribute on seasonal basis to supply the Has-
bani watercourse. The Hasbani watershed covers an 
area of 670 km2. The total river discharge from Has-
bani, Sreid and Wazzani Springs is estimated by the 
Litani Authority to an approximate annual average of 
145 Mm3/yr (Abd El Aaal Associates, P.C.). The Has-
bani flows for around 22km then it is joined by the 
waters of the Wazzani spring in the vicinity of Ghajar 
village and continues towards the border to the south 
for a few km only.
Water quality controls for natural flows and sources are 
not strict in the Hasbani Basin. This is quite notice-
able in summer when water is physically scarce. Key 
sources affecting water quantity and quality include: 
uncontrolled and untreated waste water dumped into 
the rivers (then used for irrigation); illegal drilling of 
water wells lowering the water table; and contaminat-
ed surface water from the use of insecticides, herbi-
cides, fungicides and chemical fertilizers, especially 
in agricultural areas (Badr et al. 2014).
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Figure 6.5: Main Drainage Lines over the Hasbani Basin (indicating the flow paths of the Hasbani  
River and its main tributary al-Wazzani close to the border)
Hasbani River
Wazzani
Chebaa Tributary
Border
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(Post)Occupation Context
The area has witnessed a long history of aggressions 
since the creation of the state of Israel, starting with: 
annexing the Chebaa Farms in the 1950-60s (a set of 
agricultural settlements adjacent to Chebaa town); 
preventing the local community from full benefit of 
the Hasbani-Wazzani waters; occupying parts of the 
region from 1967 (Ghajar area and Kfar-Shouba Hills) 
along the rest of the Golan, and then total occupation 
from the 1980s onward till 2000; forcing locals into 
mercenary-type militias, and still keeping partial occu-
pation with intermittent intervention till the present 
day. These represent direct impacts of (post)occupa-
tion affecting lives and livelihood choices, with farm-
ing communities displaced and farms abandoned.
There are also longer-term, indirect effects associat-
ed with insecurity and instability in local communi-
ties, compounded by repeated military interventions. 
For example, during the Israeli occupation, ‘passive’ 
civilians were sometimes even allowed to work in Is-
rael and gain new knowledge in agro practices. This 
created internal social divisions that have persisted 
even since 2000. Despite the lack of financial and 
technical assistance from the Lebanese Government, 
a large number of people returned to their villages and 
towns encouraged by moral attachment to the land, 
to family roots, and with financial encouragement by 
the private sector (especially emigrants). The latter 
is playing a crucial role in the re-development now 
taking place there. But in those zones adjacent to 
the border, a general feeling of insecurity remains, 
belying the formal end to Israeli occupation and the 
security zone. Reported military-security interven-
tions under ‘no-peace’ conditions include: shelling, 
sniping, regular military flyovers and movement re-
strictions near the border, and farming restrictions. A 
major, ongoing legacy are the military mines planted 
by Israelis in the 1980s, often claiming lives of farm-
ers and herders and, recently, even Israeli soldiers 
venturing onto Lebanese lands.
For agricultural operations, the occupation led to ma-
jor social and economic dislocation through: barriers, 
check points, and military interventions disrupting 
daily agro practices and market access. Feelings of 
insecurity and fear prevented many farmers from 
tending to their fields, with much land abandoned. 
Whether there are enduring impacts from these 
changes was a key question for the project survey; for 
example, the abandonment and degradation of agri-
cultural land; a decrease in agro-diversity and plant-
ed areas; decreases in agro-professionals and working 
labour; and changes in land ownership. The survey 
and focus group work targeted water availability as 
an indicator both of (post)occupational practices and 
climate variability and/or change. Israeli interfer-
ence in Lebanese extraction of shared waters both 
pre- and post-dates the formal occupation, with close 
monitoring and control over Lebanese development 
projects affecting and utilising Hasbani/Wazzani wa-
ter sources. 
Socio-Economic Indicators
As shown in Figure 6.2 above, there are about 57 hu-
man settlements in the Hasbani Basin, mostly of poor 
aggregated municipalities, with only 3 major centres. 
The population census is dated; more recent esti-
mates indicate a regional population of approximately 
170,000 with 2.2% average growth (SLC 2002). Land 
use and zoning is erratic, due to poor government 
management, but especially due to the long histo-
ry of conflict. Administrative and functional services 
are fragmented, with weak local governance (munic-
ipalities). For the Lebanese Government, the area is 
remote and insecure, so there is a general lack of de-
velopment plans and institutional capacity. The trans-
port network is extensive, but mostly old with limited 
upgrading and maintenance. Educational attainment 
is lower than other Lebanese areas. Public services, 
such as parks, libraries, clubs, and support facilities, 
are lacking (Sharrouf 2012). Similarly, labour stan-
dards for agriculture and other sectors are rather low. 
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Women, youth and NGOs presence have become 
more recently potentially promising. Overall financial 
municipal capabilities are terribly deficient; with reg-
ulatory control and tax system still weakly effective.
The demographic pyramid in the Hasbani Basin is a 
broad based one with almost 31.4% of youth and 4.3% 
of old age. Most working women are still in classi-
cal domains, i.e. agriculture, teaching, health, tailor-
ing, and related. Working power (normally multiple 
sourced) is mostly in agriculture at 70%, trade and 
services about 16.3%, and industry is 3.7%. The area 
witnessed a social upheaval after the Israeli with-
drawal from Lebanon in 2000. Key manifestations 
of this are: Increasing urbanization; increasing youth 
independence - even inter-marriages, with nuclear 
rather than extended families; general decrease in 
fertility; a transfer from agricultural employment to-
wards services; increasing education of women; and 
an increasing cost of living.
Jordan Rift Valley: Vulnerability and Adaptive Capacity 
Assessment
Sireen Abu-Jamous (lead author) and Ziad Mimi
Determinants of Climate Vulnerability
Biophysical Factors
Climate Change 
When farmers were asked in the survey questionnaire 
about climate change the most salient findings were 
temperature rise and precipitation decrease; 93% of 
the surveyed Palestinian farmers expressed that the 
there was a change in the mean temperature mainly 
in the past ten years where the increasing tempera-
ture became highly noticeable.
91% of surveyed farmers noticed a significant de-
crease in the amount of rainfall, reporting that the 
rainfall decrease is more than the half compared to 
ten years ago. This change in the rainfall is signifi-
cantly affecting the recharge rate of the groundwa-
ter aquifers, which are the main water source for 
the Jordan Valley. This fall is confirmed by is the 
drop in pumping rates from the agricultural wells 
in the study area. The increase in temperature and 
drop in rainfall is reflected in drought conditions: 
83% of farmers stated that the impact of drought 
had increased in the past ten years. Flash floods had 
become less frequent (according to just over 75% of 
farmers); the noteworthy flash flood that happened 
in January 2013 in the study area was the first of its 
kind in ten years. 91% of farmers referred to climate 
change as the main bio-physical factor affecting their 
agricultural practices.
Water
Water for Domestic Use
The primary source for domestic water in the sur-
veyed communities is Mekorot (the Israeli water sup-
ply company): other sources include spring water, the 
purchase of water from tankers or agricultural wells, 
notably during the summer and for communities 
not connected to the water network, municipal wa-
ter wells and rainwater harvesting cisterns. For most 
farmers there is always enough to meet their domestic 
needs (89%) and the average monthly consumption of 
water for domestic purposes ranges between 30 to 35 
litres/month from all sources. Figure 7.1 below shows 
the main water resources in the surveyed communi-
ties and the percentage of dependence. The quality 
of domestic water in most of the surveyed communi-
ties has improved due to development projects im-
plemented during the last five years.
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Figure 7.1: Water Sources for Domestic Use 
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Water for Agricultural Use 
Figure 7.2 shows that the main sources for the agri-
cultural water use are private wells owned by farmers 
and springs. Other minor sources (below 2%) include 
rainwater harvesting through reservoirs and pools and 
the purchase of water from tankers. 
67% of interviewed farmers agreed that the quantity 
of water available for agricultural use, from all resourc-
es, is decreasing and has become more noticeable 
in the past 5 years. Water supplies are not enough 
to irrigate the land they cultivated in the past; cur-
rently farmers cultivate only certain areas they know 
they can irrigate i.e. cultivated area is decreasing ac-
cording to the available water. Also, one of the prob-
lems stated by farmers is the significant drop in the 
groundwater level during summer where wells start 
pumping turbid water mixed with soil which is not 
suitable for irrigation. As indicated by most farmers 
(over 55%), the quality of water used for agriculture 
is deteriorating; mainly referring to the high salinity 
of groundwater from agricultural wells. Reasons for 
the increased salinity, from farmers’ perceptions, are 
over-pumping from groundwater wells, the decrease 
in rainfall and low recharge rates. 
Figure 7.2: Water Sources for Agricultural Use 
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Soil quality
Over the past decade, 29% of interviewed farmers 
have not noticed any change in the land quality, while 
almost 45% of farmers stated that there is a moder-
ate negative impact. The increasing experience of 
drought conditions is perceived to be reducing soil 
quality, leading farmers to spend more on money on 
pesticides and fertilizers. Many hazardous chemicals 
once used are now banned under Israeli law so are no 
longer sold to Palestinian farmers. Over 91% of farm-
ers use organic fertilizers in addition to the chemical 
ones, whereas 7% use only natural fertilizers. 
Reduced soil quality is also attributed by farmers to 
occupational practices. Some areas are used for mili-
tary purposes and occasionally tanks drive over agricul-
tural lands: according to farmers, the massive weight 
of the tanks makes the soil very compacted and no 
longer suitable for agriculture. The rehabilitation of 
such land is a long process involving deep ploughing.
Occupation-Related Factors
The Jordan Valley used to be the food basket for 
the West Bank and the predominant profession was 
agriculture as the main income source for the ma-
jority of people living in the area. As agriculture is 
deteriorating as a profitable business due mainly to 
occupation-related restrictions and climate change, 
agriculture is often no longer sufficient to meet farm-
ers’ needs. 52% of the surveyed farming households 
stated that their agricultural income is not enough to 
meet their basic needs. Insecurity of land tenure as a 
result of the Israeli occupation is a serious constraint 
on farming viability. As 81% of the Jordan Valley is 
zoned Area C, Palestinians have limited ownership 
options for agricultural development. Only 26% of 
the surveyed farmers were land owners while 29% are 
tenants and just over a third of farmers have partner-
ship agreements with land owners. There is evidence 
also of Palestinians leasing lands from Israeli settlers 
because of land and water shortages (Hass 2013). 
Occupation-related restrictions on farming viability 
are accentuated by climate-related stresses, notably 
increasing temperature and decreasing rainfall. 
Market Vulnerability
The agricultural local market suffers from competi-
tive foreign products, especially from Israel: accord-
ing to farmers, Israel dumps settlement products 
onto the Palestinian market, especially during peak 
production, in order to eliminate Palestinian prod-
ucts that may supply the local markets. More recent-
ly, traders have started importing some lower-priced 
products from Jordan, also undercutting the domestic 
Palestinian market. Israeli restrictions on Palestinian 
marketing restrict access to regional and internation-
al markets; 97% of the surveyed farming households 
market their products locally and 33% manage to im-
port to Israel through an agent. 
Small farmers are the most vulnerable group in the 
agricultural business chain: large traders often dictate 
market prices, forcing farmers to sell their products 
at low prices and minimum profit; for example, trad-
ers take advantage of the fact that farmers have to 
sell their products as soon as possible while they are 
still fresh. Also the complete dependence on Israe-
li production components, such as fertilizers, seeds 
and irrigation networks make it difficult to find Pal-
estinian alternatives to Israeli goods, meaning that 
Israeli companies control price and quality.
Water Pricing
As the main source of water in the Jordan Rift Val-
ley is groundwater, water price is always a factor in 
pumping water from groundwater wells; most of the 
Palestinian wells use diesel for pumping and as the 
diesel price goes up, so do water prices. Some areas, 
like Ras Al Fara’a, have managed to lower the water 
price by using electricity instead of diesel for pump-
ing water. Water prices vary between NIS 2.5 to 4 per 
cubic metre for diesel-pumped water from ground 
66 Transboundary Climate Security: Climate Vulnerability and Rural Livelihoods in the Jordan River Basin
water wells: this cost drops by 40% for water from 
groundwater wells using electricity, while purchas-
ing water from tankers remains more expensive. In 
comparison, Israeli farmers in the Jordan Valley pay 
on average NIS 2.1 per cubic metre for their water, 
though 50% of their water is subsidized at NIS 1.9 
per cubic metre (Hass 2013).
The political situation continues to be one of the 
main constraints prohibiting the agricultural sector 
from developing. In the questionnaire farmers were 
asked to identify restrictions related to settlements 
and military measures. The three most important 
settlement-related restrictions were: (i) competition 
from settlement farms (ii) high water consumption 
reducing water availability for Palestinian farmers, 
and (iii) developing crop diversity not available for 
Palestinians. The three most important categories of 
military-security effects were: (i) land confiscation, 
(ii) military zones with movement restrictions, and 
(iii) restrictions on marketing Israeli goods.
Adaptive Capacity
Current coping mechanisms
Palestinian farmers in the Jordan Valley have re-
sponded to reduced water availability – both occu-
pation-related and climate-related – by reducing 
production of crops considered to be high water con-
sumers, notably bananas, watermelon and different 
kinds of citrus fruits. Also some crops, like eggplants, 
cucumber, cauliflower and green peas, which used to 
be cultivated over the year, are now cultivated only 
during the winter season. In most of the surveyed 
communities the summer season (between June and 
September) has disappeared due to water shortages 
in summer as well as the high temperature. Current 
coping practices must be understood in the context 
of recent historical changes. Before 1978, the dom-
inant water irrigation system was flood irrigation 
through water canals and open channels where water 
had plentiful availability. Drip irrigation was intro-
duced after 1978 when water availability started to 
become an issue for farmers. Dates were introduced 
to the Jordan Valley in the late nineties to cope with 
the water quality available; dates can tolerate saline 
water, and are also considered a profitable crop and 
commercial products due to the high revenue and 
the special quality of the Jordan Valley’s dates (e.g. 
the Medjool date). 
Some coping practices are well-established; for exam-
ple greenhouse-based agriculture was introduced to 
the Jordan Valley in the early 1990s to reduce evap-
oration due to high temperatures, although there 
has been a major uptake of greenhouse use in recent 
years, as noted below. In the surveyed communities, 
95% of the farming households reported that they un-
dertook coping practices. A number of coping mecha-
nisms were captured during the survey including:
Change of Crop Selection
• to crops with a lower water requirement; 
• to crops tolerant to high water salinity.
Reduction of Production and Cultivated Area
• to cope with the low water availability;
• to reduce capital costs of agricultural inputs, espe-
cially for farmers with low income rate;
• to reduce the risk of the financial loss due to poor 
marketing environment.
Increased Greenhouses Agriculture
• 35% of respondents started greenhouse agricul-
ture in the past five years;
• However, a restriction on adopting greenhouse ag-
riculture is the high-cost construction and mainte-
nance; 71% of farmers using greenhouses are clas-
sified as high income.
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Drip Irrigation
• Drip irrigation as a coping mechanism has been ad-
opted by many farmers and was classified as one of 
the most effective coping mechanisms.
Partnership System in Agriculture
• A new system of agriculture has appeared between 
farmers; mainly small farmers, and land owners or 
well owners, where the land owner offers the land, 
water and/or agricultural inputs and both have a 
prior agreement on the shares.
Agreements between Farmers and Traders
• As many farmers are financial unable to start their 
own agricultural business, new agreements have 
been emerged between small farmers and traders 
from the local market: the traders support farmers 
with the main agricultural inputs to start cultiva-
tion and the farmers pay them back after harvest-
ing and marketing the products, through the same 
traders, in the local market.
Crops that are no longer dominant in the JV Reason
Cucumbers Not competitive in the market. Open field cultivation of cucumbers is no 
longer feasible; each dunum in the greenhouse produces around 10 tons 
compared to 2 tons in the open field. Also, cultivating cucumber in the 
greenhouse requires less labour. Cucumber is cultivated now mostly under 
forward contracting; mainly to be used in pickling factories locally or in 
Israel
Bananas The availability of water because bananas are considered high water 
consumers
Citrus Citrus are high water consumers and need fresh water
Tomatoes Increase viruses in the soil; became expensive for farmers where they 
have to use a lot of pesticides, in addition to the high risk of losing the 
whole harvest
Eggplants Eggplants used to be cultivated for export and now, as farmers lack ac-
cess to international market, are no longer feasible, especially with higher 
quality and lower-priced imported eggplants in the local market
Broad beans Low economic value
Greenhouses at Jordan Rift Valley
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Moving to Work in other Areas
• During the past three years, many farmers from 
Al Jiftlik (around 150 farmers) have moved to Al 
Fara’, whether they own land or they rent land, 
as agriculture in Al Fara’ is more feasible due to 
greater water availability. Also, during the past five 
years many farmers from Al Jiftlik (between 70 
and 80 farmers, including women) have moved to 
work in settlements in agricultural activities. Also, 
in Al Auja, around 1000 farmers moved to work in 
neighbouring settlements
Obstacles Facing Development of  
Adaptation Measures
93% of the interviewed farmers stated that their 
current coping practices are useful only for the short 
term. They noted that long- term coping mechanisms 
(i.e. adaptation) have to be managed on a sector lev-
el and that the Palestinian government has to be 
more involved in adopting adaptation measures for 
reduced water availability. From the questionnaire 
administered in the study area, Palestinian farmers 
identified the following as the most significant obsta-
cles to the development of adaptive capacity:
Limited Sources of Water for Agricultural Purposes
• Limited number of irrigation sources; 64% of the 
surveyed farming households depend on a single 
source of agricultural water. This limits their abil-
ity to cope with the decreasing water available for 
agriculture.
Lack of Support from Organizations
• Most farmers in the survey stated that they lack 
support from external authorities and organiza-
tions, whether national (Ministry of Agriculture 
and Palestinian Water Authority) or international 
organizations. According to the farmers, these au-
thorities and organizations should have more re-
sponsibilities in:
• Introducing additional water sources for agricul-
ture; this includes negotiating with Israel to drill 
more wells and rehabilitate some of the existing 
wells in addition to finding alternative, non-con-
ventional water resources;
• Subsidizing agricultural inputs as they are considered 
very expensive and controlled by the Israeli market;
• Providing training and advisory services; 59% 
of interviewed farmers stated that most of their 
adaptive agricultural practices were self-devel-
oped, 40% stated they observed other farmers and 
learned from them and only 16% had benefitted 
from extension services, including training provid-
ed by the Ministry of Agriculture;
• Developing an insurance system to compensate 
farmers in cases of losses; either by Ministry of Ag-
riculture or by private sector companies.
Financial Restrictions
• Most farmers in the Jordan Rift Valley have no other 
sources of income and do not have savings to help 
them develop mechanisms to adapt to lower water 
availability and the deteriorating situation of agricul-
ture. For example, many of interviewed farmers stat-
ed that they would change to greenhouse cultivation 
if they received financial support.Interviewing one of the farmers at the Jordan Rift Valley
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West Bank Focus Group
A focus group was held in September 14, 2013, and 
took place in the Youth Club in Al Jiftlik – Jericho. 
It was attended by number of participants from Al 
Jiftlik including farmers, members from the Village 
Council and members from the Farmers’ Coopera-
tive. The goal of the focus group was to ‘test’ and 
develop findings from the survey of farming house-
holds. In particular, it was designed to gather infor-
mation from the farmers and other stakeholders in 
regard to the following:
• Coping mechanisms and adaptive capacity to dif-
ferential water availability in the Jordan Rift Valley;
• How climate-related pressures and occupational 
practices affect agriculture in the region;
• The cultural and political identity of the farmers 
in the Jordan Rift Valley. 
Coping and Adaptation Mechanisms
The results and findings from the questionnaire 
analysis were presented to participants to elicit their 
feedback on the parts related to coping mechanisms 
and adaptive capacity. The sections below pres-
ent additional comments on the results and are not 
meant to repeat the results presented in the ques-
tionnaire analysis report. 
Water 
The focus group confirmed forced migration as a ma-
jor coping mechanism in the face of reduced water 
availability. For families with agriculture as their 
sole source of income, some have experienced inter-
nal movement to areas with greater land and water 
availability, renting land and practicing agriculture. 
This migration is taking place at two levels: inter-
nally as the movement between Palestinian lands in 
the search for better agricultural conditions (mainly 
water availability); and to Israel and settlements to 
work in agricultural or other jobs in order to secure a 
source of income.
In terms of adaptive capacity, the focus group identi-
fied potential from:
Soil Enhancement
• Recent research on soil with a lower crop water re-
quirement, notably artificial soil that consumes only 
10% of the crop water requirement; it was beneficial 
to use such research to find solution for the water 
shortage problems in order to enhance agricultural 
practices in the area.
Water Harvesting
• Water harvesting can be one of the fundamental 
solutions for the water shortage by construction of 
dams and pools to benefit from the runoff and wadi 
water in the winter and store it for irrigation use 
in the summer. Yet farmers are not allowed to con-
struct even small dams; it was reported that the 
Israelis once demolished a small dam constructed 
by a farmer for his own local agricultural use.
The Role of the Palestinian Authority
• The Palestinian Authority is seen as responsible 
for providing farmers with good quality and ac-
ceptable prices for agriculture. The focus group 
claimed that the Palestinian Authority can nego-
tiate with the Israeli Authority to supply Palestin-
ians with reasonably priced water from Mekorot 
Company for agricultural use.
Better Management and Allocation of Water
• It was also stated that the Palestinian Authority 
can construct conveying systems to transfer water 
from areas rich with water resources, like Tulkarm 
and Attil, to areas having water shortage problems 
like the Jordan Valley.
Use of Treated Wastewater
• Treated wastewater, as a non-conventional water 
resource, was identified as a very important source 
for agricultural use. Currently a new constructed 
wastewater treatment plant in Nablus can provide 
around 8000 m3 a day, also the current upgrading 
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of Jenin’s wastewater treatment plant will provide 
up to 5000 m3 a day. Also, the Al Beireh treated 
wastewater plant is not being used to date although 
the plant is considered the only one functioning 
well and providing acceptable treated wastewater 
quality in the West Bank. If this works, convey-
ing systems and networks can be constructed to 
supply most areas in the West Bank with water for 
agriculture.
Fair Water Management
• There are issues of equitable water allocation 
between Palestinian communities. For example, 
some areas in Jenin were converted to irrigated-ag-
ricultural and supplied the water for Al Fara’a, 
while Al Jiftlik was suffering from water shortage. 
Part of the problem can be solved internally with 
good water management and equity in water allo-
cation. Also, in Tubas deep wells have been drilled 
for agricultural purposes which reduced the water 
discharge in Al Jiftlik wells
Countering Israeli Measures
• In Al Auja, there are three deep Israeli wells that have 
negatively affected the shallow Palestinian wells and 
reduced the quantity the Palestinians can pump 
from their wells. The Oslo Agreement prevents the 
Palestinians from drilling deep groundwater wells; 
the allowed depth is only 120m.
Land
Agricultural land is threatened with confiscation by 
the Israeli Civil Administration if abandoned and not 
cultivated; water should be available for farmers to 
keep them attached to their land. The focus group 
stated that there should be a political decision to 
support farmers and enhance their resistance (su-
mud), because for most farmers agriculture is the sole 
source of income and if they cannot sustain them-
selves from agriculture they will move to other jobs 
and leave their lands. Land confiscation as a result of 
occupation is the key driver of forced migration for 
affected farmers.
According to the focus group, adaptation measures 
identified in relation to land include: 
• Enhancing the role of the Palestinian Authority in 
supporting farmers and agriculture;
• Investing more in supporting infrastructure; e.g. 
agricultural roads, electricity service. In some cas-
es the extreme weather events have destroyed the 
infrastructure, affecting the accessibility of farm-
ers to reach their lands;
• Introducing new water resources for agriculture 
use, as water is the main restrictive factor to main-
tain land cultivation and farming practices;
• Establishing an organization that facilitates loans 
for farmers for agricultural practices;
• Enhancing collective agricultural action; farmers’ 
cooperatives can facilitate buying agricultural in-
puts and marketing farmer’s products;
• Making the market for agricultural inputs more 
competitive. For Palestinians agricultural inputs 
are 40% more expensive than Jordan and Israel. 
One reason is that the Palestinian Authority gives 
licence for some companies to be the sole distribu-
tor for some agricultural inputs which plays a main 
role in their high pricing of these inputs. The Pal-
estinian Authority can remove these monopolistic 
practices, opening up markets to competition.
Proposed Adaptation Measures
According to the survey of farming households, farm-
ers have long been coping with water scarcity and 
Israeli restrictions and are already at the edge of live-
lihood viability. The majority of the surveyed farmers 
argued that it is time for governmental organizations 
to take the lead and support farmers in developing 
adaptation measures to cope with the challenges 
facing the agricultural sector, including current and 
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projected impacts of climate change. The focus group 
agreed that adaptation should include measures re-
lated to more water being available for agriculture, 
financial and marketing support, training and guid-
ance. Also, farmers mentioned the importance of lo-
cal NGOs to take greater roles in supporting the agri-
cultural sectors; constructing greenhouses, providing 
agricultural inputs, training and advisory services. 
Agreed priority adaptive actions were:
• Enhancing the role of the Ministry of Agriculture 
in determining the cropping patterns and cultivat-
ed crops each season in order to control fair prices 
for products;
• Support for agricultural insurance, where the gov-
ernment is a main partner (the government can 
cover 50% of the insurance);
• Activating tax refunds for agricultural inputs, as 
in neighbouring countries. In Palestine a system 
exists and farmer can register for tax refunds, but 
the problem is that the Palestinian Authority does 
not have the funds to pay the farmers. Also, some 
farmers are not aware of their right to tax refunds;
• A stronger labelling and marketing system for Pal-
estinian products;
• A more open market for the agricultural inputs in 
order to allow for fairer competition and more af-
fordable prices for agricultural inputs.
Culture and identity
The value of the land and agriculture was discussed 
with the focus group. What does it mean for farmers 
to stay on their land and cultivate it in spite of all the 
problems and challenges they face? The focus group 
identified different sources of collective identity re-
lated to the persistence of agricultural livelihoods.
Religious Beliefs 
From a religious point of view, believers (both Mus-
lims and Christian) believe that Palestine is a holy 
land and the Land of Prophets. Historically speak-
ing, Jerusalem has generally been the site for Mus-
lim pilgrimage, prayer, study or residence. Al-Aqsa 
Mosque is a particular seat of learning. In addition to 
many other religious Islamic sites, Muslims believe 
that the Dome of the Rock is where the prophet Mo-
hammad ascended to heaven. Also, there are many 
important Christian sites in Palestine such as Beth-
lehem, Nazareth, the Jordan River and Jerusalem was 
where Christ was crucified. Most Palestinians are at-
tached to the land on a religious basis; for Muslims, 
staying on the land becomes a form of spiritual resis-
tance (jihad).
National Beliefs
Farmers are aware of the fact that any land that is 
abandoned will be confiscated by the Israelis, making 
them responsible for keeping the land; one partic-
ipant stated, ‘even if I lose money from practicing 
agriculture on my land I will not leave it for a settler 
to take it from me and my family’. The retention of 
land is connected to Palestinian self-determination.
Family Bonds
Historically, agriculture has been considered a family 
business where the father and all his sons and daugh-
ters work on the land and agriculture was the main 
income for all family members. Most farmers have in-
herited their lands from their fathers or grandfathers 
and feel that it is their responsibility to keep the land 
for future generations.
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Determinants of Climate Vulnerability 
Biophysical Factors
Climatic Changes
In the questionnaire survey of the farming house-
holds in the occupied Golan Heights, as in the oth-
er study areas, respondents were asked about their 
perceptions of variability/changes in local climatic 
conditions. Table 8.1 summarises the results to this 
question. Most interviewees (79%) agreed that the 
Golan Heights area is experiencing an increase in 
mean temperatures, which they also claimed was 
detrimental to agricultural productivity (especially 
for orchards). These changes were noticed on aver-
age over the past 15 years. For mean rainfall, 60% of 
the sampled households stated that they have ex-
perienced major fluctuations in rainfall, while 32% 
believe mean rainfall has decreased over the past two 
decades. There was a perceived decline in snowfall 
precipitation (68%) over the last 15 years. 
90% of the sampled farming population stated that 
these climatic changes are negatively affecting their 
farming practices, since their fruit products (espe-
cially apples) are highly sensitive to temperature and 
rainfall changes, requiring winter coldness (dorman-
cy) and ample water in the growing season to ensure 
high quality produce. Highlighting the role of Israeli 
policies in addition to the climatic conditions, 57% 
stress that both Israeli policies and climatic fluctua-
tions are affecting their farming: 19% attribute these 
farming changes solely to Israeli water allocation 
policies, while 22% attribute them solely to climatic 
stresses (see Figure 8.1). 19% of the sampled farmers 
had insurance against crop loss from natural disasters.
Direction of change Average duration of change (years)
Mean temperature Increase (78.4%) 15
Mean rainfall Fluctuation (59.5%) 14
Mean rainfall Decrease (32.4%) 14
Snowfall Decrease (67.6%) 15 
Water
According to the questionnaire respondents, water 
availability is not the major constraint on farming 
practices in the occupied Golan Heights; rather it is 
the asymmetric allocation of water resources and Is-
raeli control of water resources. On a domestic level, 
most interviewees indicated that they are satisfied 
with the water quantity and quality they receive. 
Table 8.1: Perceived Climatic Changes in the Occupied Golan Heights
This is due to the abundance of water resources in 
the area and the existence of a functioning water 
network. Additionally, some areas in the village of 
Majdal Shams rely also on spring water that original-
ly used to provide their families with water. Today, 
they utilize both spring water and tap water to meet 
their needs for domestic water use.
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Figure 8.1: Farmers’ Perceptions of Main  
Reason for Changes to their Farming Practices
3%
Climate
Israeli measures
Both
Other
57%
19%
21%
Water for Agriculture
As stated in the study area profile, there has been a 
transformation in agriculture in the occupied Golan 
Heights in terms of the type of crops, land and water 
availability. The agricultural practices today depend 
on three sources of water: Mekorot (the Israeli state 
water company), spring water and rainwater reser-
voirs. Mekorot today allocates a fixed sum of water to 
the Syrian farmers of the Golan, which is later man-
aged and divided by the 20 agricultural committees of 
the region. Farmers depend solely on this water source 
during the summer season (May-October) to irrigate 
their orchards. In the winter, dependence is mostly on 
rainwater. Nevertheless and due to the sensitivity of 
the crops irrigated, the water allocated by Mekorot is 
not sufficient to meet agricultural water needs during 
the dry season. Most interviewees (76%) stated that 
at the end of the season, water restrictions by Me-
korot negatively affect the most sensitive part of the 
season, reducing the quality of the produce. Over 40% 
of interviewees stated that the water allocation they 
receive today rarely meets their needs, while 24% 
stated that it never meets their needs. 
Through a simple comparison, the interviewees re-
ceive annually an average of 107 cubic metres/dunum 
(official average is 120 cubic metres/dunum) while 
the Israeli farmers in settlements receive 800 cubic 
metres/dunum.
In terms of tampering with agricultural water sourc-
es, most interviewees (86.5%) rarely witness physical 
destruction or damage of water sources by Israeli au-
thorities, aside from the destruction of rainwater res-
ervoirs that Israel deemed illegal after its annexation 
of the Golan Heights in 1981. 
Product Cultivation
Before 1967, the Golan Heights and the rest of the 
Syrian agricultural lands were primarily areas of rain-
fed agriculture. Certain crops were suitable for this 
type of agriculture and farming practices. With the 
1967 occupation of the Golan Heights and the tech-
nological advances of ‘industrial’ scale agriculture, 
most agricultural production shifted to irrigated, 
monoculture cultivation with a focus on orchards. Since 
1967, drip irrigation was introduced by Israel to the 
region and has since been used as the main water-sav-
ing technique of irrigation. 
Young orchard near Ram Lake
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This, in addition to a number of political, economic 
and social reasons, has shifted the type of produce 
grown and cultivated in the region. From our sur-
vey interviews, these main crops were mentioned as 
crops that were cultivated in the past but are no lon-
ger grown are: grains, cabbages and cauliflowers, len-
tils, pears, nectarines, vegetables, plums, almonds, 
radishes, lemons, oranges and olives.
Quality of Land
With the increased use of pesticides and chemical 
fertilizer to increase productivity of the industrial ag-
riculture that developed in the Golan Heights after 
1967, land quality has experienced many changes. 
When asked about the change to the soil, interview-
ees stated that the soil is becoming weaker and with 
higher salinity, causing weaker productivity and pro-
duce of lesser quality. The reasons for these changes 
were attributed to the increased use and dependence 
on chemicals, the switch to monoculture, and also to 
climatic and rainfall patterns fluctuations. Farmers 
interviewed mostly use chemical fertilizer (68%), 
while 11% use a mix of organic and chemical inputs 
and only 2.7% use organic fertilizer. 56% of those 
using chemical pesticides believe this has negative 
effects on their produce, especially the taste which 
used to be stronger when only natural fertilizer was 
used. On the other hand, famers believe that the 
pesticides used today are necessary to preserve fruit 
crops from pests and diseases.
Socioeconomic Factors
Farming Income
Although most Syrian inhabitants of the Golan 
Heights were originally farmers, most today do not 
depend on their land for their income. According to 
the survey, almost a third (32.4%) stated that agricul-
ture is actually a financial burden on them, as they are 
losing more than they are making out of selling their 
produce. 43% stated that agriculture contributes up 
to 30% of their income. 78% of sampled stated that 
the income generated from agriculture today rare-
ly (30%) or never (49%) meets their needs. These 
highlight how vulnerable are farmers today that de-
pend solely on agriculture as their main source of 
income. All sampled interviewees stated that their 
main profession is not agriculture but rather in the 
field of medicine, accounting, tourism, trade and as 
contractors. 92 % of interviewees claim that their to-
tal income from agriculture is less than 50,000 NIS 
annually (Figure 8.2). 
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Figure 8.2: Average Annual Income (NIS) from 
Agriculture 
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This is also evident in the use of paid workers by 
land owners. Of the sampled population, 46% state 
that they solely depend on non-paid workers (family 
and friends) while 40.5% need up to 50 paid workers 
during the season to help with the harvesting. Only 
owners of large plots of land require more than 50 
and up to 200 paid workers per season (10.3%). 
Land ownership in the Golan Heights is mostly by 
inheritance. Due to the limited land available after 
Israel occupied most of the Golan Heights and de-
clared extensive military and green zones, the Syrian 
population today owns only 20,000 dunums of agri-
cultural land. Therefore, land leasing is not common. 
92% of interviewees were landowners, while the re-
maining 8% were co-owners with other members of 
their families. 
Due to the restrictions on land ownership and land 
confiscation, most plots of land are small. 62% of 
the interviewees owned land with an area between 
1-10 dunums, 24% owned land areas between 10-30 
dunums and 13.5% owned land plots with an area of 
up to 55 dunums. Additionally, the questionnaire 
respondents stated that land acquisition does not 
happen in the Golan Heights as most land is inherit-
ed and the idea of selling land does not occur unless 
there is a strong financial need. 8.2% stated that land 
was confiscated from them by the Israeli government 
on premises of the land belonging to the state or 
needed for military and security reasons (notably for 
land by the border). Also, the respondents reported 
incidents when Israeli police uprooted fruit trees and 
damaged crops. 
Access to Markets
The markets open today for selling Syrian produce 
in the Golan Heights is as dependent on political 
circumstances as economic and market conditions. 
In the local (Israeli) market, the produce from 
Arab farmers is negatively affected by competing 
Israeli and foreign products that flood the market. 
In addition to lacking subsidies and governmental 
support, Syrian farmers in the Golan Heights suffer 
from a local marketing monopoly by Israeli compa-
nies, which also market products from the Israeli set-
tlements. Numerous permits are needed for product 
marketing and transportation. 
The interviewees agreed that Israel is working indi-
rectly and directly on limiting the access of Syrian 
farmers of the Golan Heights to markets. The per-
mit system plays a role in delaying the marketing and 
transportation of farmers’ produce ‘legally’ and im-
poses high fines on farmers without permits. Israel 
limits the access of Golan produce in West Bank and 
Gaza Strip markets, traditionally a major market for 
the farmers. The Syrian markets are totally inaccessi-
ble due to the political turmoil in the country. Since 
2005 starting with 4,000 tons, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has facilitated 
the export of Golani apples to Syria which has hap-
pened every subsequent year apart from 2008 (poor 
harvest) and 2012 (lack of Israeli authorisation). De-
spite the war in Syria, in 2013 the ICRC enabled the 
shipment of 14,300 tons of apples from Golan farm-
ers to Syria (ICRC 2013).
In the occupied Golan Heights, there are 8 large 
coolers (storage facilities) in Majdal Shams (4), Ma-
sada (1), Buqatha (3). These coolers are collectively 
owned by the farmers who invested in their construc-
tion. The project of building the coolers was initiat-
ed by farmers to overcome the drop in apple prices 
in the market and provide produce around the year. 
Today, the coolers provide a total storage for 30,000 
tons of apples.
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Water Prices
Water pricing was initiated by Israel after its annex-
ation of the Golan Heights. For the past three de-
cades, Syrian farmers have been paying higher pric-
es for water in comparison to the highly subsidised 
farmers in the settlements of the Golan. Without 
subsidies and support from the Israeli government, 
farmers are obliged to pay for their water consump-
tion on their farms in addition to transportation of 
this water to their lands due to lack of infrastructure. 
With the establishment of agricultural committees, 
the famers collectively were able to develop a system 
where administrative costs of water allocation were 
controlled. Nevertheless, due to the continuing lack 
of governmental subsidies, Syrian farmers are still 
subject to high prices of water for agricultural use. 
From the sample of farmers surveyed, the price for 
one cubic meter of water ranged from 2.3 to 6 NIS/
cubic meter depending on the village and location 
of land. The farmers also pay additional charges to a 
farmers’ association to transport the water purchased 
from Lake Ram.
Support Systems 
In case of experiencing losses due to environmental 
changes, the farmers of the occupied Golan Heights 
have no established support system on a governmen-
tal or even provincial level. Much of the support re-
ceived is from nuclear and extended family (especial-
ly for the older generation of farmers), highlighting 
the strong bonds existing in the community. The 
lack of NGO and donor agencies present in the occu-
pied Golan has increased the importance of commu-
nal action and management of resources in the face 
of environmental and occupation-related stresses.
Political Situation 
With the prolonged status of occupation and annex-
ation of the Golan Heights, the livelihoods of the 
predominantly agricultural communities and villages 
have been transformed completely: this has isolated 
the villages from the rest of Syria. The villagers are 
partially included in the governing systems of the 
state of Israel, but their status as residents automat-
ically deprives them of their basic rights. Focusing 
on agriculture, the current farming villages are faced 
with highly subsidised, government-supported agri-
businesses located in Jewish settlements. The con-
tinuing military occupation also facilitates the con-
fiscation of land from Golan farmers under the guise 
of security.
Effects of Occupation on Crops
From the surveyed sample, the younger generation of 
farmers (aged 30-50) had not witnessed any damage 
or destruction to their products by the Israeli author-
ities. The older generation recalled several incidents 
when, they claimed, Israeli authorities had destroyed 
or damaged their crops. These accounts mentioned 
Israeli authorities claims that private land belonged 
to the state. In such cases, trees would be uprooted 
or land access denied. Sometimes, in defence of their 
land, the Syrian community has blocked the police 
from accessing the land. In other cases, land owners 
have filed lawsuits against the state to return their 
confiscated land. Land confiscation was prominent 
after 1967, where Israeli authorities planted mines 
and established border lines and managed to deny 
access and use of border lands for farming.
Through the questionnaire, the effects of the settle-
ments and military occupation are explored through 
the viewpoints of the interviewees (Table 8.2). The 
negative implications of settlements and military 
rules are strongly experienced in the case of the Go-
lan Heights. Nevertheless, it was also stated that the 
introduction of technologies by Israel since 1967 and 
the direct contact with settlements (through Syrian 
farmers seeking working opportunities there) has 
also enhanced the knowledge and skills of farmers, 
who adopted these newly acquired tools in their pri-
vate lands in the villages. 
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Table 8.2: Effects of Occupation on Agriculture in the Golan Heights
Settlements effect Military rule Need from government
Market competitiveness Land confiscation Support and guidance
Water allocation No infrastructure development Natural disasters management
Land availability taxes Water allocation
Recipient of government support Military zones and mines Market protection
Subsidies New technologies and irrigation methods Subsidies and insurance
Variety of crops Limiting farming Support research
Higher productivity Destroying livestock production Provide primary materials
Strong cooperatives Controlling natural resources Land reclamation
Interviewees expressed their belief that, should 
there be a return to Syrian sovereign control of the 
Golan Heights, their farming would prosper due to 
the following reasons:
• Open markets to the Arab world; 
• Water and land rights will be acquired and guar-
anteed; 
• Governmental support; 
• Farmers’ skills and experience in farming is com-
petitive compared to rest of Syria;
• More agricultural land would be available to ex-
pand production. 
Adaptive Capacity
Coping Mechanisms
Due to the political realities, farmers have already 
developed and used certain practices to overcome 
the manmade and natural changes happening in the 
Golan Heights. Listed practices were discussed with 
the interviewees to gauge their usage. Rainwater har-
vesting was utilised prior to the annexation of the 
Golan Heights in the 80s, but since has become il-
legal and requiring numerous permits. It is still used 
today but not on a large scale (just over 40% of sam-
ple). The main coping practices used are changing 
crop patterns (apple types or replacing with cherry) 
and changing irrigation to drip system, especially after 
1967 (see Table 8.3). In the case of the Golan, a famil-
iar cooping practice is reducing production, simply by 
keeping fruits on trees and not picking them, due to 
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Table 8.3: Coping Practices used by Farmers 
Coping practice Used by (%) When farmers started using them?
Rainwater Harvesting (Israel banned their use and incurred 
fines – no new structures after annexation)
40.5% 20-35 years ago
Changing crop selection 62.2% 1-40 years ago
Greenhouse cultivation 0%  
Changing type of irrigation (Referring to switch from flood 
irrigation to drip irrigation)
81.1% 5-35 years ago
Increasing amount of irrigation 8.1% 5-35 years ago
Reducing production 40.5% 1-35 years ago
Buying insurance 37.8% 1-30 years ago
Taking remittances from household members 10.8% 5-7 years ago
Picking crops or using products from neighbours when my 
land does not produce sufficient output
18.9% 2-20 years ago
None 2.7%
Table 8.4 lists the main source of adoption of coping 
practices, showing a high incidence of learning from 
other farmers (over 70% of the surveyed sample) 
and also a significant role of technological diffusion 
from Israel (almost a third of the sampled farmers). 
Farmers in the Golan Heights recognize the need to 
take action to cope with the climatic changes and 
the ‘manmade’ policies of the Israeli occupation. 
Table 8.5 lists their identified priorities for adaptive 
action and perceived constraints on these actions. 
89% agreed that there is a need for adaptive action, 
but less than half (46%) acknowledged the possibil-
ity of change. The identified needs are focused on 
technical, economical and agricultural development 
needs, highlighting that farmers are willing to contin-
ue working in farming but require governmental and 
institutional assistance. 
common practice is working as labour on other peo-
ple’s land, which can be in neighboring lands in the 
villages or working as labour in Israeli settlements. 
the lack of storage space and its high cost. Therefore, 
famers leave produce on trees merely to ensure they 
profit from farming at the end of the season. Another 
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Table 8.4: Sources of Adoption by Farmers of Coping Practices 
How did you begin to use these methods? Frequency of answers (percentage)
An organization raised my awareness and trained me 1 (2.7%)
I observed other farmers using these methods 26 (70.3%)
I identified a need and developed these methods on my own 3 (8.1%)
Agricultural experts shared their knowledge on technology 3 (8.1%)
All farmers used the methods 4 (10.8%)
Collective projects, farmers identifying needs and acting 3 (8.1%)
Technologies that were introduced from Israel 12 (32.4%)
Traditional knowledge 1 (2.7%)
Table 8.5: Coping with Farming Changes: Needs and Possibilities for Action 
What are the needs for action to cope with changes? What are the main constraints to the possibility for  
action to cope with changes?
New crops Land limitations 
Open international markets Market limitations
Introduce new income generating activities Lack of capacity 
Increase water availability No support and guidance 
Water technologies Not an individual task
Need for change Long term process
Table 8.6 lists methods that interviewees stated en-
hanced their farming conditions, including techno-
logical solutions to overcome climatic changes and 
also collective solutions such as committees and 
other collective action by farmers to strengthen their 
organizational capacity (notably the farmers’ associa-
tions created in 2007). 
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Table 8.6: Coping with Farming Changes: Methods and Constraints 
What are the methods adopted to cope with changes? What are the main constraints you are faced with?
Changing crops Climate and elevation
Enhance soil Lack of expertise 
Drip irrigation Investment 
Collective solutions Limited crop variety 
Drought resistant crops No research institutes 
Technological solutions (coolers, monitors) Marketing constraints 
Perceived Effectiveness of Climate- 
Related Coping Practices
Over 90% of the farmers surveyed believed that the 
practices listed above would be effective over the 
short-term (next 10 years) in dealing with projected 
annual changes of reduced rainfall and increased tem-
peratures, but this confidence falls for longer-term 
climatic effects (just over 40%) when projected rain-
fall and temperature changes are greater.
Village of Majdal Shams: water storage tanks still in use to compensate for water cuts
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Figure 8.3: Perceived Effectiveness of Climate-Related Coping Practices
extremely
somewhat
not at all
2.7%
5.4%
67.6%
24.3%
extremely
somewhat
not at all
2.7%
16.2%
56.8%
24.3%
in dealing with annual (short-term) changes in  
rainfall and temperature
in dealing with long-term changes in rainfall  
and temperature
Policy Interventions 
In terms of vulnerability of the farming communities 
in the Golan Heights, security nets available to the 
individual farmers depend on the existence of lo-
cal support, societal institutions and governmental 
bodies. In the survey, all interviewees stated that 
in case farming losses occur due to environmental 
changes, support from extended families, religious 
organizations, NGOs, governmental bodies is almost 
non-existent today. Support comes mainly from in-
come-generating jobs from household members rath-
er than any institutional support. In addition to that, 
the agricultural committees established to efficiently 
manage the water sources in the Golan Heights were 
mentioned as a support mechanism in case of envi-
ronmental changes. 
Interestingly, with all the limitations and difficulties 
faced by farmers today in the Golan Heights, 95% 
state that abandoning land is not an option for them. 
84% of the sampled population only generated up to 
40% of their income from agricultural practices.
Participation in community-based projects address-
ing issues of water, land and cultivation was high-
lighted as important by the sample population. These 
projects were forums for expertise sharing and learn-
ing. The farmers learned from agricultural experts 
and received technical support and also received 
more information on how to get governmental grants 
and establish a lobbying force. The collective action 
theme was highlighted as benefiting the farmers’ 
community as a whole in order to get organised and 
work collectively on issues that affect them all. From 
the questionnaire the respondents stated that any 
solution to climatic change and the problems it in-
flicts on farming has to come from the governmental 
(73% affirmative) and intergovernmental level (59% 
affirmative). The awareness that climate change and 
its effects are a global issue exists. Interestingly, the 
general solutions suggested by the farmers, as illus-
trated in Figure 8.4, feature both approaches to miti-
gate as well as adapt to climate change. 
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SOLUTIONS
Traditional 
organic farming
Alternative
energy
National 
planning schemes
Reduce dependence
on fossil fuel
Fight 
desertification
Technological
solutions
Communal work 
and committees
Awareness and 
guidance
Figure 8.4: Perceived Solutions to Climate Change Impacts on Farming
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Occupied Golan Heights Focus Group Report
Figure 8.5: Summary of Questionnaire Results and Focus Group Findings
Grouping Impact Coping Mechanisms Adaptive Capacity
Water • Prevention & demolition of 
water infrastructure
• Allocation –Unequal / Theft
• Pricing
• Water Pollution
• High dependence on Israel 
agriculture systems
• Rainwater harvesting
• Crop selection
• Reducing cultivated land 
• Drip irrigation/ change of irri-
gation from flooding to drip
• Advocacy and campaigning, 
pressure on Israeli authorities
• Introduction of technologies/ 
computerized systems
• Invest in advancing agricultur-
al technology
• Advocacy and exercising 
pressure on Israeli authorities 
• Understanding the science of 
agriculture to develop it
• Collective action and commu-
nal work
• Strengthening local economy 
and local consumption
• Increasing variety of livestock 
• Increasing awareness
Land • Land-use restrictions
• Land confiscation/mines/ 
military zone/ reserves
• Zoning/ permits and licensing 
of farms
•  Soil quality (salinity, pests, 
etc.)
• Crop selection
• Crop /livestock reductions & 
changes
• Increased use of pesticides
• Agricultural technologies 
(refrigerators, greenhouses, 
thermometers)
• Change of type of livestock 
• Land reclamation to avoid 
confiscation 
• Strengthen organic production 
and biological control
• Reducing the use of harmful 
pesticides/chemicals
• Less preventative spraying 
and more curative spraying
• Support local production crop 
types 
Socio-economic • Feelings of insecurity
• Israeli market hegemony/ 
Israeli planning
• Government incentives for 
settlers marketing
• Competition of products by 
settlers
• Individual work – the small 
farmer work 
• Farmers Associations 
• Collective Action (farmers 
helping each other out, Jordan 
Valley) 
• Reduction of production and 
consumption 
• Diversification of income gen-
erating activities 
• Feasibility studies for produc-
tion and marketing 
• Solving the inheritance prob-
lem which divides the land
• Encourage young generations 
to work in farming
• Opening an agricultural col-
lege in the Golan Heights
• Farmers association to be 
developed, organized and 
working strategically 
• Industry linkage (introducing 
new products) 
• Agricultural tourism 
• Link with international  
movements and networks  
(i.e. slow food movement)
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The focus group in the Golan Heights, undertaken 
on 24 August 2013 in Madjal Shams, consisted of ten 
members of the community. The age ranged from 30 
years to 63. All participants of the focus group were 
men, two of which identified their main profession as 
farmers while others professions ranged from media, 
pharmacy, trade, economist, and employees of local 
institutions. The main objectives of the study were 
presented to the participants, emphasizing the main 
factors of Israeli occupation and climate change and 
their effects on farming communities in the three re-
search regions, with a summary of the major findings 
from the questionnaire survey of farmers in the oc-
cupied Golan Heights. Three themes structured the 
focus group discussion on farming vulnerability – wa-
ter, land and socio-economic factors. Figure 8.5 pres-
ents the key conclusions on impacts, coping practices 
and adaptive capacity.
Water
In the Golan Heights, the highlighted water issues 
focused on unequal allocation of water by the Israe-
li water company (Mekorot), in what was regarded 
as ‘theft’. Additionally, the participants of the focus 
group highlighted the high dependence on Israel and 
its agricultural system, weakening the existing agri-
cultural system of the remaining Arab villages of the 
Golan Heights. 
Water Lobbying 
The farmers associations, created in 2007 to manage 
water resources efficiently and advocate for higher 
water allocation for Syrian farmers. The farmers as-
sociations are managed by agricultural experts and 
professionals and have managed to obtain rights to 
pump water from Lake Ram and other water sourc-
es nearby. This has been previously prevented by the 
Israeli water company (Mekorot). The farmers associ-
ation therefore is a new tool for farmers in mitigating 
the impacts of Israeli limitations and also the current 
agricultural practices which requires ample amounts 
of water.
Association for Coolers
In the occupied Golan Heights, there are 8 large cool-
ers (storage facilities) in Majdal Shams (4), Masada 
(1), Buqatha (3). These coolers are collectively owned 
by farmers who invested in the project. The project 
of building the coolers was initiated by farmers to 
overcome the drop in apple prices in the market and 
provide produce around the year. Today, the coolers 
provide a total storage for 30,000 tons of apples. One 
of the roles of the association is to encourage local 
merchants to prioritise the marketing of apples from 
the occupied Golan Heights. 
Technology development and active lobbying for wa-
ter allocations and rights were highlighted as the most 
effective measures to be developed as adaptation 
strategies. Increasing crop variety, introducing com-
puterised systems for product quality, and enhancing 
agricultural knowledge were also adaptive actions rec-
ommended during the focus group discussion. 
Golan Focus Group
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Land Purchasing in the Golan Heights
Land owners prohibit the selling of land to any indi-
vidual that does not belong and be part of the com-
munity of the five villages of the Golan Heights. The 
collective political identity has created these norms 
and rules to safeguard land grabbing by Israel. There-
fore, land has a collective value for the Syrian farmers.
Land
Land issues in the Golan Heights have a distinctive 
political character. Israel today, through zoning and 
land regulations, is limiting the expansion of Arab 
agricultural land. Cases of land confiscation are rare 
but the most obvious land control mechanism is zon-
ing and prohibiting the use of agricultural land, ac-
cording to the Israeli authorities, for security, safety 
(minefields) and ecological protection (nature re-
serves). This has impacted agriculture in the region 
and halted its expansion. Issues of social norms and 
practices of land inheritance have further divided the 
agricultural plots and made it less efficient and less 
profitable to farmers. This was discussed in the focus 
group and communal land management was suggest-
ed as a way to develop agriculture and preserve the 
land. Additionally, investment in organic agriculture 
was also recommended.
After the 1967 occupation and the abrupt settlement 
activity in the occupied Golan Heights, farmers col-
lectively began reclaiming abandoned hilly lands 
within their control. This has increased the amount 
of available land for growing fruit trees. 
Socio-Economic Factors
The individual efforts of farmers to stay on the land 
and continue farming was characterized as ‘the small 
farmer/falah’. With limited international marketing 
opportunities and hegemony of the Israeli agricultur-
al companies, farmers are facing grave economic and 
social burdens. Feelings of insecurity and continuous 
threat of residency revocation and land confiscation 
are driving many residents to pursue other jobs and 
professions in addition to or alternative to farming. 
Diversification of professions and careers was seen by 
the focus group participants as an empowering mea-
sure, as it allows farmers the ‘luxury’ of staying on 
the land without suffering from the economic bur-
den. The discussion also revolved around the impor-
tance of establishing and strengthening agriculture 
knowledge, through building an agricultural college 
in the Golan Heights, conducting feasibility stud-
ies on developing agricultural products, diversifying 
crop selection and strengthening local production 
and economy, stressing the importance of economic 
planning in a way that reflects the community needs, 
identity and political situation.
According to focus group participants, due to the 
geographical and political realities, their connection 
with the land will remain strong, especially as a source 
of income and livelihood. Land is seen as an import-
ant component of Golani identity, very evidently so 
during the 1967 war and its aftermath. Today, the 
Syrian population is being slowly used as labour force 
in Israel, furthering the estrangement between the 
people and the land. Land dispossession has also 
been evident in zoning and building plans, where ex-
pansion of building was only allowed vertically, allow-
ing the Israeli state to gain control over unused and 
uncultivated land. The Israeli policy is that of limit-
ing sovereignty of Syrian farmers over their natural 
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resources, reducing the independency of the Syrian 
population in agriculture. Today, Israeli authorities 
are in control of all water resources essential for irri-
gation, and therefore the vulnerability of the farmers 
is perceived as acute. Israeli occupational practices 
are seen as associated with a high level of coercion. 
Culture and Identity 
The focus group participants stressed the social bonds 
deriving from the land– from a political/economical/
social point of view, heightened by their communities’ 
isolation from the rest of the world. Today financial 
responsibilities and the economic costs burdening 
farmers are seen as encouraging younger generations 
to abandon the land. The identity was represented as 
‘Syrian Arab’ – an identity strengthened through at-
tachment and ‘steadfastness’ (sumud) on the land. This 
identity is seen as challenged by political turmoil and 
also globalisation. There was a concern relayed over 
whether the new generation will maintain its ‘Syrian 
Arab’ identity due to the current situation in Syria. 
The Golan Heights Syrian inhabitants’ identity today 
has been reshaped after decades of dis-attachment 
from Syria and being under occupation. Staying on the 
land and belonging to it has been an agreed definition 
between the participants. As one participant high-
lighted, ‘Outside of Golan we have no identity’. The 
notion stated was that of belonging to ‘humanity’ rath-
er than a nation. Remnants of a society torn by forced 
expulsion; identity preservation becomes a need 
in light of existential threat by the occupation. The 
Golan villages have formed a new society (forced) in 
terms of facilities, labor market, economics (language, 
culture) that in its core has identity as awareness be-
yond national and ethnic borders. Another participant 
stated that: ‘We are a community shattered in our val-
ues due to abandoning the simple traditional farmers’ 
life and not really reaching the modern urban lifestyle 
and mentality, therefore being at loss’. 
‘Pre-Nation State’ Collective Action
In 1943, local residents of Majdal Shams constructed 
water channels from Ein El Tufaha spring to houses of 
Majdal Shams and also constructed a sabeel (public 
tap) for people who did not benefit from the project due 
to lack of money. This was before the independence 
of Syria, during the French mandate. In the years be-
tween 1955 and 1967, residents collectively construct-
ed water channels on Al Marj agricultural land.
Also, participants discussed that there is a sense of 
an emerging post-nationalist identity and a strong 
return to sectarianism (religious or tribal). This is 
an indicator of the social fragility of the Syrian Arab 
communities of the occupied Golan Heights. How-
ever, land remains key to collective identity. Today, 
it is still considered inconceivable to buy land or be 
‘landless’ as this will further alienate the individual 
from belonging to the community. Israeli education 
systems and curriculum are not seen as helping as 
they are designed to erode the Arab identity and es-
tablish a new sectarian identity for the Druze.
The identity spirit was highest during annexation 
and the forced citizenship which the Golan Heights 
residents refused. Attachment to the land is citizen-
ship issue for the Golan Heights. In the 1950s, the 
inhabitants of the Syrian land began using modern 
agricultural techniques. Before 1950 and the estab-
lishment of a Syrian state and the introduction of 
modern agriculture, Majdal Shams residents relied 
on collective work and a more organic relationship 
with the land.
Israel, in its annexation of the Golan Heights, was 
seen by the focus group as creating facts on the 
ground that negatively impacts the Syrian inhab-
itants of the Golan Heights and weakening their 
farming practices. With its settlement buildings and 
transfer of its citizens to occupied land and the il-
legal use of its natural resources, Israel is breaching 
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international law. In addition, the Israeli authorities 
are limiting the use of space, whether to meet the 
natural expansion of the villages’ population or the 
use of land for agriculture. 
Israeli occupation was seen as working on two lev-
els; on one level it is working on bettering its image 
to the international community. Second, the occu-
pation was seen as targeting the economic destruc-
tion of the Syrian inhabitants’ agriculture. Today, 
agricultural settlements are granted large amounts of 
land and water to grow apples and cherry while local 
Syrian farmers are marginalised and disempowered. 
When the Syrian Arab farmers collectively arranged 
the collection of rainwater and assisted farmers with 
the move from rain-fed to irrigated techniques, the 
Israeli authority proposed water purchasing of water 
to the Syrian farmers. Therefore, profit was being 
made by the authority as a first priority and not the 
actual development of the agricultural sector in the 
Golan Heights. Additionally, this has increased the 
stress on the new generation to stay in farming, as it 
has become economically not feasible. 
Communal Resilience 
The Syrian inhabitants of the Golan Heights have a 
long history of communal activism in managing and 
sustaining their communities. Since the occupation, 
this has been severely weakened in agriculture, econ-
omy and social structures. Nevertheless, the cases 
presented in the focus group discussion emphasized 
the crucial aspect of communal work. Communal and 
collective work was identified as the most effective 
measure of sustaining a viable community that is fac-
ing isolation, neglect and systematic weakening. Al-
though the participants believed that many measures 
of mitigation and adaptation must be done within an 
overarching governmental involvement and invest-
ment, it was stated that all community members must 
be involved in planning, executing and maintaining. 
The efforts of the Syrian communities should, it was 
argued, be invested to reduce the dependency on Is-
rael through adaptation measures decided on locally 
and collectively. The need to strengthen diversifica-
tion of role and use of land is a collective endeavour 
to make agriculture in the occupied Golan Heights a 
profitable venture.
Farmers associations have been praised as a strategy 
to preserve the land and the interest in staying on it 
and cultivate it for future generations. The farmers’ 
association role is focused on mobilising the residents 
of the Golan Heights to negotiate and put pressure 
on the Israeli authorities in charge of water supply 
and marketing. Donor aid involvement was also high-
lighted as a factor for preserving the local bonds and 
communal work but also as potentially weakening 
community development due to lack of a structured 
vision. The lack of international community pres-
ence in the Golan was highlighted as a contributor 
to Israel not respecting the economic, political and 
human rights of the Syrian farmers. 
Identity is seen a driving force for enhancing the 
resilience of the community, as land ownership and 
farming is seen both as an investment for increasing 
the value of the land and even more a key symbolic 
resource for identity and belonging of the Syrian pop-
ulation in the occupied Golan Heights. 
Southern Lebanon: Vulnerability and Adaptive Capacity 
Assessment
Mohammed Khawlie (lead author) and Michael Mason
The Lebanese scoping survey (504 responses) and 
project-wide questionnaire survey (296 responses) 
both addressed determinants of vulnerability and 
adaptive capacity in the Hasbani study area. Both 
surveys considered climate vulnerability across the 
three regional districts of the Hasbani Basin - Has-
baya, Merjayoun, Rachaya, although the scoping sur-
vey covered urban and rural settlements while the 
project-wide survey focused on farming households 
in rural communities. As with the other study areas, a 
focus group was conducted to discuss the major find-
ings from the main survey and explore in detail the 
implications of (post)occupation on rural livelihoods 
and communities.
Determinants of Climate Vulnerability
Biophysical Determinants
In the scoping survey only 35% of respondents 
claimed to have knowledge about climate change 
and, when questioned about the principal sourc-
es of water scarcity, less than 1% attributed this to 
environmental variability. For the project-wide ru-
ral survey, there was a much greater awareness of 
climate change. Over at least the past ten years, 
97% of respondents had noticed increasing mean 
temperatures, although responses to annual mean 
rainfall changes were much less clear-cut: 37% of re-
spondents had noticed a decrease in mean rainfall, 
but 51% reported an increase. More than half the 
sampled farming households reported no significant 
change in runoff or spring flow, though almost a quar-
ter noted a decrease in runoff (24.7%) and spring flow 
(22%). Of observed changes in temperature and rain, 
88% respondents attributed these to climate change 
rather than climate variability. Over three quarters 
(77.7%) of the respondents stated that experienced 
climate changes (above all the temperature increase) 
had not had an effect on their agricultural production, 
with a minority reporting either a moderate (12.2%) 
or extreme (1%) negative effect.
Conflict-Related Determinants
In the scoping survey (in which just over 10% of re-
spondents had agriculture-related employment), 
most respondents reported that the Israeli occupa-
tion had either moderately (51.2%) or badly (19%) 
affected their economic livelihoods, although bodily 
and health-related insecurity was seen as far more 
stressful than economic insecurity. As revealed by 
the survey, the inhabitants of southern Lebanon 
experience a (post)occupation setting of political 
instability and human insecurity. Despite the 2000 
withdrawal of the Israeli army and the UN-bro-
kered ceasefire to the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war, 
conflict-related threats are ongoing (see Chapter 6 
above). Regular Israeli surveillance and military in-
cursions into southern Lebanese territory, described 
by the respondents as outside intervention or mili-
tary interference (‘tadakhol ’), take place even though 
UNIFIL forces are charged with confirming the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces and assisting the Govern-
ment of Lebanon to exercise its effective authority 
in the area. In a scoping survey question on damage 
attributed to the 1978-2000 occupation regime, di-
rect damage to water infrastructure was seen as sig-
nificant by 13% of the sampled population, although 
the harm directly inflicted on people was regarded as 
more serious (73% respondents).
The project-wide survey in southern Lebanon ad-
dressed the impacts on farming households of Israe-
li military actions up to the present day. Reflecting 
the findings of the scoping survey, just over half the 
respondents (50.7%) stated that the main impact 
of Israeli military actions (past and present) was on 
lives rather than farming livelihoods; in particular, 
the social instability, fear and personal/family insecu-
rity resulting from conflict-related conditions. Over a 
quarter did identify effects on farming livelihoods as 
the main impact of Israeli military actions, whether 
as a result of production losses (21.6%), damage to 
ecosystem services (4.1%), and lack of access to lands 
because of military barriers and installations (2.7%). 
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In a question asking respondents to state the years 
in which farming production was damaged by war 
conditions (encompassing all belligerents), 58% re-
spondents reported damage in 1982 (when Israel in-
vaded southern Lebanon) and 22% reported damage 
during 2006 (Israel-Lebanon conflict). In no other 
years was direct damage noted as significant, although 
productive farming capacity was significantly weak-
ened during the military occupation and following 
the 2006 war. And, according to the survey, ongoing 
threats of Israeli military action still significantly im-
pact on the agricultural decision-making of farmers in 
the Hasbani Basin.
From questions on water availability (covering both 
domestic and economic use) in the scoping survey, 
a third (32.5%) of respondents stated that the main 
cause of their vulnerability to water scarcity was Israeli 
(post)occupational practices. Interestingly, a greater 
proportion of 36.5% stated that their water vulnerabil-
ity was mainly a result of domestic operational failings 
in water allocation and distribution. This figure likely 
reflects perceptions of urban dwellers on water allo-
cation and management failings. In the project-wide 
questionnaire survey applied exclusively to rural com-
munities, 57% of respondents attributed decreasing 
water availability to the direct and indirect effects of 
Israeli (post)occupational practices. 
Almost all the sampled population of rural house-
holds depend on rain for their agricultural water 
needs, but find this is not enough: the most import-
ant supplementary sources are (in decreasing order 
of significance) water purchased from tankers, mu-
nicipal supplied water, spring water, reservoirs and 
private wells. Poorer farmers are more dependent on 
water supplies from tankers and springs. The threat 
and use of military force by Israel is seen to relate di-
rectly to the control of water resources in the region. 
Lebanese extraction of water from the Hasbani Basin 
was reduced during the occupation then increased 
following the 2000 Israeli withdrawal, partly as a re-
sult of a new pumping station at the Wazzani springs 
near Ghajar. Designed for local domestic consump-
tion, this pumping station was declared by Israel to 
be a direct threat to its security and was subsequent-
ly damaged by Israeli forces during the 2006 war. To 
avoid confrontation with Israel, the Lebanese govern-
ment put on hold further water pumping plans in the 
region (UN-ESCWA and BGR 2013: 195; Zeitoun et 
al. 2013: 95). The respondents to the main survey 
reported that they do not drill for water near the bor-
der (no nearer than 15 km in some locations) because 
of a perceived threat of Israeli military action against 
any new water infrastructure.
Upper Hasbani:  
oleander in dry river bed
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Adaptive Capacity
The project-wide survey of rural households revealed 
the independent, small-scale nature of farming in 
the Hasbani Basin. Of the 294 respondents, most 
described themselves as the land owner (90.5%) or 
co-owner (5.1%), with only self-reported as tenant 
farmers (3.7%) or co-tenants (7%); and most land-
holdings were reported as small - 56.8% from 1-4 du-
nums and 36.8% from 6-15 dunums. Only 7% were 
greater than 50 dunums. On average, households had 
five family members, 30 years’ farming experience 
and had one additional individual to work on the 
land. Most farming households followed multi-culti-
vation with a preference for fruit crops - cherries, ap-
ples and bananas - and also significant production of 
flowers. Just over half (52%) of respondents judged 
their economic conditions to be improving over the 
last 20 years, while three-quarters (75%) also stated 
that conditions had improved over the last 10 years, 
i.e. since the 2006 war.
Although the economic conditions for farming were 
judged to be improving since the occupation and 
most recent conflict, most of the Lebanese farmers 
surveyed stated that climate change (88%) and Is-
raeli military/security practices (57%) were respon-
sible for negative impacts on water requirements for 
agriculture (including climate-induced higher crop 
water requirements from increasing temperatures). 
As noted above, over three-quarters (78%) of respon-
dents did not think that these changing environmen-
tal conditions had yet had a significant effect on their 
production. Yet, as shown below in Table 9.1, 95% of 
farmers still felt that there was a need for immediate 
action to cope with these environmental challenges. 
Table 9.1 lists the suggestions made, of which the 
most popular is government support for the agricul-
tural sector.
Table 9.1: Perceived Need for Coping Action and Suggested Policy Responses
Do you think there is a need for action to be taken to cope with these changes? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid 0 13 4.4 4.4 4.4
Yes 282 95.3 95.3 99.7
No 1 0.3 0.3 100.0
Total 296 100.0 100.0
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Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid 17 5.7 5.7 5.7
Dams and improving water 41 13.9 13.9 19.6
Government supporting agriculture sec-
tor and enacting relevant legislation
143 48.3 48.3 67.9
Adaptation to climate change 2 0.7 0.7 68.6
Control pollution 59 19.9 19.9 88.5
Secure stability and operational needs 
(fuel, electricity etc…)
27 9.1 9.1 97.6
Land reclamation 4 1.4 1.4 99.0
Agricultural advice and NGOs help 
(including agri-syndicate)
3 1.0 1.0 100.0
Total 296 100.0 100.0
If yes, elaborate: 
Table 9.2 summarises the existing practices al-
ready utilised by the farming households to cope 
with changing environmental conditions: the most 
popular are rainwater harvesting (70.3%), changing 
crop selection (20.3%) and greenhouse cultivation 
(17.9%) and changing irrigation type (10.5%).
On the specific question of (longer-term) adaptation 
to climate change (Table 9.3), almost two-thirds of 
survey respondents favoured land reclamation, sug-
gesting a perception of a significant amount of rural 
land unavailable or otherwise not used. The extent 
to which security-related reasons (e.g. threats of Is-
raeli action, closed areas due to minefields) inform 
this perception of non-use was explored in the later 
focus group (see 9.3 below). 
16% of respondents proposed improving and sup-
porting irrigation infrastructure as the only explicit 
adaptation option for increasing water availability. It 
is also noteworthy that government support (8.1%) is 
less important as a source of climate adaptation than 
with the coping action suggestions listed in Table 9.1.
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Table 9.2: Use of Coping Practices by Farming Households
Assess the extent to which you utilise the following pratices:
Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely Never Missing  
System
Rainwater harvesting 208 72 14 2 0 0
% 70.3 24.3 4.7 0.7 0.0 0.0
Changing crop selection 
(seasonal shifwt)
60 159 67 7 3 0
% 20.3 53.7 22.6 2.4 1.0 0.0
Changing of crop to 
livestock or vice versa
36 88 131 30 11 0
% 12.2 29.7 44.3 10.1 3.7 0.0
Reducing number of 
livestock
30 95 115 47 9 0
% 10.1 32.1 38.9 15.9 3.0 0.0
Greenhouse cultivation 53 86 60 49 48 0
% 17.9 29.1 20.3 16.6 16.2 0.0
Changing type of irri-
gation
47 96 88 48 17 0
% 15.9 32.4 29.7 16.2 5.7 0.0
Increasing amount of 
irrigation
31 125 73 52 15 0
% 10.5 42.2 24.7 17.6 5.1 0.0
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Regression analysis of the Lebanese data showed 
perceived changes in mean temperature as the most 
likely environmental determinant for the adoption of 
coping practices (notably greenhouse cultivation, re-
duced number of livestock, buying insurance and the 
use of remittances from family members). Physical 
damage to agricultural assets from (post)occupation-
al measures – military and security practices – signifi-
cantly reduces the propensity to adopt most coping 
practices (greenhouse cultivation, irrigation, buying 
Table 9.3: Proposed Climate Change Adaptation Measures 
What type of solutions would you propose to address climate change and the problems it has lead to or 
may lead to in the future?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid 4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Government support social stability and 
africultural sctor
24 8.1 8.1 9.5
Improve and support irrigation water 
sources, agricultural roads and opera-
tional needs (electricity, fuel etc…)
47 15.9 15.9 25.3
Environmental approaches including 
green cover to face climate change
10 3.4 3.4 28.7
Financial needs, materials and securing 
market
19 6.4 6.4 35.1
Agricultural land, reclamation and sup-
port farmers’ needs
189 63.9 63.9 99.0
Effective, fair policies 3 1.0 1.0 100.0
Total 296 100.0 100.0
of insurance) aside from rainwater harvesting, live-
stock reduction and the abandonment of land. The 
latter can be seen as ‘passive’ or defensive coping. 
Economic losses as a result of Israeli military and 
security actions also hamper the adoption of coping 
practices, but less so than direct physical damage to 
farming assets. This suggests that, as long as farming 
assets remain intact, farmers can adopt coping strate-
gies to reduced water availability for agriculture. 
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South Lebanon Focus Group
The focus group workshop was held on September 
27, 2013, at the Snoubra Hotel in a pine forest over-
looking Hasbaya, South Lebanon. The discussion 
was attended by 23 participants from Hasbani Basin 
towns and villages, including farmers, members from 
municipal councils, professionals, rural cooperatives, 
and women. It was moderated by Dr Mounir Mhanna 
and Dr Safa Baydoun from Beirut Arab University.
Discussion of Questionnaire Results
The participants believed the survey covered the 
most significant aspects of biophysical and occupa-
tion-related vulnerabilities to farmers. Coverage of the 
coping mechanisms was stated to be comprehensive, 
but the missed emigration as a coping practice. Most 
participants agreed with the results on adaptation: 
some thought more emphasis should have been given 
to the drilled water wells. Others questioned the sur-
vey result that as many as a third (32%) of farmers had 
converted from agriculture to cattle herding.
On the role of government, the focus group partici-
pants found the survey results valid, but stated that 
there should have been more stress on awareness to 
reduce emigration among the youth, as well as an in-
creased role of marketing to support the farmers.
Options for Strengthening Adaptive  
Capacity
Water 
All participants agreed that there are water-related 
stresses on their agricultural livelihoods, and that 
their water availability may be affected by climate 
change (which they cannot quantify). Key measures 
to strengthen adaptive capacity related to water 
availability were proposed as:
• Water harvesting > changing crops to better suit 
less water-demanding crops through different sea-
sons > reducing agro operations and diversifying 
income sources > changing to more efficient irri-
gation (e.g. drip irrigation);
• Moving to cattle herding from cultivated crops, 
though some focus group participants did not sup-
port this;
• Spreading of knowledge to help farmers decide on 
best options, including greenhouse agriculture.
Land
According to the focus group participants, lands close 
to the Israeli border are now constantly under threat 
of intervention (even under UNIFIL presence) 
which makes them worthless, and once abandoned, 
leads to land degradation. Lands close to or at wa-
ter sources of Hasbani/Wazzani are also under con-
stant monitoring by Israelis as any Lebanese opera-
tion (surface or subsurface) is taken to affect water 
quality for Israel. This security-related constraint on 
water extraction and/or distribution is seen as addi-
tional to any impact due to climate change.
Southern Lebanese Focus Group
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Key measures to strengthen adaptive capacity related 
to land availability were seen as heavily constrained 
by the practice and threat of Israeli interventions. For 
example, converting to cattle herding is not seen as 
an efficient solution in the face of Israeli intervention 
and the degradation of abandoned lands. As long as 
political conditions remain the same, the main coping 
strategy is negative; that is, trying to avoid using those 
lands prone to Israeli intervention. If political condi-
tions improve, feasible adaptive options include:
• Changing crops to reduce water consumption and 
increase drought resistance;
• Using technology to increase production, includ-
ing the controlled use of pesticides (their increas-
ing use is likely in the face of climate change);
• Improving awareness and know-how of other pro-
cedures (e.g. production & preservation technolo-
gy, climate monitoring, soil erosion control);
• Improving current land-use planning and policies.
Socio-economic
The demographic pyramid in the Hasbani Basin is a 
young, broad-based one with 31.4% under 18. The 
region witnessed an upheaval in social growth after 
the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. But 
this development also led to some far-reaching social 
changes, including: increasing urbanization; increas-
ing youth independence with a growing incidence of 
nuclear rather than extended families; a general de-
crease in family fertility; an employment shift from 
the agricultural sector (though still dominant) to-
wards services; increasing education of women; and 
increasing general services (health, education, bank-
ing); and an increasing cost of living. 
In relation to socio-economic challenges, the focus 
group recommended:
• Improving agro market access and outlets;
• Organizing socio-economic services to reach all 
equally;
• Financial support to stabilise family livelihoods in 
the face of Israeli military and security practices;
• Strengthening the work of associations, syndicates 
and NGOs as ‘pressure groups’ to improve the ag-
ricultural sector and farmers capacities;
• Enhancing agricultural policies while advancing 
focused economic plans supporting the socio-eco-
nomic status of farmers.
The Violence of (Post)Occupation
According to the focus group, the area has long his-
tory of hardships related to Israeli military practices: 
the annexation of the Chebaa Farms in the 1950’s 
(a set of agricultural settlements adjacent to Chebaa 
town); the prevention of the local community from 
fully benefitting from of the Hasbani-Wazzani wa-
ters; the occupation of parts of the region from 1967 
(Ghajar and KfarShouba Hills); total occupation from 
the 1988 until 2000; and partial occupation since 
2000 until the present. These are seen as direct im-
pacts of the aggression of occupation which affect the 
community’s daily physical operations. But there are 
also indirect effects which are more long-term – the 
creation of fear, insecurity and the absence of social 
stability – through the cumulative effect of repeated 
conflict episodes and military interventions. Many 
farming households were up-rooted them from their 
lands, leading them to abandon their farms.
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During the Israeli occupation of the area, the Israeli 
military treated the people differently according to 
their passivity or resistance. Those on the passive 
side were sometimes even allowed to work on Israeli 
lands and gain new knowledge in agro practices. Yet, 
at the same time, this caused internal social divisions 
amongst the population in southern Lebanon, which 
have persisted since 2000.
After liberation the community did not feel the ‘gen-
erosity’ of the Lebanese Government, as the Gov-
ernment did not have enough financial and capacity 
resources to assist. Nevertheless, the return of a large 
number of people to their villages and towns was en-
couraged by moral attachment to the land, to their 
family roots, and by the private sector. The latter is 
playing a crucial role in the re-development now tak-
ing place there. But in those zones adjacent to the 
borders, a general feeling of insecurity remains.
The focus group summarised the main conflict-relat-
ed impacts over the past 20-30 years as: 
• Abandonment and degradation of agricultural land;
• Some community members have gained knowl-
edge of new technology;
• Almost total absence of the Lebanese Govern-
ment, though the rise of strong political parties;
• Driving the youth to work with reduced of edu-
cation;
• Decrease in agro-diversity and planted areas;
• Decrease in agro-professionals and working labor;
• Lands falling in the hands of ‘feudal lords’, pre-
venting agricultural exploitation.
The main Israeli military-security practices that have 
continued since 2000 are: 
• Shelling, bombarding, sniping, kidnapping and 
general ‘no-peace’ conditions;
• A general absence of stability, security, in addition 
to daily barriers and check points;
• Daily operational practices imposing feelings of 
fear, leading to emigration.
For the focus group, this more recent ‘partial occu-
pation’ continues to negatively affect farming liveli-
hoods, through:
• Barriers, check points, interventions … reduced 
daily agro practices and reduced market access;
• Feelings of insecurity and fear prevented farmer 
attending his agro practices, therefore abandoning 
land and its degradation;
• Israeli interference in water exploitation, continu-
ing to oppose development projects affecting/uti-
lizing the Hasbani/Wazzani water sources;
• Declining water quality for the agricultural sector 
(minimal effects were noted in water quantities, 
though any such reductions are masked by the 
general decline in the agricultural sector, the gen-
eral abundance of the area with water, and mini-
mal community monitoring of water levels in the 
Hasbani watershed).
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Culture and Identity
The participants in the focus group discussed their 
valuation of land, agricultural practices and what it 
means, culturally, for farmers to stay on their lands. 
In response to the question ‘why remain on the land?’ 
they noted:
• Clinging to national identity and challenging the 
occupation;
• Clinging to land as an existential entity;
• Clinging to Arab identity;
• A challenge to forces for emigration.
And the choice of farming livelihoods was attributed to:
• Shortage of other livelihood choices;
• Limited financial resources;
• The identity-bestowing nature of the land;
• Agricultural practices as an inherent part of rural 
culture;
• Feelings of socio-economic security from land 
ownership;
• Cultural communal identity in practicing agriculture;
• The agricultural culture inherently clings to the 
land.
Israeli security and military practices were seen to 
intensify this cultural valuation of the land and its 
identity-bestowing character, prompting:
• A stronger clinging to national identity;
• Creation of a spirit of resistance making defending 
the land a patriotic must by itself.
Resistance therefore was associated with clinging to 
rural livelihoods:
• By a commitment to land development, securing 
daily living needs and maintaining the land, espe-
cially as a community;
• By carrying to focus on agricultural practice;
• By staying on the land (not emigrating, even to get 
higher education).
As discussed by focus group participants, there was 
a gendered pattern to this commitment to rural 
livelihoods. Women’s agricultural roles are seen as 
essential, because women constitute a high propor-
tion of the working labour and contribute to family 
income. Although sometimes this agricultural work 
is exploitative of women, it is more generally seen as 
strengthening their social position from its social and 
economic value. 
For the focus group participants, climate change 
was seen as a less important constraint of farming 
livelihoods than (post)occupation, because it is not 
noticed in a direct way, and therefore, as yet, is not 
a major concern. Where it is slightly noticed, some 
participants believed that ‘nature’ itself will adapt. 
However, there was agreement with the survey find-
ings that government should do more to assist farm-
ing households adapt to projected climate-related 
stresses to agricultural production, notably by sup-
porting marketing access, improving awareness of 
climate change and its potential impacts, improving 
agricultural extension activities and implementing 
other policies that would reduce the water–related 
vulnerability of agricultural communities.
Conclusions
Key Findings
This study investigates the climate-related vulner-
abilities of agricultural communities in (post)occu-
pation environments. Following the IPCC (2012: 
5), vulnerability is understood as the propensity or 
predisposition to be adversely affected by hazards 
or stresses, where climatic stresses are mediated 
by social vulnerabilities. Military occupation by for-
eign armed forces comprises an exceptional but un-
der-researched condition of social vulnerability to 
climate-related stresses. We define (post)occupation 
as areas with current or historically recent experi-
ence of military occupation. The three study areas 
reflect distinct stages of occupational control within 
the same regional watershed (Jordan Basin). They 
encompass: protracted military occupation (West 
Bank), annexation (Golan Heights) and post-occupa-
tion (southern Lebanon). That the coercive control 
regime for all three areas is, or was, administered by 
the Israeli state (military or civil administration) cre-
ates a governance linkage for comparative analysis. 
While each of the three areas has distinctive charac-
teristics, this conclusion highlights key findings on 
climate vulnerability and rural livelihood choices un-
der (post)occupation. These are related to the three 
research aims of the project.
1. To identify the main determinants of climate vulner-
ability for selected rural communities under (post)oc-
cupation
Across the three study areas, farmers’ perceptions 
within the past 10-20 years of reduced water availabil-
ity, increased annual mean temperatures and a de-
layed rainy season corroborate scientific identification 
of a regional drying trend. This trend is broadly con-
sistent with scientific projections of climate change 
for the Jordan Basin, which focus on a northwards 
shift of the Mediterranean storm track, reducing an-
nual precipitation. In the Golan Heights and southern 
Lebanon, the drying trend was associated with rising 
temperatures and variable, rather than reduced, pre-
cipitation. However, in the Jordan Rift Valley/West 
Bank over 90% of surveyed farmers reported a de-
crease in average participation of more than half over 
the past decade. Climate-driven water stresses are 
potentially greatest here given that most agriculture 
is rainfed-dependent: the climatic viability of rainfed 
agriculture in the Jordan Rift Valley is threatened, 
during the course of this century, by the projected 
northwards retreat of the 200mm isohyet – the ap-
proximate ‘limit’ for rainfed agriculture (Evans 2009: 
428-30; World Bank 2012: 70-71)
However, climate stresses are perceived by farmers 
to be less important than (post)occupational condi-
tions in determining water availability. Israeli state 
practices are seen as harmful to farming livelihoods, 
e.g. prohibition and demolition of water infrastruc-
ture, land confiscation and/or restrictions, exclusive 
incentives to Israeli settlers, barriers to markets). 
Significantly, this holds even for contexts where Is-
raeli military authority no longer has formal effective 
control - the move to Israeli civilian administration 
in 1981 in the Golan Heights and the withdrawal 
of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in 2000. In 
both cases significant water supply constraints are 
attributed to Israeli control or influence, whether as 
a result of legal rules (Golan Heights) of the threat-
ened use of force across a border (southern Lebanon). 
This suggests a continuum of (post)occupational 
practices that escapes the legally self-contained idea 
of occupation – effective control of a foreign territory 
by a hostile armed force (Hague Regulations 1907, 
Article 42) – contained in international humanitarian 
law (e.g. Benvenisti 2013).
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2. To survey mechanisms for coping with differential 
water availability
Over the past two to three decades across the study 
areas, common coping practices by farmers to dif-
ferential water availability are: more rainwater har-
vesting, selection of drought-resistant crop types 
(e.g. from citrus plants to dates), reductions in live-
stock or cultivated land, and switching from flood to 
drip irrigation.
Rainwater harvesting is a preferred, low-cost coping 
practice in the three study areas, but its increased 
use is prohibited by the Israeli government both 
in the occupied Golan Heights and the Jordan Rift 
Valley (in Area C). There is more scope for chang-
ing crop selection. In the Jordan Rift Valley there 
has been a major reduction in the Arab production 
of thirsty crops (e.g. bananas, watermelon and citrus 
crops) and the loss of a summer season for crops now 
cultivated only in the winter season (e.g. eggplants, 
cauliflower and green peas). Similar crop changes and 
reduced production were also reported in the Golan 
Heights and, to a lesser extent, southern Lebanon 
(where physical water stresses are less pronounced). 
Both areas favour fruit production, though with great-
er monocultural cultivation in the Golan Heights.
The move to drip irrigation in the occupied Golan 
Heights began after Israel took over in 1967, with 
over 80% of farming households surveyed reporting 
a switch from flood to drip irrigation over the past 
5-35 years. Drip irrigation was judged to be one of 
the most effective coping mechanisms by West Bank 
farmers in the Jordan Rift Valley, though reduced wa-
ter quantity and quality mean that sometimes even 
drip irrigation cannot meet agricultural needs, and 
the cultivated area is therefore reduced. Changing 
irrigation type was less important to farming house-
holds in southern Lebanon (just over 10% cited this 
as a coping action), though post-occupation damage 
to agricultural assets is a seen as significantly reduc-
ing the propensity to switch irrigation type. 
Temporary or permanent migration is an important 
coping practice in the Jordan Rift Valley and south-
ern Lebanon, but difficult to quantify. In the Jordan 
Rift Valley, for example, farmers from Al Jiftlik and 
Al Auja have moved to less water-stressed Palestin-
ian areas to continue agriculture and also become 
wage labourers in Israeli settlements. By subjecting 
Palestinian farmers to wage labour, the economic 
feasibility and legitimacy of occupation is deepened. 
According to the southern Lebanese focus group, 
forced migration of farming households is a signifi-
cant coping practice, but there are no precise statis-
tics on these population movements: existing esti-
mates in rural areas are rendered more uncertain by 
the recent, substantial inflow of refugees from Syria. 
3. To assess the adaptive implications of farming live-
lihood strategies and rural livelihood choices under 
conditions of ‘(post)occupation’
The questionnaire survey and focus groups distin-
guished between short-term coping and long-term 
adaptation measures in the context of differential 
water availability under conditions of (post)occupa-
tion. Are current farming livelihood strategies and 
practices equipped to address additional climate 
stresses in the future?
Across the three study areas, existing independent farm-
ers’ associations are judged the most effective means for 
improving the capacity or farmers to adapt to continu-
ing water-related stresses (e.g. the ‘sharaka’ partner-
ship system in the West Bank, the collective-owned 
coolers for storing apples in the Golan Heights). This 
finding is not surprising in the context of a lack of 
support from governmental organisations, which are 
typically seen either as weak (Lebanese government 
and Palestinian Authority) or hostile (State of Isra-
el). Collective action over shared agricultural claims 
is thus an act of self-determination within a domain 
of contested sovereign authority.
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As recommended by the regional focus groups, pro-
posed adaptation measures across the three study 
areas vary according to distinctive governance con-
ditions. Each of the focus groups highlighted better 
governmental support for farmers, encompassing 
technical, economic and land supply concerns. Exist-
ing coping practices are generally seen as templates for adap-
tation subject to governmental support for their scaling up in 
response to future climate-related stresses. Yet in each area 
Israeli security and military practices are perceived to 
be the main obstacle to institutional strengthening 
of the farming sector: the maintenance and devel-
opment of farming livelihoods is severely hampered 
by exceptional governance practices which system-
atically discriminate against the affected Arab/Druze 
communities. Even if the threat of use of force is 
rarely exercised, the securitisation of land and water 
resources in the three areas undermines agricultural 
development. This is most obvious in the occupied 
Golan Heights and Jordan Rift Valley, where intensi-
fying and creeping annexation in under way; but the 
pervasive risk of violence faced by Lebanese farmers 
in the south-eastern borderlands of the Hasbani Ba-
sin is as debilitating for agricultural livelihoods.
Under conditions of (post)occupation, farming live-
lihoods in the three study areas are self-represent-
ed as oppositional to Israeli authority and influence, 
suggesting shared social identity as a source of livelihood 
resilience. Farming acquires political subjectivity as 
‘staying on the land’, whether celebrating the small 
farmer (falah) in the occupied Golan Heights or ‘striv-
ing forward’ (jihad) in the Jordan Rift Valley. Both in 
the West Bank and Golan case studies, a common 
referent in the field survey and focus groups was the 
concept of sumud (‘steadfastness’) developed first 
in a Palestinian political context as a non-violent 
response to Israeli military-occupational practices. 
Moral attachment to the land therefore underpins 
livelihood choices that may be judged by third parties 
as economically ‘irrational’ but, from a participant 
perspective, are necessary for political resistance to 
a sovereign actor perceived as hostile.
Finding on hypothesis
The working hypothesis informing the study is that:
The coping mechanisms used by farming households exposed 
to differential water availability under (post)occupation neg-
atively affect their capacity to adapt to additional climate 
stresses. 
This hypothesis is falsified in the sense that current 
coping mechanisms by themselves do not negatively af-
fect the capacity of farmers to adapt to additional cli-
mate stresses. In fact, the main coping strategies by 
farmers in the three study areas generally enhance the 
capacity to adapt to enduring climate stresses (e.g. 
growing use if drip irrigation in the Golan Heights 
and West Bank; shift to olive trees in the Hasbani Ba-
sin, southern Lebanon). However, (post)occupation-
al practices associated with Israeli military-security 
actors are seen by Arab farmers as negatively affect-
ing their capacity to adapt to these added biophysical 
stresses. A qualified version of the hypothesis, treat-
ing (post)occupation as the independent variable, 
is supported by the research; that is: (post)occupation 
negatively affects the capacity of farmers to adapt to climate 
stresses. However, this hypothesis would need to be 
systematically examined more directly.
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Policy Implications 
In its contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of 
the IPCC, Working Group II (Impacts, Adaptation 
and Vulnerability) identifies, for poorer farmers in 
semi-arid regions, a high risk of loss of rural liveli-
hoods and income in coming decades due to insuf-
ficient water availability and reduced agricultural 
productivity (IPCC 2014: 12). At the same time it 
recognises that there are large uncertainties about 
future vulnerability to climate change in the light 
of complex interactions between human and natu-
ral systems. Effective adaptation to climate change 
is seen as context specific, with decision-makers 
encouraged first to focus on reducing vulnerability 
and exposure to prevent climate vulnerability (IPCC 
2014: 22).
The research findings of this project reveal high vul-
nerability to the differential availability and quality 
of agricultural water: the sustainability of rural live-
lihoods in all three study areas is threatened by the 
lack of predictable and/or affordable access to suffi-
cient water. A significant part of this differential wa-
ter availability can be attributed to climate stresses. 
As noted above, the drying trend over the past two 
decades reported by most of the surveyed farmers 
accords with climate observations and is projected 
by climate scientists to continue. Whether or not 
increased temperatures and more variable/reduced 
participation are the result of climate variability or 
change, communities across the Jordan Basin faced 
particularly dry conditions over the 2013-14 winter 
season: UNICEF forecast an impending drought for 
Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, intensified in its effects 
by massive population displacement and social dis-
ruption as a result of the conflict in Syria (UNICEF 
2014). A focus on current climate stresses can nev-
ertheless displace attention from long-term de-
mographic growth and urbanisation in the Jordan 
Basin. According to a recent inventory of regional 
water sources, the intensification of water use from 
socio-economic development may outweigh any ef-
fects caused by climate change (ESCWA-BGR Co-
operation Project 2013: 213). Thus far, there is 
insufficient collection and dissemination of water 
resource use data to allow confident assessments of 
the factors driving changes in water availability and 
quality across the Jordan Basin. Given the political 
sensitivity of much national data on water use, ba-
sin-wide scientific coordination on the collection and analysis 
of regional meteorological and hydrological information can 
facilitate technical improvements in assessing shared (climatic 
and non-climatic) impacts on water resources.
Across the three study areas in the Jordan Basin, this 
research project highlighted the multiple means by 
which farmers, who choose to stay on the land, are 
coping with differential water availability. Some of 
these coping strategies (e.g. selection of drought-re-
sistance crop types and a shift to drip irrigation) 
already reflect adaptive responses to enduring re-
ductions in water availability, indicating some re-
silience in the face of climate-related water stress-
es. However, the physical scarcity and/or poor quality of 
agricultural water in the study areas is, according to those 
surveyed, caused above all by conditions of (post)occupation. 
Through the empirical lens of this study, (post) oc-
cupation describes a state of exceptional governance 
in which either: (i) the sovereign actor (Israel), as oc-
cupying power, systematically discriminates against 
Arab/Druze farmers concerning the allocation and 
management of agricultural water (West Bank, occu-
pied Golan Heights); or (ii) a weak sovereign actor 
(Lebanon), unable to control the means of violence 
within its southern borderlands, struggles effective-
ly to manage or develop agricultural water resources 
(Hasbani Basin). Policy recommendations for ‘good 
water governance’ blind to these geopolitical realities 
are of little practical use, especially those increasing 
dependence on state entities. Internal and external 
support for institutional strengthening in water management 
is best targeted at supporting the independent farmers’ as-
sociations which, in each of the study areas, have developed 
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autonomous, bottom-up capacity for adapting to differential 
water availability. Such support could encompass not 
only requested technical and financial assistance, but 
also strengthening the legal infrastructure of these 
civil society organisations in the midst of difficult, 
even hostile, governance environments.
The international community has a dismal record ad-
dressing the (post)occupational roots of differential 
water availability in the Jordan Basin, most obviously 
in regard to the occupied Palestinian territory but no 
less applicable to the occupied Golan Heights and 
the post-occupational legacy of water insecurity in 
southern Lebanon. 
Despite several bilateral agreements featuring trans-
boundary flows in the basin (e.g. 1994 Israel-Jordan 
Treaty of Peace and the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian In-
terim Agreement (Oslo II)), regional political conflict 
and Israeli occupational practices mean that there is 
still little prospect of a basin-wide agreement on wa-
ter (ESCWA-BGR Cooperation Project 2013: 213). 
This is in spite of technical opportunities for posi-
tive-sum cooperation provided by the development 
of ‘new water’ (notably the substantial expansion of 
Israeli desalination capacity) and more efficient wa-
ter management (Phillips 2012). 
The chronic securitisation of water in the basin re-
flects of course wider territorial and ideological dis-
putes over the region in which external powers are 
intimately involved. Their broader geopolitical mo-
tives and differences account for diplomatic inter-
ventions over water management preoccupied more 
with conflict management than conflict resolution, 
leaving in place sharp asymmetries in the control 
of water resources (Zeitoun et al. 2013). This has 
perpetuated underlying grievances over differential 
water availability in which the basin ‘hegemon’ (Is-
rael) dictates the terms of engagement over future 
(national) water needs. There is a danger that the 
framing of regional water availability in terms of cli-
mate vulnerability displaces necessary political-legal 
analysis in favour of a technical-managerial discourse 
focused on adaptation within prevailing structures 
of water allocation and control (Messerschmid 2012; 
Mason 2013). 
An examination of the water rights and needs of af-
fected communities should be the baseline for donor 
interventions seeking to address climate and water 
insecurity under (post)occupation in the Jordan Ba-
sin. International actors concerned with reducing the ‘climate 
vulnerability’ of small-scale farming communities (and other 
marginal groups) in the (post)occupied regions of the Jordan 
Basin must respect the rule of international law – interna-
tional humanitarian law, international water law, and inter-
national human rights law. 
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